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Abstract 
   This thesis aims to generate an understanding on entrepreneurial finance in Egypt. 
Furthermore it explores the opportunities for a venture capital industry as a promising 
tool in entrepreneurial finance. As one of the MENA region‟s emerging economies, 
Egypt is facing economic challenges and high unemployment rates. The Arab spring 
uprisings added to the pressures upon the economy of Egypt; however, it managed to 
ignite an entrepreneurial spark among the youth population. Access to finance is an 
evident hurdle facing entrepreneurship in Egypt. Thus promoting entrepreneurial 
finance as a growth engine in anticipation to overcome unemployment and slow rates 
of start-ups might be a plausible solution. Through utilising an institutional theory 
lens and its institutional determinants, regulatory, normative, and cognitive forces, 
were found useful to analyse the current entrepreneurial finance environment. 
     This research is an exploratory research; it takes into account both the supply side 
and demand side of entrepreneurial finance in Egypt. It adopts a qualitative approach 
for in-depth understanding of the domain and a grounded approach in regard to data 
gathering for its limited availability on the subject taking the form of a naturalistic 
enquiry. In doing so it follows an inductive approach to understand the interaction 
among the supply and demand of finance and the determinants shaping it. This thesis 
built on secondary data supplied by current research and reports and the primary 
research conducted via in-depth interviews and participant observations and analysed 
it from an institutional perspective.  
     According to the findings of this research, it was plausible to argue that the 
regulatory pillar was held most accountable for the under development of 
entrepreneurial finance in Egypt. The normative and cognitive pillars both have 
supportive and inhibiting factors. However, the overall effect of normative and 
cognitive pillars could be positive if policy makers were able to factor in the cultural 
and normative forces in policies promoting entrepreneurial finance. The thesis further 
suggests policy recommendations to enhance entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial 
finance, and a vivid venture capital industry in Egypt. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
     The perception of entrepreneurship has changed over the last three decades; it has 
become widely appreciated and perhaps most valued for employment creation (Carter 
and Jones-Evans, 2006). During the last fifteen years a large volume of research has 
addressed this subject in business schools and among practitioners promoting 
entrepreneurship both academically and practically (Eid, 2006). It is widely 
demonstrated that entrepreneurship and small businesses contribute to economic 
growth (Wennekers and Thurik, 1999; Audretsch, 2002; Carree, Van Stel, Thurik, and 
Wennekers, 2002; Acs and Virgill, 2010) through job creation (Reynolds, 2012; 
Fritsch, 2013) and knowledge spill-overs (Audretsch, Keilbach, and Lehmann, 2006). 
However, their growth potential was found to be limited by scarce access to external 
finance (Becchetti and Trovato, 2002), and thus holds back innovation and growth 
(Hyytinen and Toivanen, 2005).  SMEs face higher constraints in accessing external 
finance than large corporations (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006), hence the topic of 
SME access to external finance is of high importance to both academics and policy 
makers in both developed and developing countries (Berger and Udell, 2006). The 
topic of entrepreneurial finance is of growing interest to entrepreneurship in general 
and the financial sectors all over the world (Denis, 2004). How and why entrepreneurs 
finance their businesses: whether internally via self-finance and bootstrapping (Bhidé, 
1992; Winborg and Landstrom, 2001; Ebben and Johnson, 2006; Lam 2010) or 
externally via debt or equity became the interest of many researchers (Berger and 
Udell, 1998; Hamilton and Fox, 1998; Cassar, 2004; De Bettignies and Brander, 
2007). Furthermore, researchers explored the different tools for entrepreneurial 
financing such as the fields of angel financing (Lerner, 1998; Mason, 2007; 
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Schwienbacher, 2007; Fairchild, 2011; Kerr, Lerner and Schoar, 2014), most 
frequently venture capital (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; Fried and Hisrich, 1988; 
Gorman and Sahlman,1989; Norton, 1996; Amit, Brander and Zott, 1998; Gompers 
and Lerner, 1999; 2001), and the most recent crowdfunding (Lambert and 
Schwienbacher, 2010; Schwienbacher and Larralde, 2010; Ordanini, Miceli, Pizzetti, 
and Parasuraman, 2011; Belleflamme, Lambert, and Schwienbacher, 2013) as primary 
sources for entrepreneurial finance.  
       In fact, the venture capital (VC) industry has become a worldwide phenomenon 
in the financial markets and developed to be a significant provider of capital to small 
and young firms which cannot raise capital elsewhere (Gompers and Lerner, 2001). 
Thus, it remains an essential financing vehicle for entrepreneurs especially in the high 
technology sector (Dossani and Kenney, 2002). According to Jeng and Wells, the VC 
industry might be an influential component for a nation's economic growth through 
commercialising technological innovation (2000). They specified the role of the VC 
industry together with the Silicon Valley in the United States (US) as a clear example 
of such benefit. Salehizadeh (2004) argued that the next "logical group" to gain from 
the VC industry is the emerging markets by increasing the VC investments in those 
countries and eventually improving their economic status. With great enthusiasm 
towards venture capital, many developed countries tried to replicate the model of the 
successful US and United Kingdom (UK) approaches resulting in a few success 
stories (Lerner, 2009). In addition, countries in transitional and emerging economies 
sought after synthesising the environment for creating and stimulating an indigenous 
venture capital industry and furthermore, attracting foreign VC firms (Wright, Pruthi, 
and Lockett 2005b; Bruton, Fried, and Manigart, 2005; Lerner, 2009). 
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1.2 Motives of the Study 
    The growing interest in entrepreneurship worldwide, in addition to its role on 
economic growth (Wennekers and Thurik, 1999; Audretsch, 2002; Carree et al., 2002; 
Acs and Virgill, 2010) and job creation (Reynolds, 2012; Fritsch, 2013) was an 
important motive for this study. The researcher was prompted to explore how Egypt 
could benefit from its youth and potential entrepreneurs through an understanding of 
the role of entrepreneurial finance in supporting entrepreneurship and innovation. 
Thereby, determining the current options for entrepreneurs in Egypt in financing their 
ventures and the prospect for a venture capital industry in Egypt was the foremost 
motive for this study. In so doing, to understand the reasons and determinants within 
the current situation while making recommendations to develop the domain of 
entrepreneurial finance in Egypt. 
    In 2013, Egypt‟s population was over 82 million. The Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) growth was 6.8% in 2006, reached 7% in 2007 and 2008, then declined to 5% 
in 2009 and 2010, and further declined to 2% in 2011, 2012, and 2013 after the 
January revolution. The GDP doubled from 2007 from approx. 130 billion USD to 
257 billion USD in 2012 and reaching 272 billion in 2013. Yet, the Gross National 
Income (GNI) per capita (Atlas method) was 1,390 USD in 2006 and reached 2,980 in 
2012, and 3,140 in 2013 with problems of poverty escalating from 19.6% of 
population under poverty line in 2005 to a staggering 25% in 2011, high 
unemployment (approx. 10%), and high inflation rates reaching 7.6% in 2006 and 
reaching over 10% in 2011 and 12% in 2012 (World Bank, 2007; 2013; 2015).  
    Escalating unemployment and the increasing need for job creation has long been 
the biggest challenge facing the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) including 
Egypt (Youssef, 2004). Job creation is the first priority to MENA region and the 
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situation is expected to worsen with the current political and economic instability 
(O‟Sullivan, Rey, and Galvez, 2011). The combination of poverty and unemployment 
triggered the Arab spring uprising that started in late 2010 in Tunisia, followed by 
Egypt in January 2011, and then Libya, Yemen, and Syria. Those populous uprisings 
were also against dictatorship, corruption, and police brutality; however, a life with 
dignity away from the shame of poverty and unemployment was paramount. The 
Arab spring, that had overthrown most of the state regimes at that time, added to the 
economic burdens and the need for major economic and political reforms (O‟Sullivan 
et. al., 2011). Foreign direct investment (FDI) and tourism were the most affected in 
Egypt (O‟Sullivan et. al., 2011). Worth to mention, the young people of the countries 
that witnessed the uprisings were the main foundation and contributor to their success. 
The number of people between the age of 15 to 24 in MENA was nearly 90 million in 
2010 with half of the total population under the age of 25 (Roudi, 2010). However, 
youth unemployment reached as high as 50% in Palestinian territories, 30% in Saudi 
Arabia and 25% in Jordan and Egypt (O‟Sullivan et. al., 2011). The large youth 
population of the region could be considered as an economic opportunity if it were 
well utilised and the youth was properly educated and ready for the job market 
(Roudi, 2010). Nevertheless, the challenge lies in issues of unemployment, 
underemployment, female unemployment (Gender gap), brain drain, and increasing 
cost of livings that adds to the burdens of the youth of the region (Roudi, 2010).  
     In the MENA region, unemployment is even high among the highly educated; 
worth to mention, 70% of non-agricultural employment in Egypt is in the private 
sector (O‟Sullivan et. al., 2011). According to Veganzones-Varoudakis (2006), prior 
to the 1990s education in MENA was directed towards preparing youth to state jobs, 
and therefore they were not ready for the private sector job market. This hampered the 
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economic growth of the region and caused lower productivity levels compared to 
other developing countries such as South-East Asia. 
    The MENA region is considered one of the emerging markets that can possibly 
benefit from the private equity (PE) and VC industries (Eid, 2006). The high 
unemployment rates signal the urgency to promote start-ups to absorb the continuing 
escalating numbers of unemployed, yet qualified youth in the region especially in 
non-oil producing countries (Eid, 2005). Entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial 
finance, in the form of PE/VC, emerged to be an adequate and reliable solution for 
such problems and was proven by other economies to create jobs and help in their 
economic growth (Eid, 2006). This research focuses on the case of Egypt, as one of 
those countries seeking a rescue boat to overcome the chronic unhealthy symptoms of 
unemployment and slow rate of start-ups. The domain of entrepreneurial finance is 
thoroughly investigated focusing on the equity side of financing for its greater 
relevance to entrepreneurial ventures. Its VC industry is deliberately separately 
analysed as the main vehicle funding high growth firms appreciated for their 
contribution to innovation, economic growth, and job creation. In addition, the 
research provides policy recommendations to promote a favourable entrepreneurial 
finance environment and a vibrant VC industry. 
 
1.3 Entrepreneurial Finance in Egypt 
    Access to finance has long been an issue for the Egyptian business sector; it has 
been underdeveloped till the early 2000s even when compared with other GCC 
MENA region (OECD, 2010a). Moreover, access to finance remains highly 
unfavourable for Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) all over the 
MENA region; it is estimated that the financing gap for MSMEs in MENA is 320 to 
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390 billion USD (IFC, 2011). In Egypt, 49% of nascent entrepreneurs will totally self 
finance their ventures while 51% will seek external funding (Hattab, 2011). The start-
up capital required to start a business is of a median of 50,000 EGP; 91% of 
businesses can be started with 500,000 EGP or less (Hattab, 2008). 
    In 2004, the Government of Egypt (GoE) had undergone major reforms in the 
financial sector including the banking sector, introducing a centralised non-banking 
financial services regulatory authority (Egyptian Financial Regulatory Authority, 
EFSA), improving the stock market exchange, attempting to enhance risk capital, 
developing credit guarantee schemes, and improving credit rating and quality of 
information (OECD, 2010b). However, most of the current institutions needs to 
improve their performance, bankruptcy laws needs to be updated, risk capital needs 
more promotion, and financial literacy has to be improved (OECD, 2010a). 
    Bank credit is the dominant and mostly the only significant source of finance to the 
private sector in the MENA region (Rocha, Arvai, and Farazi, 2011). On the other 
hand, SMEs access to bank finance is limited all over the MENA region with a very 
small percentage of the total lending portfolio of an average of 8% compared to 
16.2% for middle income countries and 22.1% for high income countries; Egypt is no 
exception counting to 5% of the total lending in 2009 (Rocha et. al., 2011). 
    Sources of entrepreneurial finance are either through internal, personal resources or 
business earnings, or external resources, via debt, or equity, or a combination of all 
(elaborated in section 2.5). Among external equity options, there are formal 
alternatives through public markets or venture capital and informal financing such as 
family and friends (love money) or business angels (see section 2.8). Regarding the 
informal equity funding in Egypt, the estimated amount of „angel‟ financing was 
estimated to be 8.13 billion EGP (approx. 750 million GBP) which is almost 1% of 
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the GDP in 2008; over 35% expects no return at all which is in most cases “love 
money” where the investment is in a family member‟s businesses (Hattab, 2008). 
Regarding the formal VC industry, VC in Egypt is relatively nascent and highly 
inclined towards late stage financing often known as private equity. It is also very 
small with around 15 operating VC/PE firms, mostly late-stage funding PE firms. 
This research acknowledges the different sources of entrepreneurial finance, whether 
debt or equity, as one integral segment serving entrepreneurial ventures. However, 
there is a deliberate focus on the equity financing tools such as angel investment, 
crowd funding and venture capital as an under researched domain (See section 4.6). 
The greater focus was on VC funding for its significance in financing high growth 
firms that are believed to foster innovation and being the greatest contributor to job 
creation. Reasons behind the need for promoting a venture capital industry in Egypt 
among other countries in the MENA region, precisely early-stage and start-up 
funding, prevailed to be of great importance (Eid, 2011). The January revolution in 
2011 evidenced this importance; the urgent need to create jobs and capitalise on the 
young population in Egypt and the region suggests further attention towards 
entrepreneurial finance in general and VC in particular. In addition, the unprecedented 
entrepreneurial momentum that is taking place after the revolution needs to be 
captured and directed to create a positive impact on the economy. It should be well 
noted that this research is not presuming that entrepreneurial finance or specifically 
VC is capable of tackling the MSMEs finance gap, however it suggests VC will 
support a significant underserved segment of early stage, innovative and high growth 
entrepreneurial ventures. 
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1.4 Research Aims  
    This research aspires to generate an understanding of the domain of entrepreneurial 
finance in Egypt. It explores the major impediments and enabling factors shaping its 
current status. Moreover, it explores where the VC industry development in Egypt 
currently stands compared to the MENA region and other developing countries. To 
achieve the aims of this research, this study have three main objectives.  
 
First: to explain the current status of entrepreneurial finance in Egypt by mapping the 
financial alternatives and the institutional determinants shaping it.       
 
Second: to understand the development of the venture capital industry by 
understanding the surrounding institutional factors affecting its growth.  
 
  The first and second research aims are fulfilled through the two main research 
questions and sub-questions as illustrated in section (1.5). The answers of these 
questions would lead to the third objective of the research. 
 
Third: to develop policy recommendations for an Egyptian venture capital model that 
would better fit the case of Egypt in the light of the current institutional forces. 
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1.5 Research Questions 
    To achieve the research objectives, this research seeks to answer the following 
questions. There are two main questions each with two sub-questions to clarify 
enablers and hurdles facing entrepreneurial finance and the venture capital industry in 
Egypt separately.  
 
First Question: What are the main institutional determinants shaping 
entrepreneurial finance in Egypt?    
 
1.1- What are the major hurdles impeding the development of entrepreneurial 
finance in Egypt?   
1.2- What are the conducive factors supporting the development of 
entrepreneurial finance in Egypt?     
           
Second Question: What is the prospect for the development of a venture capital 
industry in Egypt? 
 
2.1 What are the current institutional forces supporting the growth of a venture 
capital industry in Egypt?   
2.2 What are the current institutional forces encumbering the progression of a 
VC industry in Egypt? 
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1.6 Research Methodology 
    This research is an exploratory research; it takes into account both the supply side 
and demand side of entrepreneurial finance in Egypt. It adopts a qualitative approach 
for in-depth understanding of the domain and an approach similar to grounded theory 
in regard to data gathering in being grounded and immersed in the data. This approach 
was adopted for the limited availability of the data on the subject while taking the 
form of a naturalistic enquiry. In doing so it follows an inductive approach to 
understand the interaction among the supply and demand of finance and the 
determinants shaping it. The units of analysis are structure focused in the form of 
organisations, institutions, and entrepreneurs. It is also geographically focused thus 
studying the case of Egypt as part of the MENA region (Further elaboration on 
research design and methodology in Chapter 5). The thesis builds on secondary data 
supplied by current reports and research while adding to it the primary research 
conducted on the financiers, venture capital market, entrepreneurs, policy makers, and 
industry professionals in Egypt and analyse it from an institutional perspective on 
both macro and micro levels (Discussions on the theoretical framework takes place in 
chapter 4). On the macro-level, the thesis will test the effect of institutional forces on 
the development of entrepreneurial finance and VC industry. On the micro-level, the 
research analyses the entrepreneurs‟ and financiers‟ behaviour and investment 
decisions. In addition, the thesis investigates the capacity of a venture capital industry 
to succeed, grow, and help in the growth of the Egyptian economy. 
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1.7 Implications for Theory and Practice 
    As little is known of entrepreneurial finance in the Africa and the MENA region, 
this research contributes to the knowledge of entrepreneurial finance and venture 
capital in those regions through the case of Egypt. The theoretical implications of this 
research would directly contribute to the work on institutional theory and its usage. It 
adds to the literature which utilises the theory in industry analysis in emerging 
economies and especially entrepreneurship and the VC industry. In addition, it aims to 
enhance the literature of entrepreneurial finance and entrepreneurship in general. On 
the practitioners‟ level, it aspires to assist investment decisions of entrepreneurial 
financiers and entrepreneurs operating in Egypt, whether local, regional, or 
international. Moreover, it recommends policy changes to improve the current 
entrepreneurial finance environment and develop the emergence of the VC industry 
and consequently promote entrepreneurship and innovation in Egypt.  
 
1.8 Thesis Structure 
    The thesis is introduced in Chapter one, followed by an overview of existing 
entrepreneurial finance literature (chapter two). This overview is divided into two 
sections; first the literature on entrepreneurship and economic growth highlighting the 
literature on entrepreneurship in developing economies, its effect on job creation, and 
the role of government on promoting entrepreneurship. The second part is concerned 
with the literature on SMEs and entrepreneurial access to finance, including finance 
gap, and the literature on capital structure. Further literature on the available tools of 
financing for entrepreneurs are reviewed including bootstrapping, angel finance, 
crowdfunding, and venture capital.   
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    Chapter three contextualises the research for the case of Egypt. It starts with the 
socio-economic conditions of Egypt as part of the MENA region. It presents the 
current data on entrepreneurship and challenges regarding entrepreneurial finance in 
Egypt. It also provides an insight on the main regulatory financial institutions and the 
current debt financing tools as well as equity. This includes governmental initiatives 
as well as alternative financial tools such as angel financing and venture capital. 
     Chapter four presents the theoretical foundation of this research. It provides an 
argument for the choice of institutional theory and its fitness for this work. It 
introduces the categorisation of institutional determinants into regulatory, normative, 
and cognitive pillars that are used by this research in the analysis section. It further 
identifies the gap in literature which leads to the research questions.       
     Chapter five describes and explains the rationale behind the research design and 
methodology of the thesis. It starts with the research design and its exploratory nature. 
It provides the argument for choosing a qualitative and grounded approach data 
gathering method. Furthermore, the chapter identifies the sampling strategy and data 
collection methods, which comprised in-depth interviews with the main stakeholders 
and participant observations. It also provided the data analysis method using QSR-
NVIVO (computer aided software for qualitative analysis) and validation methods. 
The chapter ends with the study timeframe and limitations.   
    Thereafter is the discussion on the findings which is divided over chapters six and 
seven. Chapter six focuses on the findings regarding entrepreneurial finance in 
Egypt. It identifies the major sources of capital for entrepreneurs in the Egyptian 
market. It then presents the findings on the major hurdles affecting entrepreneurial 
finance as well as the conducive factors shaping the domain. It answers the first 
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question of the research illustrating the institutional determinants shaping 
entrepreneurial finance in Egypt. 
     Chapter Seven, the second chapter of the findings, answers the second question 
regarding the opportunities for a VC industry in Egypt. It illustrates the magnitude of 
the industry in Egypt and the MENA region. It further analyses the current macro-
perspectives on the industry level and the micro-perspectives on the firm level of the 
VC industry under current influential institutional forces. It also provides an 
understanding of the influence of Islamic finance on the industry and its development. 
It finally presents policy recommendations for enhancing a VC industry in Egypt and 
suggests a localised model of VC under current institutional forces. 
     Chapter Eight concludes of the thesis. It presents the key findings in the light of 
the research objectives and further emphasises on the contribution of the research 
findings to knowledge and its implications to theory and practice. It is concluded by 
the research limitations and direction for future research. 
 
1.9 Ethical Implications     
    This research had no health, safety or legislative hazards. Moreover, the ethical 
perspectives were taken into consideration during all the interviews. Each interviewee 
gave an informed consent of the nature of the research. Confidentiality and level of 
disclosure was approved, and anonymity was offered and implemented among all 
interviewees. In addition, interviewees were informed of the recordings while 
explicitly giving their consent and had the option to stop at any time if they felt 
inconvenient. The interviewees were offered a copy of the write-up of their interviews 
for further approval whenever requested. 
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Chapter Two: Overview on Entrepreneurial Finance  
 
 2.1 Introduction     
    Entrepreneurial finance is an interdisciplinary domain that lies mostly among the 
literature of entrepreneurship, finance, and economics. To understand the economic 
implications of this domain, one must recognize the distinguishing topics of 
entrepreneurship, the demand side of this specific type of financing, as well as its 
impact on economic development. This thesis explores entrepreneurial finance in 
Egypt as one of the developing countries attempting to overcome its economic 
burdens by enhancing its entrepreneurial activities. Thus understanding 
entrepreneurship in developing countries and its effect on economic growth, 
innovation, and job creation would be of high relevance to this review. Moreover, it 
will explore the available financial tools that are widely applied to fund entrepreneurs 
in developed and developing economies. This chapter is divided into two sections, 
first it begins with the observations in the literature on entrepreneurship and economic 
growth in developing countries and how the literature examines the effect of 
entrepreneurship on economic development and regional growth followed by a 
summary and direction for the second section. The second part of the review covers 
entrepreneurial finance and the major themes on SMEs‟ access to finance and the 
finance gap. It is followed by the capital structure decisions made by entrepreneurs 
and the available financial mechanisms for entrepreneurial ventures including debt 
financing and equity financing. The chapter ends with a summary and discussion on 
the significant topics relevant to entrepreneurial finance. 
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2.2 Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth 
     2.2.1 Entrepreneurship  
    The field of entrepreneurship may be defined as “the scholarly examination of how, 
by whom, and with what effects opportunities to create future goods and services are 
discovered, evaluated, and exploited” (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000: p. 218). A 
sociological account based on the demand side perspective on how, where, and why 
new ventures are formed was discussed by Thornton (1999). There is a growing work 
on entrepreneurship in economics, among various branches of behavioural economics 
and new institutional economics which are found useful in entrepreneurship research 
(Minniti and Lévesque, 2008). 
     It is important to elaborate on the definition of entrepreneurs and differentiate from 
SMEs which would be considered the larger domain. Literature has elaborated on the 
definition of entrepreneurship (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Carter and Jones-
Evans, 2006) and many have considered entrepreneurship as an activity that can take 
place in an organisation „Intra-preneurship‟ (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000); or for 
social causes „social entrepreneurship‟ (Nicholls, 2006); or in high growth, high 
potential ventures (Henrekson and Johansson, 2010). There is no general agreement 
on the definition of entrepreneurship; hence it is worth focusing on examining the 
process of entrepreneurship rather than trying to define it (Delmar, 2006). However, 
there remain distinctions between small business owners and entrepreneurial ventures; 
“not all owner managers can be regarded as entrepreneurs, nor are all small 
businesses entrepreneurial” (Kirby, 2006: p.291). Thus entrepreneurship and SMEs 
are not the same, they overlap at some points; furthermore they are both important for 
a country‟s economy (Thurik and Wennekers, 2004). However, in developing 
countries the distinctions between SMEs and entrepreneurs are even more blurred. 
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This might be explained by relatively less innovation, in addition to the differences in 
perceiving innovation in the first place. Some of those who might be perceived as 
entrepreneurs in developing countries could be counted as SMEs in developed 
countries and vice-a-versa. High growth and high potential ventures were found to be 
the most economically rewarding, as well so are the most commonly referred to in 
defining entrepreneurs in general. Therefore, an increasing literature is in favour of 
this clear differentiation, especially on the argument of the economic significance of 
high growth enterprises (HGEs) (Timmons and Spinelli, 2003; Van Praag and 
Versloot, 2008; Henrekson and Johansson, 2010), known as „Gazelles‟ (Birch and 
Medoff, 1994). Notably, the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) classifies 
necessity-motivated entrepreneurs and opportunity-motivated entrepreneurs 
separately, which partially helps for this differentiation. 
    There are different perspectives in attempting to understand who entrepreneurs are. 
Two of the best known approaches to entrepreneurship are the “Schumpeterian” and 
the “Kirznerian” Entrepreneur (Acsand Virgill, 2010). The Schumpeterian, in 
reference to Joseph Schumpeter, recognises that development is a process of 
“disturbance” and change initiated by entrepreneurs causing what is known as 
„creative destruction‟ (Schumpeter, 1947). Schumpeterian concept of innovation (new 
products, new market, and new processes) takes the widest possible definition of 
entrepreneurship (Acs and Virgill, 2010). On the other hand, Kirzner (1997) argues 
that most of the time markets are in disequilibrium due to errors caused by other 
entrepreneurs and the alert and imaginative entrepreneur takes the opportunities and 
acts to correct the market. Thus the learning experience from failure and success is a 
prerequisite for a vibrant entrepreneurial environment. In a study by Minniti and 
Levesque (2010), they classified entrepreneurs into two distinct categories; the 
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imitative „Kirznerian arbitrageur‟ and the innovative entrepreneurs. Research-based 
entrepreneurs are involved in commercializing original technological discoveries 
while incurring R&D expenditure; on the other hand, imitative entrepreneurs mobilize 
resources to expand existing markets by increasing competition and promoting 
efficiency (Minniti and Levesque, 2010). 
      Notably, the definition of entrepreneurship is beyond the scope of this research. 
Hence this research will adopt the widest possible definition for entrepreneurship and 
will address the high innovative entrepreneurs and HGEs separately whenever 
appropriate. 
 
    2.2.2 Entrepreneurship and Developing Economies 
    A growing body of researchers found empirical evidence supporting a positive 
relationship between entrepreneurship and economic growth (Wennekers and Thurik, 
1999; Audretsch, 2002; Carree et al., 2002). Economic development requires change 
and the entrepreneur is the agent of this change by filling the gap of underdeveloped 
markets and responding to market imperfections (Acs and Virgill, 2010). Testing the 
effect of entrepreneurship on economic development was found to be not an easy 
task; using the indicator of Total Entrepreneurship Activity (TEA) utilised by the 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) report, Van Stel, Carree, and Thurik (2005) 
found that the impact of TEA on GDP growth was not a simple linear one. They 
found that it had a negative effect in developing countries while a positive one in 
developed countries suggesting entrepreneurship plays a different role in countries in 
different stages of economic development. The findings were partly explained by the 
absence of large corporations and the presence of many small entrepreneurs 
“shopkeepers”, while in developed countries there were more innovative 
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entrepreneurs and a higher presence of large firms that might complement the small 
ones (Van Stel et al., 2005).  
     Minniti and Lévesque (2010) suggest that entrepreneurial activity may take the 
form of either imitative or research-based labour and that the presence of a sufficient 
amount of either type of entrepreneurship has a positive effect on the growth pattern 
of the economy. They added that when the cost of innovation is high, a country can 
experience economic growth by focusing on imitation such as the case of China, 
where „imitative‟ entrepreneurs mobilise abundant resources (low wage labour) to 
create growth. However, this might not be the case in other developing countries with 
low wage labour since they lack „appropriate political institutions‟ and thus hinders 
entrepreneurial initiatives. On the other hand in the case of low growth in Japan and 
Sweden, it signals a low level of entrepreneurial activity as large amount of labour 
employed in R&D does not guarantee an economic benefit as it depends on how much 
of this R&D is actually commercialised (op cit.). 
    Acs and Virgill (2010), identified network, knowledge, failure and demonstration 
as externalities affecting entrepreneurship in developing countries. They argued that 
economies that work positively with those externalities would produce greater level of 
entrepreneurship. Networks are both local, such as domestic associations, or 
international, industry clusters and links to international clusters. “Networks are 
extremely important in developing countries in ways which go beyond the traditional 
network externalities of connecting firms with information on suppliers, markets, and 
production techniques” (Acs and Virgill, 2010: p. 45-46). Regarding knowledge, they 
argued that knowledge causes productivity improvements and promotes economic 
growth, and since knowledge and education are problematic in developing countries 
they tend to go to known industries rather than new ones. Knowledge and information 
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on what to produce and how to produce are impacted by information asymmetries, 
transaction costs, education levels, research and development opportunities and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and thus hampered by high discovery costs in 
developing countries. This might partially explain the low level of innovativeness in 
developing countries and challenges that face them. Regarding demonstration and 
failure externalities, it is learning by watching success and failure, which are affected 
by 1) culture value and norms; 2) views of outsiders and inclusiveness; 3) the level of 
economic freedom; 4) economy‟s fundamentals including macroeconomic stability, 
infrastructure, and level of development of its financial markets. 
 
    2.2.3 Entrepreneurship and Job Creation 
       Growth of the small firm contributes to economic development, and as owners 
expand their businesses in terms of profitability and sales turnover, employment 
generation occurs as a consequence (Smallbone and Wyner, 2006). According to 
Fritsch (2013), the effects of new business formation on regional development would 
include creation and destruction of employment, introduction of innovations, 
structural change, and increasing productivity, among other factors causing a diverse 
indirect effect on development and thus becomes much more important than the 
growth effects of newcomers. Reynolds‟ (2012) study suggests that in countries with 
access to informal finance and emphasis on traditional rather than secular and self-
expressive values are more likely to find business opportunities and are confident of 
their capability to start their own business. Formal institutions have very modest 
relation with business creation, while informal institutions such as established culture 
and value systems have considerable influence (op cit.).  
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    New businesses formations do create employment, however their direct 
contribution to overall employment is relatively small; they have indirect effects that 
can take up to 10 years to manifest and hence indirect employment tends to be much 
larger than direct (Fritsch, 2013). Van Praag and Versloot (2008) argued that high 
technology firms have a relatively higher employment creation, productivity growth, 
and innovation; moreover, all entrepreneurial firms have a long run spillover that 
affects regional employment growth. Concentrating on high growth alone such as 
„gazelles‟ might not be sufficient for job creation, although it‟s easier from a public 
policy dimension than supporting hundreds of thousands of small enterprises 
(Reynolds, 2012). The concept of „Gazelles‟ was first introduced by Birch (1979, 
1981, 1987) in which he claims that new businesses are the main job creators in the 
US between 1969 and 1976 demonstrating that two thirds of increase in employment 
was in small firms with 20 or less employees, and a few fast growing „Gazelles‟ are 
responsible for the majority of those jobs arguing that 4 percent accounted for 70 
percent of new jobs between 1988 and 1992 (Birch and Medoff, 1994). This argument 
did not stand in all cases, when taking into consideration overall job growth in a 
certain sector, for example Wal-Mart created 2 million jobs in 50 years but the overall 
retail market net jobs did not increase (Reynolds, 2012). It was found important for 
the outcome of this research to realise the role of „gazelles‟ and HGEs in job creation, 
moreover to differentiate SMEs and HGEs when it comes to policy recommendations. 
It is important to understand the literature concerned with this concept to recognise 
the debate around entrepreneurship and job creation and how HGEs, as the main job 
creator, could be funded by providing a vibrant VC industry. 
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    2.2.4 Entrepreneurship and Role of Government 
    The government role in entrepreneurship policy is mostly through institutional 
development to enhance and promote entrepreneurship. According to Busenitz, 
Gomez, and Spencer (2000), an institutional perspective taking into consideration 
regulatory, cognitive, and normative accounts was found beneficial to evaluate 
country differences on the level of entrepreneurship development and type of 
entrepreneurs. The role of government in entrepreneurship policy is important; 
however, what kind of role to play varies across countries and there is no one policy 
that fits all (Minniti, 2008). In a study by Manolova, Eunni, and Gyoshev (2008) on 
entrepreneurship in emerging economies in Eastern Europe, they found significant 
differences in the three institutional dimensions of regulatory, cognitive, and 
normative, reflecting distinctive cultural norms and values, traditions, and institutional 
characteristics in promoting entrepreneurship. Thus cultural aspects where found 
important for determining the role of government. McMullen, Bagby, and Palich 
(2008), argued that governmental restrictions affecting economic freedom would 
affect entrepreneurial activities in different countries; however, they found differences 
among opportunity motivated versus necessity motivated entrepreneurs where 
property rights was positively related with the former, while fiscal and monetary 
freedom was positively related with the later.  
    Anokhin and Schulze (2009) suggest that corruption and the quality of a nation‟s 
institutions are important factors affecting rates of entrepreneurship and innovation 
across countries. Bennett (2006), identified three main dimensions for the 
governments‟ role to assist and promote SMEs; a regulator, economic agent, and 
strategic planner and promoter.  
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    2.2.5 Summary 
    Entrepreneurship and SMEs, though not the same, are both important to countries‟ 
economic growth (Thurik and Wennekers, 2004). Researchers suggest that there is a 
positive relationship between entrepreneurship and economic growth (Audretsch, 
2002; Carree et al., 2002). Economic development requires change and entrepreneurs 
are the agents of that change (Acs and Virgill, 2010). New business formation creates 
employment (Birsch, 1987), yet more evidently on the long run (Fritsch, 2013). High 
growth, high potential ventures (HGEs) are argued to have more significance in job 
creation and innovation leading to economic growth (Timmons and Spinelli, 2003; 
Van Praag and Versloot, 2008). Accordingly, governments act to promote 
entrepreneurship and SMEs (Minniti, 2008); among the roles that governments can 
assist and promote SMEs is addressing lack of capital (Bennett, 2006). According to 
previous discussions, this research argues that HGEs are of significant value to the 
Egyptian economy and a valuable contributor to innovation, economic growth and job 
creation. Furthermore, access to finance could be a key issue hindering the 
development of HGEs in Egypt, particularly with the challenging entrepreneurial 
finance scene and specifically the venture capital industry.  
    It should be well noted that there is an increasing set of literature dealing with 
ethical implications, dilemmas, and moral issues regarding entrepreneurship 
(Hannafey, 2003). “The numerous cases of unethical practices reported from 
entrepreneurs‟ personal experiences illustrate various forms of unethical attitudes by 
entrepreneurs and managers, in a range of management fields: marketing, 
negotiation, personnel management, supplier–customer relations, government 
relations. Dubious practices include lies and deception, breaches of promise, passive 
corruption, unfair competition, personal advantages for management and the 
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manipulation of communication.” (Fassin, 2005: P.  266). Furthermore, Anderson and 
Smith (2007) researched the moral space in entrepreneurship exploring ethical 
imperatives and the moral legitimacy of being an entrepreneur. Also Morris, 
Schindehutte, Walton and Allen (2002) explored the ethical context of 
entrepreneurship. This set of research suggests that further investigation on 
entrepreneurship and ethics needs to be addressed alongside the economic benefits of 
entrepreneurship. This thesis is concerned with literature on entrepreneurship in 
general and entrepreneurial finance in particular, however, it was found important to 
acknowledge the debates on ethical implications on entrepreneurship. The second 
section of this literature review elaborates on the topics of entrepreneurial finance 
literature, both internal and external finance and whether debt or equity. 
  
    2.3 SMEs and Access to Finance 
    Although there is a robust correlation between SMEs and economic growth, yet 
there is no causal impact of SMEs on GDP per capita growth (Beck and Demirguc-
Kunt, 2006). This lack of empirical causality might be partially a result of constraints 
facing SME growth, and access to finance would be counted as one of those 
constraints. Accordingly the topic of SMEs access to external finance became of high 
importance to both academics and policy makers in both developed and developing 
countries (Berger and Udell, 2006). It is widely believed that SMEs face higher 
constraints to access external finance than large corporations (Beck and Demirguc-
Kunt, 2006). Moreover, the growth potential of small firms was found to be limited 
by scarce access to external finance (Becchetti and Trovato, 2002), and thus holds 
back innovation and growth (Hyytinen and Toivanen, 2005). Small firms are in many 
ways different than large quoted firms where the later have access to capital markets 
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and a clear separation of ownership and management structure (Jarvis, 2006). 
Consequently, such differences generally lead to information opacity, where the 
owner/manager is not obliged to run systematic bookkeeping or disclose financial 
data. In fact, information opacity is argued to be a key feature that differentiates 
SMEs from large corporations; the former are not listed to access public market, 
contracts are not publicly visible to press, and many have no audited financial 
statements (Berger and Udell, 1998). Such information opacity creates a state of 
„information asymmetry‟ between the business owner and financiers causing a „moral 
hazard‟ and increasing the risk of non-repayment. Besides information asymmetries, 
lack of collaterals and weak cash flows are all challenges that face small businesses to 
raise external finance (Berger and Udell, 1998). As a result, theory of financial 
intermediation elucidates the role of financial intermediaries to facilitate overcoming 
small firms‟ opacity (op cit.). 
      Improving financial systems would support entrepreneurial activities and enhance 
the probability of successful innovation and thus accelerate economic growth (King 
and Levine, 1993). Lack of financial and institutional development hinders SMEs 
access to finance and thus believed to be a major constraint to their growth; 
nevertheless financial tools such as leasing, factoring, systems of credit information, 
and competitive banking structure might help in mitigating this problem albeit 
absence of well-developed institutions (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). 
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   2.4 Entrepreneurial Finance and Finance Gap 
     In a paper providing an overview on issues regarding entrepreneurial finance, 
Denis (2004: p.303) identified four 'primary areas' of research: alternative sources of 
capital, financial contracting issues, public policies and risk and returns of 
investments. Elaborating on alternative sources of capital, Denis pointed out three 
'primary sources' for financing entrepreneurs, VC funds, angel investors and corporate 
venture investors, arguing that VCs provides several benefits to the entrepreneur; 
however, they remain an expensive source of capital. According to Vinturella and 
Erickson (2004) “Entrepreneurial ventures can be defined as new business start-ups 
with high growth aspirations.” Contrary to corporate finance the goals of the business 
and the entrepreneurs are intertwined. Financing comes from two basic sources: debt 
and ownership equity; self-finance, bootstrapping, friends and family, customers and 
suppliers, leasing, barter. The seed capital of the vast majority of entrepreneurial 
finance is a combination of personal investments of the owners of the venture with 
equity and from family and friends; external financing is mostly through private 
equity and debt rather than public markets (Berger and Udell, 1998). 
     At the point when profitable opportunities arise beyond firms‟ internal financial 
capacity; there emerges what is known as a „finance gap‟ where firms would need 
external finance to grow (Jarvis, 2006). From another perspective, a study by Vos, 
Yeh, Carter, and Tagg (2007) indicated that SMEs in the UK and US shows a 
significant level of financial content and very few (less than 10% in UK and 1.32% in 
US) signalled shortage of capital (other than working capital). Furthermore, older 
firms with more educated owners were found less likely to seek external finance (Vos 
et al., 2007). According to Javis (2006), the financing gap hypothesis stems from as 
early as 1931 by Macmillan et al. and is argued by some scholars (e.g. Deakins, 1996) 
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to be, if still exists, considerably narrowed due to market reactions and public policies 
while this claim is disputed by others (e.g. Harrison and Masson, 1995).  As this 
might be the case in developed economies, a finance gap still persevered to exist in 
developing economies.  
     The main challenges remain; risk, information asymmetry, and moral hazard. It 
varies according to the organisational form, type of business, and degree of control; 
the amount required, shareholders preference and legal issues. The problems of equity 
and debt financing and information asymmetries are believed by several financial 
economists to be eliminated by financial intermediaries such as VC firms (Lerner, 
1998). To overcome the information problem venture capital would get involved with 
planning and operations of the small firm and thus the entrepreneur would forego 
some of his control; on the other hand banks would use collaterals, contracts and 
covenants while the entrepreneur would remain in full control over the firm‟s 
operation (Berger and Udell, 1998). According to Rosen (1998), group of theories on 
entrepreneurial finance would focus on financial constraints, while others focus on 
capital structure and portfolio aspects, another group would focus on information 
problem. Various theories suggest that entrepreneurial finance is not a static state; it 
changes over time and preference of internal and external sources of funding (Rosen, 
1998). Entrepreneurial finance can take the form of debt and/or equity financing, 
however it is apparent that the source of external finance is highly dependent on the 
type, age, and preference of the entrepreneurial venture. The coming section (2.5) 
elaborates on the capital structure, followed by a dedicated section on debt financing 
(2.6) and bootstrapping (section 2.7), and then equity financing is elaborated in 
thorough details (section 2.8). 
 
27 
 
    2.5 Capital Structure 
    According to Myers and Majluf (1984), the presence of information asymmetries 
would lead firms to acquire equity at a higher cost than debt. They argued for what is 
known as a „Pecking order theory‟ of capital structure that firms would prefer internal 
finance over debt, short-term debt over long-term debt, and all debt over external 
equity. Before reaching the financial gap, most firms would fully exploit their internal 
resources before seeking either debt or equity in a manner argued to comply with the 
notion of pecking order. The capital structure of small firms and preference of its 
owners were thoroughly researched and that debt was best utilised after exploiting 
internal finance was well established (Berger and Udell, 1998). Hamilton and Fox 
(1998) argued that small firms‟ choice between debt and equity were not properly 
understood and had unrealistic expectations of new equity deals. They suggested that 
the funding gap is a „consequence rather than the cause‟ of the small firm‟s financing 
decisions. Norton (1991) suggests that contrary to financial theory, bankruptcy costs, 
agency costs, and information asymmetries play little role, if any, in affecting capital 
structure policy; rather, small firms would follow a pecking order in regard to its 
capital structure while concerned with market conditions and personal preference.  
      Information opacity is argued to be a key feature that differentiates SMEs from 
large corporations (Berger and Udell, 1998). It is generally perceived that the opacity 
of SMEs causes the banks to neglect this sector, on the contrary, De la Torre, 
Martinez Peria, and Schmukler (2010) found that SME sector is a strategic group for 
all types of banks and would expand in serving them. In their study of 12 developed 
and developing countries, they found that banks developed new business models to 
serve SMEs where lending is one of many services. However, they argued that start-
ups and hi-tech companies might still have to resort to alternative non-banking routes 
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of financing. Hence high growth-high risk ventures with intangible assets more often 
attain equity financing, while low growth-low risk ventures with tangible assets are 
more likely to acquire debt financing (Berger and Udell, 1998). The decision on using 
capital, whether debt or equity, was found to affect the performance, risk of failure, 
operations, and growth opportunities of start-ups (Cassar, 2004). The source of capital 
and the capital structure of small firms would vary according to the size and age of the 
firm (Berger and Udell, 1998). Entrepreneurs were found in favour of debt in the form 
of bank finance to sustain their full control over the venture; however in the case 
when VC productivity was higher than entrepreneurial productivity, equity in form of 
VC was preferred over bank finance (De Bettignies and Brander, 2007). Figure (2.1) 
shows how different sources of financing fit to the age and size of different venture.  
 
Figure (2.1) Firm Continuum and Sources of Finance 
 
Source: Berger and Udell (1998) 
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   2.6 Debt Financing 
     Private debt financing is sourced from different alternatives; financial institutions, 
non-financial, government, and individuals (Berger and Udell, 1998). Non-financial 
debt is in the form of trade credits from suppliers and government guarantees; 
individuals are friends and family or credit cards; and financial institutions would be 
banks and other institutions. However, many new firms and start-ups find it difficult 
to raise debt financing due to lack of collaterals, unstable cash flows, and opacity 
(Berger and Udell, 1998). Sources of finance, other than equity, for the small business 
could be banks, loan guarantee schemes, leasing and hire purchase, and factoring 
(Jarvis, 2006). In fact, leasing is an important financial tool for SMEs when supported 
by credit guarantee schemes (Kraemer-Eis and Lang, 2012). Collaterals and 
guarantees play an important role in small firms‟ lending to overcome the moral 
hazard that might take place after lending (Berger and Udell, 1998). 
   Berger and Udell (2006) developed a conceptual framework for SME financing. 
They argued that there is a causal chain that starts with government policies 
influencing market shares and competitiveness of financial institutions among 
regulatory environment and ends with the availability of alternative SME lending 
technologies represented in financial statement lending, small business credit scoring, 
asset-based lending, factoring, fixed asset lending, leasing, relationship lending, and 
trade credit. “The choice of lending technology for a specific creditworthy SME 
depends on the sources of information available for that firm, as well as the 
adaptability and appropriateness of the various screening, underwriting, contracting, 
and monitoring techniques dealing with the firm in its environment” (Berger and 
Udell, 2006: p. 2962).  
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     Smaller and younger firms that are most likely still owned by their founders are 
more constrained to receive bank financing (Levenson and Willard, 2000). The larger 
the start-up, the larger is the proportion of debt and reliance on banking finance 
(Cassar, 2004). Moreover, banking finance is positively related with the presence of 
tangible assets, and thus lack of tangible assets would lead firms to seek informal and 
non-banking sources of finance which is found consistent with agency cost found in 
start-ups (Cassar, 2004). In the US it was found that over half of the small businesses 
sample would use bank finance in the form of lines of credit while the second largest 
usage was mortgage finance at 13.89% (Berger and Udell, 1998). Moreover, over 
50% of bank credits were personally guaranteed by the business owners (op cit.). 
They can take the form of internal or external collateral assets, or in the form of 
inventory and accounts receivables. Loan commitment contracts and debt covenants 
were other methods used to mitigate the banks‟ risk in SME lending. Relationship 
lending is another concept where the financial institution (usually banks) relies on 
detailed information on entrepreneurs and credit history over a relatively long period 
of time (op cit.).  
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  2.7 Bootstrapping 
     Before resorting to external debt or equity financing, entrepreneurs would most 
often opt to bootstrapping. Bootstrapping techniques are widely and strategically used 
by entrepreneurs and has been an important topic of study in entrepreneurial finance 
(Bhidé, 1992; Freear, Sohl, and Wetzel, 1995; Winborg and Landstrom, 2001; Ebben 
and Johnson, 2006; Lam 2010). Bootstrapping is defined as a collection of methods 
used to minimize the amount of outside debt and equity financing needed from banks 
and investors (Winborg and Landstrom, 2001). Some of these methods would include 
reducing overall capital requirements, improving cash flow, and taking advantage of 
personal sources of financing (Ebben and Johnson, 2006). Bhide (1992) criticised 
entrepreneurs for spending a lot of time to seek large funds from venture capital firms; 
instead of concentrating on taking off their ventures. He emphasised on the benefits of 
bootstrapping over venture capital. VC firms require solid business plans, track 
records, and well defined markets, while entrepreneurs strive on energy and 
enthusiasm which could be hampered by VC requirements. Winborg and Landstrom 
(2001: p.243-244) identified six main methods used in bootstrapping. (1) “Owner 
financing methods” by direct or indirect provision of resources from the (owner) 
manager and relatives; (2) “minimisation of accounts receivable” by speeding up 
invoicing or using interest on overdue payment; (3) “joint utilisation” by sharing and 
borrowing resources from other businesses; (4) “delaying payment” such as delaying 
payments to suppliers and leasing equipment; (5) “minimization of capital invested in 
stock”  by using formal routines to minimise the amount of capital invested in stock ; 
and (6) “subsidy finance” by obtaining subsidies from public organizations. Ebben 
and Johnson (2006) indicated that firms would use different types and levels of 
bootstrapping over time.  
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  2.8 Equity Financing 
    Entrepreneurs at some point would need external finance to scale their business 
beyond their personal capital. From previous discussions over capital structure and 
availability of debt finance, smaller firms with lack of collaterals, intangible assets, 
high risk, and most probably in the high technology sector seeking external finance 
would resort for equity. Whether it is a personal preference or the only available 
option is explored in this section as well as the available tools of equity finance and 
when and why they are chosen. The most common sources of external equity finance 
are the informal angel financing and the formal institutionalised venture capital 
(Berger and udell, 1998). The reason that high-growth, high-risk new ventures often 
obtain angel finance and/or venture capital before they obtain significant amounts of 
external debt finance suggests that the moral hazard problem may be particularly 
acute for these firms (Berger and Udell 1998). Regarding preference on when to raise 
external equity, Schwienbacher (2007) suggests that some entrepreneurs would invest 
their own money then seeks finance from a venture capitalist (Just-do-it strategy), and 
others would seek external finance before they invest their own money (wait-and-see 
strategy). It was found that in the more profitable ventures, entrepreneurs would rather 
invest their own money before seeking venture capital, and they would rather seek 
angel investors before venture capital to maximise their profits (Schwienbacher, 
2007). Although one of the major constraints for SME finance is to access public 
markets (Berger and Udell, 2006); many countries such as the UK, introduced 
secondary stock exchange for the small and growing firms to raise equity (Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM)). However, the conditions for listing and the cost of listing 
made „very little contribution‟ to small firms in the case of AIM in the UK (Jarvis, 
2006: p.349). This research acknowledges the contribution of secondary stock 
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exchange markets to the development of SMEs and entrepreneurial finance 
ecosystem. However, the literature on the significance and effect of secondary 
markets on entrepreneurial ventures is beyond the scope of this work. This thesis 
explores entrepreneurial finance with an intentional focus on start-up financing and 
the alternative sources of funding. In other words, angel investments, the newly 
developed crowdfunding platforms, and a larger emphasis on the venture capital 
industry are of a primary focal point to this research. The coming sections will start 
with angel investors followed by crowdfunding and finally venture capital as means 
of equity for entrepreneurial ventures.  
 
      2.8.1 Angel Investors 
     Angel financing might be the oldest form of funding in the history of economic 
activities through high net worth individuals (HNWIs) and wealthy families; however 
recently in 1990s angel investors started forming groups and collectively finance 
entrepreneurial ventures (Kerr, Lerner, and Schoar, 2014). The definition of business 
angels by Mason (2006: p.363) is “high net worth individuals who invest their own 
money, along with their time and expertise, directly in unquoted companies in which 
they have no family connection, in the hope of financial gain.” 
    It is believed that many promising firms fail to raise finance from venture capital 
firms; moreover, venture capital firms tend to concentrate their investments in certain 
regions and industries, accentuating the value of angel investors (Lerner, 1998). Angel 
financing is greater in number of transactions and value of investments than venture 
capital worldwide (Fairchild, 2011). Angel investments are considered an “informal 
venture capital market”, where angel investors finance whether their circle of family 
and friends (family funding or love money) or complete strangers (Business Angels) 
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(Mason, 2007). The profile of a business angel worldwide (except Japan) was found 
to be over 95% male, between 46 and 65 years of age, successful cash out 
entrepreneurs, and well educated (Mason, 2007). Business Angels would fill the 
equity gap before seeking venture capital; as venture capital deals are relatively larger 
to cover the transaction costs, they tend to overlook the smaller deals that might still 
be feasible to business angels (Schwienbacher, 2007). The investment process of 
business angels is similar to the venture capital (detailed in section 2.8.3), however 
less sophisticated; in addition, venture capital and business angels have a 
complementary relationship in serving entrepreneurial finance (Mason, 2007). 
Although venture capital firms have greater business capabilities than angel investors, 
entrepreneurs might prefer angel investors due to the level of entrepreneur-angel 
empathy and trust relationship that help overcoming moral hazards (Fairchild, 2011). 
The hands-on management of business angels is an important value adding factor 
considering their expertise, knowledge, and experience; ranging from informal 
coaching to board representation, angels are most likely to invest in industries of their 
interest and familiarity (Mason, 2007).  In addition, a strong positive relation was 
found between angel funding and start-ups‟ success and survival rate (Kerr et al., 
2014). Furthermore, Kerr et al. (2014) suggest that there is other significant value 
adding activities of angel investors rather than pure financial input. Ventures funded 
by angel groups were found to outperform rejected ventures regarding survival, exits, 
employment, patenting, Web traffic, and financing (Kerr et al., 2014). It is very 
difficult to assess the amount of investments of informal capital market, since angels 
are willing to stay anonymous and they are not obliged otherwise, yet the invested 
amounts remain very significant (Mason, 2007).  
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    2.8.2 Crowd funding  
    Most recently, entrepreneurs started raising direct capital from the public “crowd” 
using internet platforms to cover their financial needs, what is now known as “crowd 
funding” (Schwienbacher and Larralde 2010).  According to Belleflamme, Lambert, 
and Schwienbacher (2013; p.4) crowdfunding could be described as “an open call, 
essentially through the Internet, for the provision of financial resources either in form 
of donation or in exchange for some form of reward and/or voting rights in order to 
support initiatives for specific purposes”. The concept evolved around the emergence 
of “Crowd Sourcing” (Kleemann, Voss, and Rieder, 2008) where the crowd 
contributes to the development, design, or any value creation to a venture 
(Schwienbacher and Larralde 2010). The phenomenon of “crowdsourcing” was made 
possible with the technological innovation of “Web 2.0”; where customers-firm 
relationship evolved to a concept of “working consumer” (Kleemann et al., 2008). 
    Lambert and Schwienbacher (2010) found that that crowdfunding market was very 
young (3-4 years prior to their study) with about 60% taking place in Anglo-Saxon 
countries. The concept started with artists and movie makers which then included 
ICT, sport, journalism and more. Crowdfunding is sometimes based on donations, 
however almost 80% would get some sort of reward including shares, cash payments, 
or a personalised free copy of the products. The median of the required capital is 
approximately 100,000 Euros, yet the median raised was about 28,500 Euros (op cit.). 
According to a NESTA report (a UK charity innovation foundation), more than 2.7 
billion USD was raised through crowdfunding globally in 2012; in the UK alone 200 
million GBP were invested through crowdfunding (Baeck and Collins, 2013). 
    The option of crowdfunding is generally used by entrepreneurs for several reasons. 
First, for pure financial reasons, i.e. other options are unavailable or are lower than 
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venture capital and business angel appetite. Second, for reducing cost of capital that 
might reach a form of donation from the public. And finally, to create “hype” in the 
internet world and social networks thus creating exposure to greater audience and test 
demand (Lambert and Schwienbacher, 2010). On the other hand, crowdfunding 
participants would participate for the joy and fun of contribution in addition to 
financial rewards (Schwienbacher and Larralde 2010). Moreover, consumers feel they 
are part of product success (desire of patronage), part of communal social initiative 
(desire of for social participation), as well as financial payoff (desire for investment) 
(Ordanini et al., 2011). Belleflamme et al. (2013) identified two types of crowd 
funding; a pre-order the product type and the share for profit equity type. They argued 
that crowdfunding could be considered a form of bootstrapping, especially when it is 
in the form of pre-ordering the products and using the money as a working capital.  
    Many of the internet economic activities are considered much less geographically 
dependent; it was found that in crowdfunding this was also true, yet the role of 
proximity was still evident (Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb, 2010). In a different 
study by Agrawal et al. (2011) on artists seeking crowdfunding, they found that the 
average distance between artists and funders was 3000 miles, signalling a reduced 
role of spatial proximity, however, distance still plays a role most visible in family 
and friends investing in the same projects.  
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      2.8.3 Venture Capital  
     There is no strict definition of venture capital firms; however, the simplest would 
be as "risk equity investing" (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). Amit, Brander and Zott 
defined a venture capital as a provider of capital to privately held entrepreneurial 
firms with equity, debt or hybrid financing accompanied by managerial assistance 
(1998). There are corporate venture capital and independent venture capital 
(Chesbrough, 2002). This research will adopt the „broader‟ definition of VC which 
includes early-stage independent classical VC and late-stage capital commonly 
regarded as PE while focusing in the analysis on the former which is the independent 
classical VC model financing start-ups and early stage enterprises while providing 
them with managerial and technical assistance.  
    Several studies have used this „broad‟ definition and included MBO/MBI 
(Management Buy-ins and Management Buy-outs) and PE activities in their research. 
This occurs more often in Europe, (Wright and Robbie, 1998; Karsai, Dudzinski, and 
Morovic, 1998; Megginson, 2004; Wright et al, 2005b), and in Asia whereas PE is the 
more predominant investment (Bruton, Ahlstrom and Singh, 2002; Bruton, Ahlstrom 
and Yeh, 2004).  Indeed, there is no conflict between this definition and the one 
adopted by the study of Gompers and Lerner (2001: p.146), “We will focus here on 
venture capital, defined as independent, professionally managed, dedicated pools of 
capital that focus on equity or equity-linked investments in privately held, high growth 
companies”. In support of this „broad‟ definition, the VC including PE investments 
definition is commonly used in most of VC/PE associations worldwide. Another 
reason for adopting the broader definition in this research is the fact that all the 
reports and hence all the data addressing venture capital whether via local or 
international agencies deal with PE and VC collectively and interchangeably, 
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especially for what concerns the MENA region whereas classical VC hardly exists 
compared to PE. Fig. (2.2) clarifies the fitness of VC in regards of financing lifecycle.  
 
Figure (2.2): Financing lifecycle 
 
    Source: Cadullo (1999) 
 
      The origin of the VC industry emerged in the USA with the first 'true' VC firm in 
1946, where Karl Compton (MIT president) and General George F.Doriot (professor 
at Harvard Business School) formed ' The American Research and Development' 
(ARD) (Gomper and Lerner, 2001). The golden era of the VC in the US of the 80s 
and 90s started with the wave of dot coms and IT enterprises. Many high technology 
firms have received VC funding such as Apple computers, Intel, Microsoft, Cisco 
systems and others, other industries in service sectors includes Starbucks, TCBY and 
Federal Express have also been among the VC funded firms (Gompers and Lerner, 
39 
 
2001).Following the same steps of North America, the UK witnessed early trials in 
1945 (BVCA, 2005). According to Murray (1995) the UK VC industry, as we know it 
today, started in the late seventies and the early eighties to displace banks and 
financial houses in the investment of young and unquoted companies. 
     Regarding the „raison d‟être‟ of the VC industry, Amit, Brander and Zott (1998) 
argued that the industry emerged by developing capabilities whereas the venture 
capital firms are able to overcome „hidden information‟ and „moral hazard‟. The 
hurdle of 'hidden information' was often encountered by the tendency of the investee 
to hide important information to oversell his project and 'moral hazard' when an 
entrepreneur might have a plan to take the money and run (Amit et al., 1998). 
Similarly, Gompers and Lerner (2001) stated that VC firms can overcome this 
information gap by rigorous tools that „scrutinise‟ the investees before funding and 
monitoring them afterwards. According to Dennis (2004) the major difference 
between VC as an alternative source of funding and conventional sources of finance, 
is the magnitude of the agency problem and asymmetry problem, exemplifying the 
differences between entrepreneurial financing and corporate financing. He added that 
this is the reason that the most commonly used theories to explain the VC industry are 
agency theory and information asymmetries. Examples for using agency theory in 
studying VC industries are the work by Sahlman (1990) on Investors-VC and VC-
Entrepreneurs relations and governance, and the research by Norton (1996) on the 
concept of capital allocation and the role of agency cost. Norton (1996) suggested that 
many problems are associated with capital allocation decisions by VC firms. 
Cumming (2005) explored the effect of agency cost among other factors on 
contracting issues in VC in the US and Canada. Further on VC-entrepreneur 
40 
 
relationship perspective, Cable and Shane (1997) used a prisoner‟s dilemma 
framework to analyse this relationship.  
     Understanding the nature of the VC firms, the way their business is done, and their 
investment cycle is essential to efficiently analyse the industry and its behaviour. 
According to Dennis (2004), main activities of VC firms are „monitoring‟ as in 
mentoring, strategic advice and directorship, „Professionalization‟ in business 
planning and human resource policies, and „certification‟ of the start-up quality. 
Gompers and Lerner (2001) believed that comprehending the 'venture cycle' is an 
integral part to understand the VC industry. They summarised it as "raising a venture 
fund; proceeds through the investment in, monitoring of, and adding value to firms; 
continues as the VC firm exits successful deals and return capital to its investors; and 
renew itself with the venture capitalist raising additional funds" (p.152). Fried and 
Hisrich (1988) in Figure (2.3) exhibit the VC process illustrating the relationships of 
investors-VCs-investee as well as the investment process of VC firms.  
Figure (2.3): The Venture Capital process 
 
          Source: Fried and Hisrich (1988)  
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    The literature concerned with the dimension of the VC firms‟ operations is 
reflected in the analysis of their decisions throughout their business cycle. Thus, it can 
be better comprehended by following the venture cycle illustrated by Gompers and 
Lerner (2001), fundraising, investment, monitoring, value-adding, and exiting. 
Fundraising decisions start with the legal setup of the company, establishing the fund 
and the fund management company whether onshore or offshore or a combination of 
both depending on regulatory and capital gain taxing policies. At the same time the 
VCs identify the main strategy of the fund whether generalist or specialist and the 
investment criteria (size and stage) of the portfolio of companies. Afterwards, it 
materializes in the actual fundraising (Gompers and Lerner, 1998) where capital gains 
tax and interest rates are among the factors that affect the inflow of capital (Gompers 
and Lerner, 2001). Berger and Udell (1998); Gompers and Lerner (1997) suggest that 
when the stock market is slow and IPO shuts down this may reduce the flow for angel 
investment and VC funds and when the market is high it increases the rush towards 
VC funds and angel investments.   
     The investment process can be expanded by using the Tyebjee and Bruno model 
(1984) showed in figure (2.4) to deal origination, screening, valuation (Manigart et 
al., 1997), structuring and using contracting methods (Cumming, 2005; 2006). There 
are the investment strategies (Dimov and De Clercq, 2006; Mangiart et al., 2002; 
2006), selection criteria of the investee companies (Wright and Robbie, 1996), and the 
concept of syndication which are quite common among developed VC markets 
(Lockett et al., 2006). Brander, Amit and Antwieler (2002) tested two possible 
reasons for syndication which were informative second opinion and complimentary 
additional VCs‟ management skills. They have used an empirical analysis from 
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datasets of the Canadian VC industry and their findings favoured the managerial 
value-adding activities over informative selection reasons. 
Figure (2.4): Venture capitalist investment activity 
 
              Source: Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) 
 
    Finally, are the post-investment activities, which are the fifth and last of the 
Tyebjee and Bruno model (1984) and include the monitoring, value-adding, and 
exiting practices as indicated by Gompers and Lerner (2001) VCs cycle. On 
monitoring there is the work by Steier and Greenwood (1995), and the research on 
management strategies whether hands-off or hands-on and sector specialisation 
whether high-tech or low-tech (Jungwirth and Moog, 2004), governance (Sahlman, 
1990); the amount of time dedicated (Jaaskelainen, Maula and Seppa, 2006). Then 
there is the value-added activities towards their portfolio of companies (Gorman and 
Sahlman, 1989) how closely they monitor the CEOs or entrepreneurs (Macmillan, 
Kulow and Khoylian, 1989) and how they overcome times of difficulty (Higashide 
and Birley, 2002). Disagreements are found beneficial while personal friction 
declined performance. From a different perspective, importance of networks as 
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another value-added activity was empirically analysed by Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and 
Lu (2007) to test the relationship of networking and fund performance in the US VC 
market and figured that better networked VC firms encompass significantly better 
performing funds. Finally, there is the stage of Exit and the strategies preferred and 
exercised among VC firms (Lange et al., 2001; Doukas and Gonenc, 2005).  
     The following highlights on the foundation work on the US VC industry will 
operate as the benchmark in the analysis of the industry in Egypt. First is the 
previously mentioned model of venture capitalist investment activities by Tyebjee and 
Bruno (1984) which consists of five sequential steps; 1) Deal origination, 2) Deal 
Screening, 3) Deal Evaluation, 4) Deal Structuring, and 5) Post Investment Activities. 
In addition, they categorised the selection criteria to five main factors; 1) Market 
Attractiveness, 2) Product Differentiation, 3) Managerial capabilities, 4) 
Environmental Threat Resistance, and 5) Cash Out potential.  
     Second is the work by Gorman and Sahlman (1989) on what do venture capitalists 
do and the relationship between VCs and the portfolio companies by which they have 
identified six main forms of VCs assistance to their portfolio companies; 1) help 
obtaining additional financing, 2) Strategic planning, 3) Management recruitment, 4) 
operational planning, 5) Introductions to potential customers and suppliers, 6) Resolve 
compensation issues.  
     Third is the research by Macmillan, Kulow and Khoylian (1989) on the VCs 
involvement in their investments which grouped VCs‟ involvement to three main 
groups; laissez-faire involvement, moderate involvement and close tracker 
involvement. They identified the activities with most VC involvement as follows: 
serving as sounding board to entrepreneur team, obtaining alternative source to equity 
financing, interfacing with investor group, monitoring financial performance, 
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monitoring operating performance, and obtaining alternative sources of debt 
financing. On the other hand, the activities with least VC involvement were identified 
as follows: selecting vendors and equipment, developing production or service 
technique, developing actual product or service, soliciting customers or distributers, 
testing or evaluating marketing plans, and formulating marketing plans. The classical 
VC model in developed markets, namely the US, emerges from the combination of 
the former literature specially the work of Tyebjee and Bruno (1984), Gorman and 
Sahlman (1989) and the work of MacMillan et al. (1989) which this study will use as 
the points of reference.  
    The Venture capital industry is growing tremendously worldwide, and this growth 
is taking an international dimension in both growing indigenous VC markets copying 
the US and other successful VC industries‟ model (Wright, Pruthi, and Locket, 2005b; 
Bruton, Fried, and Manigart, 2005), or in the form of VC firms crossing borders and 
expanding their activities in foreign countries where opportunities exist (Wright et al., 
2005b). A good deal of research has shown that there are differences in the 
development of VC industries due to different environments in different countries in 
addition to differences in the behaviour of the VC firms among different countries and 
regions (Ooghe, Manigart, and Fassin, 1991; Bruton et al., 2005). In their paper on 
VC development in Europe, Ooghe et al. (1991) stressed on the differences between 
European US VC industries, they also mentioned that even among European countries 
there are many differences due to different structures, institutions and policies. Wright 
et al. (2005b) extensively reviewed the literature on international VC (multi-country 
comparisons). They indicated that the institutional dimension, namely social networks 
and cultures, is an under researched area and suggested using institutional 
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perspectives along with the resource based view for a better understanding of the 
behaviour of VCs across countries.   
 
2.9 Summary and Discussions 
    SMEs face higher constraints to access external finance than larger corporations 
(Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). This is a result of information opacity causing 
„information asymmetry‟ and „moral hazard‟, lack of collaterals, and weak cash flows 
(Berger and Udell, 1998). A „finance gap‟ occurs when opportunities arise in a 
venture beyond the capacity of personal or internal funding (Jarvis, 2006). Before 
resorting to external finance, many entrepreneurs use bootstrapping techniques 
through reducing capital requirements, applying more efficient cash flow, and 
personal sources of funding (Ebben and Johnson, 2006). Seeking external finance 
would be through either debt or equity; the source depends on the age and the size of 
the firm (Berger and Udell, 1998). Smaller and younger firms are more constrained to 
receive bank financing (Levenson and Willard, 2000); while the lager the start-up the 
more is the proportion of debt and reliance on bank finance (Cassar, 2004). Many 
high growth firms and start-ups with limited collaterals such as high technology firms 
are more likely to resort to external equity financing in the form of business angels 
and venture capitalists (Berger and Udell, 1998). Most recently using the internet 
technology, crowdfunding emerged to be another supplier of entrepreneurial finance 
in the form of equity (Schwienbacher and Larralde, 2010). Angel investors are greater 
in number and volume of investments than VCs (Fairchild, 2011). They would fill the 
gap before seeking venture capital (Schwienbacher, 2007), yet they remain with 
several value adding activities over and above the finance (Mason, 2007; Kerr et al., 
2014). Venture capital emerged to be a significant supplier of capital for 
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entrepreneurs by overcoming the information asymmetries (Gompers and Lerner, 
2001). The VC industry is growing worldwide and the US model is sought by many 
developed and developing economies (Wright et al., 2005b; Bruton et al., 2005).  
    In the light of the previous literature, entrepreneurship could be a solution for 
developing countries to create jobs and stir innovation, most importantly by 
promoting HGEs. The domain of entrepreneurial finance has proved to be of high 
importance towards promoting entrepreneurship. Equity tools in the form of angel 
financing and venture capital were found to be of indispensable importance for the 
growth of HGEs. Thus researching entrepreneurial finance and VC in Egypt is 
believed by this researcher to be of crucial importance; with the potential to contribute 
significantly to the recovery of the Egyptian economy.  
    The next chapter of the thesis will first contextualise the research in the light of the 
previous literature for the case of Egypt. It is then followed by the theoretical 
framework, namely institutional theory, which is further utilised in the analysis of the 
findings.  
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Chapter Three: Overview on Egypt and Access to Finance 
3.1 Introduction  
   This chapter is an overview on Egypt while exploring the environment of 
entrepreneurship and the available sources of finance. At some parts, it is important to 
relate to the MENA region to fully understand the context of Egypt as an integral part 
of the region. The chapter will start with an overview on Egypt, the key socio-
economic indicators, its business environment, and the government‟s reform attempts. 
Also it will illustrate the domain of SMEs and its importance to the Egyptian 
economy. It is followed by an assessment on the demand side of entrepreneurial 
finance represented in entrepreneurship using data from GEM report on Egypt and 
MENA. The situation of SMEs access to finance and entrepreneurial finance in Egypt 
and the key regulatory institutions will be further illustrated. A brief on the currently 
available debt and equity financial tools in Egypt will be discussed. Sources of 
funding are grouped into debt financing tools, the Social fund for Development as the 
official provider of capital to SMEs in Egypt, and finally equity financing. Debt 
finance options in the Egyptian market are SME banking, leasing, and factoring, also 
this part will highlight the supporting role of credit guarantee and credit rating in SME 
banking environment in Egypt. After, is an illustration on equity financing tools 
including the Nile Stock Exchange (NILEX) entitled to SMEs equity market, and 
BEDAYA fund for SMEs, as well as an overview on alternative sources of funding 
such as business angles, and venture capital in Egypt. The chapter will end with a 
summary on the ecosystem of entrepreneurial finance in Egypt. 
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3.2 Overview on Egypt  
 
Map (3.1): Egypt, Arab Republic of 
 
                       Source: www.mapsof.net 
 
    Modern Egypt as a republic was established after July 1952 when the monarchy 
was put to an end by the military. The king of Egypt was overthrown and the new 
republic of Egypt came in place. Naguib was the first official president that was later 
forced into a house arrest in 1954. Nasser came to power and adopted a socialist and 
centralised economic regime, state owned enterprises appeared and nationalisation 
was the main stream (Amin, 2000). During the 1970s, Sadat adopted an open-door 
policy which encouraged openness to the outer world and witnessed the emergence 
and growth of the private sector (Amin, 2000). Since 1982, when Mubarak came to 
power, the government of Egypt (GOE) made further adjustments towards a market 
economy by privatisation and more involvement of the private sector in the economy 
(Amin, 2004).  
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    Egypt is an integral part of the MENA region. The region shares common culture, 
language, and religion as well as political and demographic similarities. However, the 
region is of a high economic diversity, with oil rich countries such as Kuwait, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates and others with scarce resources and high 
population such as Egypt, Jordan, and Syria (World Bank, 2013). They are commonly 
classified as resource-rich, labour abundant countries, including Algeria, Iraq, Syria, 
and Yemen; resource-rich, labour-importing, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, The United Arab Emirates, and Libya; and resource-poor 
countries, including Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, 
and the Palestinian Authority (O‟Sullivan et al., 2011).  
 
Map (3.2): MENA Region 
 
                      Source: www.ohchr.org 
 
  The population of the region is 355 million inhabitants, with almost 23% living on 
less than 2 USD a day and 4% on less than 1.25 USD a day (World Bank, 2013). 
Egypt alone contributes to 23% of the total region‟s population (World Bank, 2013).   
50 
 
The GDP growth of the region was 5.6% in 2012, declined by half reaching 2.8% in 
2013, and was expected to increase again in 2014 (World Bank, 2013). It‟s notable 
that MENA oil exporting countries had a GDP growth of 5.7% in 2012 resulting in a 
current account surplus of about 440 billion USD in 2012 (IMF, 2012) which shows 
economic divergence across MENA countries. The GDP growth of Egypt was 6.8% 
in 2006, reached 7% in 2007 and 2008, then declined to 5% in 2009 and 2010, and 
further declined to 2% in 2011, 2012, and 2013 (World Bank, 2015). Inflation rates in 
the MENA increased from 6.6 % in 2010 to 9.3% in 2011 and reached 11.3% in 2012 
(IMF, 2012). Egypt‟s high inflation rates reached 7.6% in 2006 and then over 10% in 
2011(World Bank, 2013). Although, GDP in Egypt doubled from 2007 from approx. 
130 billion USD to 257 billion USD in 2012 and reaching 272 billion in 2013, GNI 
per capita (Atlas method) increased from just 1,390 USD in 2006 and reached 2,980 
in 2012, and 3,140 in 2013 with problems of poverty escalating from 19.6% of 
population under poverty line in 2005 to a staggering 25% in 2011(World Bank, 
2013; 2015). Besides poverty and hard economic situations in the resource scarce 
countries, which constitutes the vast majority of the region, unemployment rates 
reached as high as 24% in 2009 which is the highest among all world regions (Roudi, 
2011). Egypt‟s official unemployment rate has been 10% for the last 10 years 
(O‟Sullivan et al., 2011). The problem with unemployment and the inevitability for 
job creation is the major challenge facing the Middle East and North Africa (Youssef, 
2004); and it is expected to deteriorate with the current political and economic 
instability (O‟Sullivan et al., 2011).  
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Figure (3.1): Unemployment Rates Percentage in 2000 and 2009 
 
                                          Source: O‟Sullivan et. al., 2011:via World Bank 2011 
    
    The combination of poverty and unemployment triggered the Arab spring uprising 
among other reasons such as, dictatorship, corruption, and police brutality. The 
uprisings added to the economic burdens and the need for major economic and 
political reforms affecting Foreign direct investment (FDI) and tourism the most in 
Egypt (O‟Sullivan et al., 2011). The large youth population of the region could be 
considered as an economic opportunity, yet challenges such as unemployment, 
underemployment, female unemployment (Gender gap), brain drain, and increasing 
cost of livings added weighed down the youth of the region (Roudi, 2010). The 
private sector in Egypt contributes to 70% of non-agricultural employment 
(O‟Sullivan et al., 2011); yet there remains high unemployment even among the 
highly educated (O‟Sullivan et al., 2011). Most of the education in MENA prior to the 
1990s was preparing youth to state jobs and not the private sector; leading to lower 
productivity levels and thus slowing economic growth compared to other developing 
countries such as South-East Asia (Veganzones-Varoudakis, 2006). Thus, the 
education system might be partly responsible for this high unemployment. 
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Table (3.1) illustrates the contribution of youth to total labour force by gender 
compared to the rest of the world. 
 
Table (3.1) Labour Force Participation (LFP) and Unemployment (U) Rates (%) Among Youth 
Ages 15-24, By Gender and Region, 2009 
 
                                         Source: (Geneva:ILO, 2010): (Roudi, 2010) 
 
    It is argued that economic integration of the MENA region would help in the 
prosperity of its countries; little of this integration is taking place whether on trade, 
labour, capital flow, or regional economic policy coordination (El-Erian and Fischer, 
1996). MENA is a region of diverse economies, have the benefit of a large youth 
population, yet the vast majority are burdened by economic challenges, 
unemployment and underprivileged education. It is widely agreeable that 
entrepreneurship is a sound resolution to overcome unemployment; moreover, it has 
proven to be of significant effect on the economic development of nations (Eid, 
2006). 
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   3.3 Business Environment in Egypt 
   The business sector in Egypt has survived a radical change since the 1950s till 
present time. The shift from an era of national industries and state owned enterprises 
to an era of privatisation and major contribution of the private sector has taken the 
GOE over thirty years to approach a free market economy. Several reforms had taken 
place which came clear in the „Doing Business Report‟ by the World Bank (2008) as 
being on top of all reformers 2006/07 jumping 26 places in one year and second in 
business start-up reformers for the same years. Compared to 178 countries, Egypt 
ranked 43
rd
 on procedures to open a business, 16
th
 on days to open a business, 102
nd
 
for the cost to open a business. This makes Egypt easier to open a business in, yet 
more costly than most of the world. Further reforms took place in 2009, paid in 
minimum capital was reduced by 20%, and cost was reduced as a result of bar 
association fees‟ abolishment and time was cut due to tax registration automation; in 
2010, Egypt had eased the business start-up process by eliminating the minimum 
capital requirement and in 2011 it reduced the cost to start a business. However, 
according to „Doing Business Report‟ (2013) there were no further reforms between 
2011 and 2013. According to same report for doing business in year 2014, which is 
published in 2013, Egypt ranked 50
th
 out of 189 countries on procedures to open a 
business, with an overall rank of 128
th 
for ease of doing business. Egypt ranked a 
149
th
 for gaining construction permits and 105
th
 for getting electricity and property 
registration. Regarding access to credit Egypt ranked 86
th
 while 147
th
 and 148
th
 for 
protecting investors and paying taxes respectively. It was 83
rd
 for trading across 
borders and 156
th
 for enforcing contracts and 146
th
 for resolving insolvency. This 
shows a clear deficiency in the rule of law governing the Egyptian business 
environment. It also signals an attention on bankruptcy laws which is one of the worst 
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in the world according to the report. Although Egypt ranks well below average on the 
overall ease of doing business compared to MENA region, it came 3rd after the UAE, 
and Morocco on ease of starting a business and a joint second with UAE and Oman 
for ease of getting credit while Saudi Arabia came 1
st
. Egypt performed poorly and 
was ranked 16
th
 of 20 countries in the region for protecting investors and resolving 
insolvencies. The weakest performance was in enforcing contracts were it was ranked 
18
th
 and second from last ranked 19
th
 for paying taxes in the region.  
 
Figure (3.2): How Egypt and Comparator Economies Rank on the Ease of Doing Business 
 
                                Source: IBRD, (2013) 
    
   According to the Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI), Egypt scored an overall 
26.5% on the scale of 100%. The WGI report (a research dataset part of the World 
Bank Group) six aggregate governance indicators for 215 countries and territories 
over the period 1996-2012, covering i) Voice and Accountability, ii) Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence, iii) Government Effectiveness, iv) Regulatory 
Quality, v) Rule of Law, and vi) Control of Corruption (WGI, 2014).  
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   On the Index of Economic Freedom (EFI), Egypt also performed poorly with an 
overall declining trend in the past five years and an overall „mostly un-free‟ economy. 
 
Figure (3.3): 2013 Index of Economic Freedom, Egypt 
 
 
  3.4 SMEs in Egypt 
    Regarding the SMEs sector, in June 1998 "A Draft National Policy on Small and 
Medium Enterprise Development in Egypt" took place as a result of economic 
pressures burdening the GOE at that time. The Underserved segment of SMEs was 
found to be of high priority for the development of the socio-economic dimension in 
Egypt, according to the draft national policy (1998). The report identified five main 
"constraints", financial, input, marketing, regulatory, and management as institutional 
constraints. It then assigned a conceptual framework and general policy guidelines as 
a requirement of developing the sector. In another complementing report "Enhancing 
Competitiveness for SMEs in Egypt" (2004a), guidelines and policy frameworks were 
set to enhance the competitiveness of SMEs in Egypt in the globalising world 
economy such as: promotion of direct exports, business development services, 
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financial services, and innovation enhancing measures, organic clusters, networking 
and creating a favourable legal and regulatory environment. 
   According to the OECD (2010a) report on SME policy and promotion in Egypt, 
„medium-sized, small and micro-enterprises account for over 90% of active 
businesses and contribute to over 80% of GDP and 75% of total employment. The 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor‟s (Hattab, 2008) report for Egypt in 2008 estimated 
over 13% of adults were in the process of starting a business or already owned one 
that was under three years old. With an average of 1.83 jobs per start-up, the report 
estimated that the job creation potential of the 1.34 million ventures created in 2008 
was significant: if they succeeded, they would create some 2.5 million potential jobs. 
    
3.5 Entrepreneurship in Egypt 
   Entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial activities represent the demand side of 
entrepreneurial finance and VC. Thus, it is important to understand the implications of 
entrepreneurship in Egypt as one of the determinants shaping its entrepreneurial 
finance sector. It is hard to set a clear differentiation between the business owner i.e. 
SMEs, and entrepreneurship in Egypt. This was evident in the policy approaches 
targeting the sector which are mostly directed for the SMEs in general. Also regarding 
the GEM report on Egypt (Hattab, 2008; 2011) the sample does not differentiate 
between the two, however the GEM classification on necessity-motivated 
entrepreneurs and opportunity-motivated entrepreneurs partially helps in this 
differentiation. Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), a renowned research based 
initiative focuses on entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial activities across the world. 
The GEM included Jordan since 2004 in their global report, the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) since 2006, and Egypt since 2008. In 2009, a regional report on MENA 
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included 7 countries from the region as its base. The GEM-MENA report 2009 
(Stevenson et al., 2010) as well as the work by Eid (2005; 2006) showed 
heterogeneity among countries in the MENA region signaling a motive for country 
specific research and that generalisation within the region should be dealt with care. 
However, it remains indicative on the general direction of entrepreneurship and main 
themes arising across the region. Specifically, the cultural dimension which is 
relatively homogenous across the region was of significance to this study.  
 
       3.5.1 Perception of Entrepreneurship 
       On GEM global report 2012, over 75% of the respondents in MENA region 
considered entrepreneurship to be a good career choice, the same case was with Latin 
America and Sub-Saharan Africa (Xavier et al., 2013). In addition, the status of 
entrepreneurship in MENA is considered high and societies view positively a 
successful entrepreneur and have a low fear of failure to start their business 
(Stevenson et al., 2010). Regarding the perception and status of entrepreneurs in 
Egypt, Egypt ranked 12
th
 among the 43 GEM countries with adult population 
considering entrepreneurship as a career and perceived status of successful 
entrepreneurs highly in 2008, which even improved in percentage in 2010 to become 
the 14
th
 among 59 countries ahead of many efficiency and innovative driven countries 
(Hattab, 2008; 2011) . With 90% of the Egyptian population believes that a successful 
entrepreneur gets a high status in the society and 70% think the media gives adequate 
coverage on entrepreneurs (op cit.). In 2008, Egypt signalled a very low fear of failure 
rate ranking second after Iran indicating a surprising appetite for risk; however this 
has changed in 2010 to rank Egypt 11
th
 among the 59 GEM countries (Hattab, 2011). 
This is still a positive aspect in the country which indicates a good mindset for 
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entrepreneurship and low fear of failure. Moreover, it was found that 63% of the 
Egyptian population believes they have enough knowledge and qualifications to start 
their own business, however, on the other hand only 25% would consider a starting 
their own business in three years time (op cit.).  
 
   3.5.2 Entrepreneurship Activity 
    A total of 2.7 million are entrepreneurially active in Egypt in 2010; starting 
731,000 new enterprises compared to three million nascent entrepreneurs in the 
process to start 1.34 million new enterprises in 2008 (Hattab, 2008; 2011). Egypt was 
ranked last on the TEA for factor-driven economies in 2010 (Hattab, 2011). Egypt 
was ranked 11
th
 among 43 countries in the early stage Total Entrepreneurial Activity 
(TEA) (Hattab, 2008); however it deteriorated in the ranking in 2010 to become the 
37
th
 among 59 countries (Hattab, 2011). Nevertheless, the region is considered to have 
low rates of entrepreneurship activity and establishing businesses compared to the rest 
of the world (Xavier et al., 2013). Although, 24% of the adult population in MENA is 
involved in an entrepreneurial activity (Stevenson et al., 2010), only 0.6 new limited 
liability firms per 100 adults entered the economy in the MENA region during 2004-
2009 (OECD, 2013). When compared to over 4.2 in high-income countries, 2.2 in 
Europe and Central Asia and 1.3 in Latin America it shows the low level of business 
formation in the region, furthermore even if the formal and informal sectors are 
combined it still lags behind other emerging economies (OECD, 2013). This could 
indicate a large sector of informal businesses in addition to the large number with an 
„intention‟ to be an entrepreneur, which is included in GEM‟s data of entrepreneurial 
activity. It could be an opportunity for policy makers to build on the momentum of 
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those intending to start their business to become entrepreneurs and establish their own 
businesses. 
    
      3.5.3 Motives for Entrepreneurship 
      There are different motives towards entrepreneurship; the GEM research 
categorises entrepreneurs to necessity driven, where entrepreneurs are forced to start 
their business out of poverty conditions, and opportunity driven where entrepreneurs 
find a good business opportunity and pursue their trade accordingly. In the case of 
MENA, it was found that 27% of entrepreneurial activity is necessity driven; it also 
showed that it ranges from 8% in UAE to over a third in Yemen (Stevenson et al., 
2010). Albeit, the UAE has the lowest necessity entrepreneurs, two thirds of Emiratis 
would start a new venture primarily to increase their income (El-Sokary, 2013). In the 
case of Egypt in 2008, “opportunity-entrepreneurship” and “necessity-
entrepreneurship” had a ratio of 4.3:1 which was a positive sign and “unexpected” for 
types of entrepreneurs in developing countries (Hattab, 2009: p.14). However, this has 
changed dramatically, in 2010 it was found that 53% of early stage entrepreneurs 
were necessity driven which was one of the highest for GEM countries (Hattab, 
2011). It is confirmed within GEM studies that necessity entrepreneurs are much 
higher in low income countries than high income; however, the MENA region with 
only 27% necessity entrepreneurs is much lower than other low-income parts of the 
world that reaches up to 45% (Stevenson et. al., 2010). Usually in Latin America and 
Asia women contribute to a large portion of necessity entrepreneurs which might 
explain how MENA is low on this aspect as it has a very low participation of female 
entrepreneurs (Xavier et al., 2013). Another explanation might be the charitable 
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Islamic practices in the region which leads to less necessity and thus less necessity 
driven entrepreneurs (Stevenson et al., 2010).  
      
     3.5.4 Demography of Entrepreneurs 
      Regarding the demographics of Entrepreneurs in MENA, a gender gap is highly 
apparent and is one of the highest in the world (Stevenson et al., 2010); notable in 
Egypt and Palestine where less than 20% of entrepreneurs are women (Xavier et al., 
2013). In MENA, men are 2.8 times more likely than women to start their business 
(Xavier et al., 2013); with countries such as Syria and Palestine reaching 4 to 1 while 
Yemen and Algeria would reach 1.5 to 1 all in favour of men (Stevenson et al., 2010). 
Regarding age of entrepreneurs, the findings were consistent with the rest of GEM 
countries where the majority of entrepreneurs were within the age bracket of 25-34 
years. Given that there are 90 million individuals in MENA in the age of 15-24 in 
2010 (Roudi, 2010), this provides the region with a large group of potential future 
entrepreneurs. The intentions to start a business increases with the level of education 
and household income in MENA which is in line with the rest of the world, yet less 
than 5% of adults received any training or formal education on how to start a business 
(Stevenson et al., 2010).  
 
 3.6 SMEs Access to Finance in Egypt 
   Access to finance has long been an issue for the Egyptian business sector; it has 
been underdeveloped till the early 2000s when compared with other GCC MENA 
region (OECD, 2010). However, access to finance remains highly unfavourable for 
MSMEs all over the MENA region; it is estimated that the financing gap for MSMEs 
in MENA is 320 to 390 billion USD (IFC, 2011). In Egypt, 49% of nascent 
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entrepreneurs will totally self finance their ventures while 51% will seek external 
funding (Hattab, 2011). The start-up capital required to start a business is of a median 
of 50,000 EGP (approx. 4,500 GBP); 91% of businesses can be started with 500,000 
EGP (approx. 45,000 GBP) or less (Hattab, 2008). 
   According to OECD (2010b) report on access to finance in Egypt, the GoE had 
undergone major reforms staring from 2004. This financial sector reform included the 
the banking sector, introducing a centralised non-banking financial services regulatory 
authority (Egyptian Financial Regulatory Authority, EFSA), improving the stock 
market exchange, attempting to enhance risk capital, developing credit guarantee 
schemes, and improving credit rating and quality of information. However, further 
improvement is needed to enhance the financial sector, such as updating bankruptcy 
laws, promoting risk capital, and improving financial literacy, among other 
suggestions (OECD, 2010a). 
  
 3.7 Financial Regulatory Institutions 
    There are two main institutions that regulate the financial markets, the Central Bank 
of Egypt (CBE) for all the banking activities, and the Egyptian Financial Supervisory 
Authority (EFSA) governing all the non-banking financial services. The Central Bank 
of Egypt (CBE) is an autonomous regulatory body, assuming the authorities and 
powers vested therein by Law No. 88 for 2003, and the Presidential Decree No. 65 for 
2004 (CBE, 2013). The main objectives of the CBE as published on their website are 
realizing price stability and ensuring the soundness of the banking system; formulating 
and implementing the monetary, credit and banking policies; issuing banknotes and 
determining their denominations and specifications; supervising the banking sector; 
managing the foreign currency international reserves of the country; regulating the 
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functioning of the foreign exchange market; supervising the national payments' 
system; and recording and following up on Egypt's external debt (public and private) 
(op.cit.). The CBE as part of a national programme issued a decree on improving 
SMEs finance in Egypt. The CBE and the Egyptian Banking Institute (EBI), which is a 
non-profit organisation since 1991 under the auspices of the CBE responsible for 
qualification, training and research for the Egyptian banking sector (ebi.org.eg), 
established a dedicated SME unit in 2009 for the specific purpose of enhancing SMEs 
financing environment (SME-Egypt, 2013). The unit is part of the Business 
Development Support Services Project (BDSSP) funded by the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA). The definition of SMEs is a highly debatable issue 
(Gibson and van der Vaart, 2008) and details on definition are beyond the scope of this 
research. However, the definition of SME in Egypt is according to the law no. 141 for 
the year 2004 on Development of Small Enterprises; a small enterprise should have a 
paid in capital of not less than 50000 EGP (approx. 4,500 GBP) and not more than 1 
million EGP (approx. 90,000 GBP), and with no more than 50 employees, a Very 
Small Enterprise (VSE) should have a paid in capital of less than 50000 EGP (approx. 
4,500 GBP) (SFD, 2013). According to EBI publication, the turnover of a small 
enterprise is between 1 and 10 million EGP (approx. 90,000 to 900,000 GBP) per 
annum, while a medium enterprise annual sales are between 10 and 100 million EGP 
and an employment of between 50 and 200 employees (Poldermans, 2011). In 
December 2008, the CBE passed a regulation by reducing the reserve requirements for 
SME lending in an effort to provide a financial incentive to the banks (Poldermans, 
2011).  
    The other regulatory institution in the financial market is the Egyptian Financial 
Supervisory Authority (EFSA). The EFSA is responsible for governing all the non-
63 
 
banking financial activities, including „the Capital Market, the Exchange, all activities 
related to Insurance Services, Mortgage Finance, Financial Leasing, Factoring and 
Securitization‟ (EFSA, 2013). EFSA is established in accordance to law 10 of the year 
2009. The Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority is a replacement for the Egyptian 
Insurance Supervisory Authority, the Capital Market Authority, and the Mortgage 
Finance Authority in application of the provisions of the supervision and regulation of 
Insurance law no. 10 of 1981, the Capital Market law no. 95 of 1992, the Depository 
and Central registry law no. 93 of 2000, the Mortgage Finance law no. 148 of 2001, as 
well as other related laws and decrees that are part of the mandates of the above 
authorities; and EFSA is the concerned administrative body entitled to apply the 
Financial Leasing provisions promulgated by law no. 95 of 1995 (op. cit.). This was 
all part of the financial services reform that took place in 2004 including all banking 
and non-banking financial services. EFSA is also the supervisory body for micro 
finance and venture capital under the law no. 95 of year 1995. One of EFSA‟s main 
objectives is “Support efforts aiming at developing non-banking financial markets to 
enhance methods and possibility of market penetration” which includes facilitating 
financing access by SMEs (EFSA, 2013). 
 
3.8 Overview on SME Financial Tools in Egypt 
    3.8.1 Debt Financing 
        3.8.1.1 SME Banking 
    Bank credit is the dominant and mostly the only significant source of finance to the 
private sector in the MENA region (Rocha et al., 2011). On the other hand, SMEs 
access to bank finance is limited all over the MENA region with a very small 
percentage of the total lending portfolio of an average of 8% compared to 16.2% for 
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middle income countries and 22.1% for high income countries; Egypt is no exception 
counting to 5% of the total lending in 2009 (Rocha et al., 2011). SME banking in 
Egypt started to pick up in years 2004 and 2005 as a national strategy direction; 
around half of the 39 banks in Egypt are currently involved in SME banking 
(Poldermans, 2011).  
     Based on an SME nation-wide census, the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) and the 
Egyptian Banking Institute (EBI) commissioned the Central Agency for Public 
Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) conducted a survey on the economy of SMEs 
in Egypt. El-Said, Al-Said, and Zaki (2013) analysed this data and came with a 
conclusion that less than 50% of the sample deals with banks and very few are able to 
export. They also found that the concentration is highly skewed toward only three 
governorates with almost 50% in Cairo, Sharqia, and Gharbiya mainly in the 
manufacturing and trading sectors. Almost 60% of the legal setup of the SMEs sample 
was a sole proprietorship and the remaining 40% distributed among other forms of 
companies with only 7.3% as stock joint. Noticeably, 82% of the SMEs were of a 
capital of less than 250,000 EGP (approx. 23,000 GBP), and almost 85% with less 
than 20 workers and over 50% have a turnover of less than 500,000 EGP (approx. 
45,000 GBP). Worth to mention is that within the 47% who deal with banks, only 
22.4% have facilities from the banks. It is clear that SMEs in Egypt especially those 
with less than 20 workers and capital less than 250,000 EGP have a serious obstacle to 
access banking finance (El-Said et al., 2013).  
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Figure (3.4): SME Loans as a Percentage of Total Loans in Selected Economies in MENA, 2009 
 
          Source: Roche et al., (2011) 
 
     Adding to the problem of banking finance to SMEs, the banking sector in general is 
shy on lending to the private sector. Herrera, Hurlin, and Zaki (2013), pointed that 
there is a 10 per cent fall in private credit in the banks in Egypt after January 2011. 
They mentioned that credit to the government accounted to the majority of this decline 
while reduced economic activity contributed around 15 per cent of the total fall in 
credit. Moreover according to a survey by NILEX (Nile Stock Exchange for Mid and 
Small Cap), only 6% of the Egyptian banks total portfolio is directed to SMEs with a 
92% rejection for the total applications (OECD, 2010b). This signals that banks are 
adding to the pressure of access to finance of the private sector, nonetheless it adds 
more impediments in front of SMEs accessing bank finance.  
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   3.8.1.2 Leasing 
   There are currently 207 registered leasing companies (EFSA, 2013). According to 
the Egyptian Leasing Association (ELA), “most of these companies are inactive, as 
they are essentially "single-contract companies", established for the purpose of one-off 
leasing deals enabling them to benefit from the five-year tax holiday granted to 
financial leasing companies” (ELA, 2013). Accordingly, the financial leasing industry 
in Egypt consists of 10 major market players, accounting for more than 90% of the 
new contracts in the market. Leasing in Egypt is governed by Law 95 for 1995, and it 
is for commercial purposes only and excludes targeting consumers (op. cit.). 
Within the scope of the SME policy development project (SMEPoL), Ministry of 
Finance (MoF, 2004b) published a report on enhancing opportunities for SME leasing. 
The report addressed the regulatory and technical problems facing SME leasing, 
however, it emphasised the importance of leasing as a financial tool that can 
considerably facilitates SMEs access to finance in Egypt (op. cit.). Egypt is one of few 
MENA countries that strive to grow its underdeveloped financial leasing sector, 
knowingly that it can play a significant role especially to SMEs, however many 
impediments including financial and regulatory factors is hampering its development 
(Nasr, 2004). It is argued that leasing is an important financial tool for SMEs when 
supported by credit guarantee schemes (Kraemer-Eis and Lang, 2012). “The small size 
of the leasing industry in MENA is disappointing. The industry is Sharia compliant by 
its nature and could provide an important alternative source of investment finance for 
small, medium, and even large enterprises, especially in a region where the collateral 
regime remains weak, depriving many enterprises of credit” (Rocha et. al., 2011; 
p.83). 
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    3.8.1.3 Factoring 
   Factoring is another debt financing tool, where factoring companies discount 
collectable invoices incurring a fee or percentage in exchange of immediate cash. It is 
a growing source of financing all over the world for large corporations and SMEs 
(Klapper, 2006). In the case of Egypt there are only two licensed Factoring companies 
of which only one is operational (MoI, 2013). „Egypt Factors‟ was established in 2006 
in a joint venture between Commercial International Bank Egypt (CIB) 40%, 
FIMBank Malta 40%, and International Finance Corporation (IFC) 20% 
(egyptfactors.com). According to the company‟s website, the business has to generate 
40 million EGP (3.7 million GBP) of annual sales or a monthly turnover of 3.3 million 
EGP (300,000 GBP) in the form of commercial receivables, to be able use factoring 
services. The company funds between 80 to 90% of the purchased invoice in cash, and 
they cover international and domestic trading (op cit.). 
 
   3.8.1.4 Credit Guarantee 
     An important component in facilitating SMEs access to finance is a credit 
guarantee institution (OECD, 2010b). It is aspired that this form of initiative would 
encourage banks towards more SME lending. In Egypt, an initiative between the 
Ministry of International Cooperation, the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), and the Credit Guarantee Company lead to the establishment 
of an SME credit guarantee programme (CGC, 2013). Credit Guarantee company was 
established in 1991, yet the SME programme was launched in 2011. The main 
objective of the programme is to enhance the role of banks in SME credit to help in 
the economic growth of Egypt by decreasing unemployment and increasing exports of 
SMEs. The target business is an investment cost of 40,000 EGP till 50 million EGP. 
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They have no sector preference and finance fixed assets as well as working capital. 
The minimum required credit should be no less than 10,000 EGP and no more than 2.5 
million EGP for a single venture. The portion guaranteed is typically 75% which 
increases to 80% for agricultural programmes and financial services in rural areas. The 
term of guarantee is of a minimum of 6months and a maximum of 5 years that could 
be extended upon request of the bank. The company also cooperates under a signed 
protocol with the Egyptian factoring company and the Egyptian company for export 
guarantee (op cit.). 
 
Figure (3.5): Number of Guarantees per Year in Selected Economies in MENA, 2009 
 
                             Source: Saadani et al, (2011); Rocha et al, (2011) 
   
   Although the CGC had achieved a „critical size‟ needed to have an impact on SME 
lending in Egypt (OECD, 2010b); figure (3.5) shows that Egypt and the whole MENA 
region still have plenty of room to increase the credit guarantee activities. 
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   3.8.1.5 Credit Rating 
   Credit rating is a necessity for any economy to enhance and facilitate its access to 
finance, especially SMEs (OECD, 2010b). Egypt launched its first credit bureau in 
2005, which till 2007 then it was fully functional. The Egyptian Credit Bureau, 
branded as „I-Score‟, is a private company funded by 25 banks and the Social Fund for 
Development (I-Score, 2013). The company was established under the auspices of the 
CBE and with support of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and 
technological support of Dun and Bradstreet (OECD, 2010b). I-Score holds database 
for individuals and SMEs; it now holds more than 92% of credit data of individuals 
and SMEs from commercial banks in Egypt (both banks and non-banks) as of June 
2010 (I-Score, 2013). The activities of I-score have been very successful in improving 
the quality of information and ensuring greater credit transparency (OECD, 2010b).  
 
   3.8.2 Social Fund for Development (SFD) 
    The SFD focuses on poverty alleviation and regional inequality in the more 
deprived areas such as the Upper-Egypt, it is the largest governmental institution 
representing and responsible for small enterprises in Egypt (OECD, 2010a). A law on 
micro and small enterprises MSEs was introduced in 2004 that targeted to improve 
and promote small enterprises in Egypt through the SFD. According to the SFD 
official website the role of the SFD ranges from financial services, non-financial 
service, and community development. The financial services constitutes of direct 
lending, finance through intermediary agencies and banks, finance through 
franchising, and micro-finance. As for the non-financial services, they offer training 
and training courses, internal and external exhibitions, business and technology 
incubators, and other services such as marketing, technical support, business 
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development, and feasibility studies. Regarding the community development, SFD 
finances infrastructure projects, community development projects, and environment 
related projects. The SFD remains the top recipient of donor agencies and 
developmental agencies in Egypt. In 2012, SFD signed 6 agreements with the World 
Bank, European Investment Bank, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD) and Arab Fund for Social and Economic 
Development with loans totalling 190 million USD for small and micro enterprises 
and grants totalling 228 million USD for labour-intensive projects and non-financial 
services (SFD, 2012). In Figure (3.6) shows the amount of financing disbursed during 
the last four years. It shows the uptrend in the outflow of capital that would also signal 
the strength of endowments committed to the SFD. 
 
Figure (3.6): Amounts disbursed to MSEs within 2009-2012 in million EGP 
 
             Source: SFD Progress Report 2012 
 
     The SFD is the main co-ordinator for the MSE framework in Egypt; however it 
does not cover medium size enterprises and high growth enterprises (OECD, 2010a). 
The SFD is also broad in its activities; it has its own business incubation programme. 
The programme included 7 incubators both physical and virtual in Cairo and other 
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selected governorates; SFD supplies free working space as well as business loans with 
a 6% interest (STFD, 2012). 
 
3.8.3 Equity Financing 
   3.8.3.1 Nile Stock Exchange 
   Another government initiative was introduced in 2008 to enhance the access to 
finance to SMEs in Egypt is the NILEX, and it began trading on June 2010. It is the 
Egyptian stock exchange for growing small and medium enterprises. According to the 
NILEX brochure posted on their website, they are the first small and mid-cap market 
in the MENA region. They target listing any company from any sector that meets the 
listing requirements. One of the requirements is to have a nominated adviser. The 
minimum free float should be 10% of the shares and number of shareholders should 
not be less than 25. The issued capital should not be more than 50 million EGP when 
listed and should not exceed 100 million at any time. The annual listing fees are 0.5 
per thousand EGP annually with a minimum of 500 EGP and a maximum of 30,000 
EGP. Trading fees are 1/10 per thousand of total transaction with a maximum of 100 
EGP. There are currently 23 listed companies of which 22 are trading. Two were listed 
in 2008, three in 2009, a record high nine in 2010, three in 2011, three in 2012, and 
four in 2013 of which one is not traded yet. The current numbers and volume are not 
what was expected from the launch of the NILEX, however the obvious effect of the 
political situation visible in 2011 through 2013 maybe a good explanation specially 
with the record high of 2010. On another level, only two companies out of the 24 
listed companies are in the technology business.  
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     3.8.3.2 Bedaya Fund  
     The last governmental initiative on the SME financing list is the BEDAYA fund 
which is established by the General Authority of Free zones and Investment (GAFI), a 
division of the Ministry of Investment (MoI). BEDAYA 1 is a fund specialised in 
PE/VC financing to SMEs in Egypt, its target size is 134 million EGP and has a fixed 
term of 10 years. The investment strategy is in companies of net worth between 2 and 
50 million EGP and an annual turnover of not more than 120 million EGP. No more 
than 50% shall be invested in SMEs ranging from 25 million EGP and 50 million EGP 
net worth. Not less than 2% and no more than 15% are allocated to “green fields”. As 
for the geographical allocation, not more than 40% is to be invested in SMEs in Cairo 
and a maximum of 25% is to be invested in one sector. The fund focuses on SMEs 
with high return on job creation. The Bedaya Fund is part of the GAFI initiative to 
support SMEs and entrepreneurship, among other services delivered in this 
programme is their business development services. It is an SME clinic where a full 
range of consultancy is delivered to assist in the growth of the SMEs. The 
entrepreneurship programme is where GAFI plays a catalytic role with other 
programmes and initiatives. Also there is a pilot project on SMEs business linkages. 
 
   3.8.3.3 Alternative Sources of Financing 
    This part focuses on the other equity financing tools, specifically angel financing 
and venture capital. The domain of alternative financing is not well established in 
Egypt. Until the early 2000s such forms of financing were non-existent. Although 
„business angel‟ investment was found significant in Egypt‟s GEM report (Hattab, 
2009), there was no evidence for organised networks of habitual business angels as 
known in developed economies in her research. The amount of „angel‟ financing was 
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found approximately L.E. 8.13 billion which represents 1% of the GDP in 2008; with 
a significant one third expecting no return at all indicating “love money” investment is 
in family members‟ businesses (Hattab, 2008).  
      Regarding VC/PE activities, law no. 95 on venture capital (risk capital) and other 
non-banking financial tools was introduced in 1995; nevertheless, most of the 
registered companies under that law don‟t undertake any venture capital activities and 
are solely seeking some tax benefits (OECD, 2010b).  
        The venture capital industry in Egypt is still nascent. It is relatively small with 
around 15 operating VC/PE firms, while most activities are late-stage funding PE 
firms. Entrepreneurial finance, in the form of PE/VC, is argued to promote 
entrepreneurship and offers solutions to create jobs and help in economic growth as 
proven by other economies (Eid, 2006). Promoting a venture capital industry in Egypt 
funding early-stage and start-ups is sought after by the Egyptian government to 
enhance entrepreneurship. The January revolution in 2011 emphasised the urgency to 
create jobs and capitalise on the young population in Egypt. Thus, further attention 
towards entrepreneurial finance in general and VC in particular is needed to capitalise 
on the unprecedented entrepreneurial momentum taking place after the revolution to 
enhance economic growth.  
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3.9 Overview on VC in Egypt and MENA 
    According to Eid (2006), promoting entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial finance 
using the capital growth in the PE market will eventually lead to job creation and 
economic growth in the MENA region (2006). Eid (2011) had republished her work 
after the Arab spring uprisings to stress on the urgency and topicality of her work to 
the current circumstances. “It is not hard to understand why policymakers are such 
strong proponents of PE in general and VC in particular. Both academic and 
practitioner-oriented research has clearly demonstrated that such investing creates 
significant economic value” (Megginson, 2004; 90). According to the MENA 
investment policy brief by the OECD (2006) investment programme focusing on its 
VC/PE industries, knowledge based economies are a must for a country‟s 
competitiveness and growth, and the MENA region is no exception. They added that 
innovation and risk taking are its major components which urge the region‟s policy 
makers to realise the need for supporting innovation and its key barriers through 
addressing the entrepreneurial financing gap. The report showed great optimism in 
VC industry‟s potential in the region; however, the industry was described „nascent‟. 
They identified three main challenges and three opportunities related to the VC/PE 
development in the region. The first challenge was decreasing unemployment which 
have been proven in other nations that VC helped in increasing employment rates, 
second was economic diversification in non-oil industries especially high technology 
ventures which is a complement of the VC industry, and third was addressing the 
entrepreneurial finance gap as a main hurdle towards entrepreneurship in the region. 
The three opportunities were, first the unprecedented liquidity caused by record oil 
prices accompanied by the private wealth of high net worth individuals in the Gulf 
reaching 1.5 trillion USD in 2007, second was the fact that VC firms worldwide are 
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expanding and searching for new opportunities in emerging economies, and third was 
the compliance of the VC concept with Islamic finance which is gaining a great 
momentum in the region. From this policy brief further investigation for the 
challenges and opportunities for a VC industry was required.  
   According to Morales, Schlichting, and Youssef (2011), the PE industry is growing 
remarkably, and there needs to be a further understanding of the industry to assess its 
potential development; they highlighted the issues on the opacity of information and 
the lack of data in the region and how it‟s negatively affecting understanding and thus 
the evaluation of the industry.  
     Until 2004 the private equity funds were merely over a billion USD and between 
1994 and 2005 USD 5.8 billion were raised as PE with 41% raised in 2005 alone 
(OECD, 2006), with Egypt and UAE receiving almost 30% of the MENA PE funding 
since 1998 till 2006 (Zawya.com, 2006) . The MENA region and specifically the 
GCC has always been a target area for raising funds for PEs in the US and Europe; 
hence the large numbers of high net worth individuals (HNWIs) and Sovereign 
Wealth Funds (SWFs) (Morales et al., 2011). However in the last few years it 
managed to attract western PEs as a destination (BVCA, 2013). Before year 2000 PE 
only existed in Egypt for its more developed business infrastructure and privatisation 
opportunities; the industry started to grow in the GCC in 2004 and 2005 accompanied 
by the accumulated wealth of historic oil price rises (BVCA, 2013). As of 2011 there 
were 120 firms in the MENA region in both PE and VC activities (Morales et al., 
2011). Figure (3.7) shows the annual raised PE/VC funds in terms of numbers and 
amount. 
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Figure (3.7): Funds raised by year 
 
 
  Source: MEPEA, (2013): Zawya Private Equity Monitor 
   
 
     Following to the year 2006 the trend was still upwards in the fundraising and 
reached its peak in the year 2007; in 2008 there was a significant decline that was 
followed by a sharp drop in 2009 and the following years. The drop was in both the 
amount raised and the number of funds raising capital. This is in part an effect of the 
slowdown of the global economy and the financial crisis that have affected many of 
the regional funds as well as HNWI who suffered large losses.  According to Middle-
East Private Equity Association (MEPEA) report (2013), this might as well be a 
reflection for the increasing investors‟ focus on growth capital, VC and SMEs for 
those activities would require less sums of investment. The focus on VC and growth 
capital was noticed as early as 2006, “Appetite is forming to invest in these higher-
risk funds that provide seed or early-stage capital to nascent businesses” (MEED, 
2006). It prevailed more evidently post global financial crisis and the beginning of the 
Arab spring uprisings; “We have seen an increase in growth capital, VC, and SME 
investments which are generally lower value, minority interest investments. There has 
been an absence of large buy out deals post the global financial crisis and is 
anticipated to remain the case for the next 12 to 18 months.” (MEPEA, 2013: p.11).  
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The current „democratisation‟ of the region is expected to improve the entrepreneurial 
environment and eventually the SME sector is thought to gain a larger share of the 
region‟s PE investments which was neglected by the PE sector (op cit.).  
        Regarding the regional share of PE investments in the MENA region, there has 
been a shift from Saudi Arabia and Egypt towards the Levant countries, especially 
Lebanon which more than doubled its share from 6% in 2006 to 15% in 2012. Also 
Jordan and the Palestinian Territories witnessed a significant increase reaching 6% 
and 8% of the total investments respectively. Morocco witnessed a slight increase 
from 14% to 16% to become the top recipient of investments in the MENA region. 
Egypt was the top recipient with 17% since 2006 reaching 12% in 2012 and coming 
third after Morocco and Lebanon. This shows a significant effect after the 25
th
 of 
January revolution and the aftermath of political and economic turmoil. It might also 
be a result of the slowdown for privatisation opportunities. Figure (3.8) shows the 
split of investments since 2006 and the current situation in 2012. 
 
Figure (3.8): Regional split of investment volume  
 
     
                    Since 2006                                                          Since 2012                
 
  Source: MEPEA (2013): Zawya Private Equity Monitor 
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    Concerning the sectors of investment of the PE industry in the MENA region, there 
is a dramatic shift towards the IT sector in the region. Since 2006 the share of the 
investment to the IT sector was a mere 15% which reached a staggering 40% of all 
PE/VC investments in 2012 where 35 out of 36 investments where venture capital in 
nature (MEPEA, 2013). This is an outcome of the decline in buy-outs and larger deals 
in the region, however, it still signals a healthy component in the development of the 
region‟s economy. In 2006, the Middle-East Economic Digest stated that the majority 
of the industry is inclined towards late stage financing (PE) with the real estate sector 
attracting the majority of the funds. The article showed that there is a need for other 
investment opportunities and that the market will shift towards venture capital 
(MEED, 2006). The construction sector had the most declines from 9% since 2006 to a 
negligible contribution. The industrial manufacturing decreased from 12% to 9% 
during the same period while the remaining sectors were snot highly affected. 
 
  3.10 Summary 
    Egypt is facing many political and economic challenges. The escalating issue of 
unemployment remains one of its biggest problems. However, promoting 
entrepreneurship among the large numbers of its youth population can be seen as an 
opportunity and part of a solution to its economic burdens and high unemployment. 
Many hurdles in the business environment and regulations might not be supportive to 
an entrepreneurial ecosystem. Cumbersome regulations to start and dissolve a business 
are present; low enforcement of law, corruption, and low economic freedom among 
other constraints might obstruct the development of entrepreneurship in Egypt. On the 
other hand, positive perception on entrepreneurship and low fear of failure in Egypt 
are positive indicators that might help increase entrepreneurial activities. Lack of 
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sufficient education, training, apparent gender gap and lack innovation seems to be 
among the major impediments. Despite the charitable and cooperative nature evident 
in „love money‟ support to entrepreneurs, a finance gap to SMEs and start-ups is still a 
major aspect hindering new business formation and growth of existing businesses. The 
government of Egypt aware of this important obstacle introduced a package of reforms 
for the financial sector with an emphasis on SME financing. The banking sector and 
debt financing are slowly developing through SME lending, leasing, factoring as well 
as the supporting activities of credit guarantee and credit rating. Other initiatives such 
as the SFD is also playing an important role to the MSEs, however medium size and 
equity financing is beyond its scope. The introduction of the NILEX and the recently 
established BEDAYA fund were introduced by the government to support in equity 
financing to SMEs among the efforts initiated to foster entrepreneurship and promote 
venture capital as a contributor to entrepreneurial finance. The unprecedented liquidity 
caused by record oil prices accompanied by the private wealth of high net worth 
individuals in the Gulf contributed to the growth of a PE industry in the MENA region 
with large share in Egypt. The fact that the appetite for VC firms is increasing and 
inclining towards high growth technology based ventures with the compliance of the 
VC concept with Islamic finance, which is gaining a great momentum in the region, 
are all in favour of a vivid VC industry in the region and Egypt. This research explores 
entrepreneurial finance in Egypt and the opportunities for its development with a 
deliberate focus on the venture capital industry as a prospect component towards 
entrepreneurship development and supporting HGEs in Egypt. In doing so, this study 
adopts an institutional theory framework to analyse entrepreneurial finance and VC 
respectively. The coming chapter is the theoretical framework, then the research 
methodology, followed by the analysis of the findings and further discussions.  
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Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework 
4.1 Introduction 
   This thesis explores the situation of entrepreneurial finance and venture capital in 
Egypt and thus relevant organisation-environment theories would be a plausible 
theoretical foundation fitting the structure of this research. It is important to take into 
consideration the compatibility and the applicability of those theories to emerging 
economies. It is imperative to take into account the distinctive characteristics and 
changing nature of emerging economies and therefore choose a framework that would 
give a comprehensive explanation on both the macro-level and firm-level. The general 
environment is of high essence to this research, specifically in regard to the economic, 
social, cultural, and legal context. According to Hatch (1997), the most influential 
theories that are capable of explaining the relationship between organisations and the 
environment are resource dependency theory, population ecology, and institutional 
theory. In addition, Pfeffer (2003) considered these to be the three important theories 
on organisations and their environment as they all share in common the emphasis and 
importance of the surrounding environment. The differences between the three are 
mainly in the level of analysis and the degree of influence of organisations on the 
environment and vice versa; whether organisations are passive in their environments 
or they are the shapers of this environment. 
     It is worth mentioning that in this chapter the use of theoretical foundation is for 
data analysis purposes and not as an explanatory theory. Thus, the use of institutional 
theory and its categorisation (elaborated in section 4.4) was found to be most suitable 
as an analysis framework most appreciated for data presentation and analysis of 
findings in chapters six and seven. The use of institutional theory framework in a 
similar manner was utilised largely in studies on entrepreneurial finance and VC 
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(Bruton, Ahlstrom and Singh, 2002; Isaksson, Cornelius, Landstrom and Junghagen, 
2004; Wright et al., 2005b; Scheela and Van Dinh, 2004; Zacharakis, McMullen and 
Shepherd, 2007; Bruton et al., 2010; Valdez and Richardson, 2013) (Further 
discussions in section 4.5). 
   The following section introduces the three most influential theories, namely resource 
dependency, population ecology, and institutional theory, followed by the rationale for 
adopting the institutional theory framework. The chapter then focuses on institutional 
theory and its categorisation, highlighting the previous research adopting the same 
framework, then the gap in literature, research questions, and finally the research 
direction.  
 
4.2 Theoretical Foundation 
      A brief introduction on resource dependence theory, population ecology, and 
institutional theory is essential to consider their fitness to this research. First, resource 
dependence theory argues that the organisation is strongly connected to the external 
resources of the environment, such as capital, raw materials, labour, equipment and 
knowledge, and by being able to understand these factors, it helps overcoming the 
dependency on them (Barney, 1991). This makes organisations vulnerable if they are 
highly dependent on their external resources, however, understanding and overcoming 
such vulnerability is argued to be the most important advantage of this theory (Hatch 
1997). The essence is that organisations do need resources; financial, physical, 
information, which are all acquired from the environment and therefore dependent on 
external resources (Pfeffer, 2003; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2007). On the other hand, 
population ecology theory studies the patterns of success and failure of organisations 
while they compete for their resources (Hatch, 1997). However, similar to resource 
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dependence theory, population ecology views organisations as dependent on the 
environment. According to Pfeffer (2003), resource dependence theory and 
institutional theory differ in how they deal with environmental determinism, strategic 
choices, and connections between external and internal dynamics, yet both theories are 
growing close together. Some researchers combine resource dependence theory and 
institutional theory, such as on sustainable competitive advantage (Oliver, 1997), and 
on studying organisations such as large law firms (Sherer and Lee, 2002), and on 
SMEs export choices (Hessels and Terjesen, 2010). Moreover, according to Greening 
and Gray (1994), in their paper testing a model of organisational response to social 
and political issues, there are some complementarities between the resource based 
theory and institutional theory, however, they are distinct on the extent of influence of 
managerial decisions on the environment. 
     Within the scope of this research, resource dependence theory would explain how 
vulnerable and dependant entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial finance are on the 
resources of the environment, however it will not be able to explain other effects from 
a broader perspective such as cultural and normative perspectives which remains of 
essence to the objective of this research. Also, as the level of analysis of resource 
dependence theory differs from both population ecology and institutional theory since 
it focuses on the organisational level while the latter focuses on the environmental 
level (Hatch, 1997). This also remains an important factor for this study where both 
the environmental and firm level are both fundamental. 
      In respect of population ecology, a group of scholars, Hannan, Freeman, Carroll 
and others lead initiatives to study a population of organisations' collective behaviour, 
their origins and their evolution. Literature has evolved to shape a contour of this 
discipline in the emergence of theory fragments such as; organisational forms and 
83 
 
population (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Hannan and Carroll, 1992), structural inertia 
and change (Hannan and Freeman, 1984), age dependence (Freeman et. al. 1983), 
density dependence (Hannan and Freeman, 1988), niche structure (Freeman and 
Hannan, 1983) and resource partitioning (Carroll, 1985). It might have been 
conceivable to use organisational ecology theories in this research; however, first 
assumptions would show that the newness of entrepreneurial finance and VC industry 
in Egypt and the insufficient sample of the population were not supportive for such 
analysis. Moreover, the low level of „technical development' of the VC industry in 
Egypt and the influence of institutional determinants on the financial services sectors 
incline towards the use of institutional theory. Hatch commented on the constraints of 
using population ecology: "There are several constraints on the usefulness of the 
population ecology view. First, as with Darwin's theory, the definition of fitness is a 
problem.....we only know survival when we see it. Second, the theory applies most 
readily to populations that are highly competitive....When competitiveness is 
compromised by existence of enormously powerful organisations or barriers to entry 
or exit, the population ecology model loses much of its explanatory power. In these 
circumstances the institutional view is helpful." (Hatch, 1997; p.83). Finally, 
population ecology concentrates on the "technical, physical and economic sectors" 
while the institutional theory "focuses on the influences associated with social, 
cultural, political and legal sectors" (Hatch, 1997; p.87), which is found to be more 
appropriate for explaining the case of entrepreneurial finance in Egypt. 
 
 
 
 
84 
 
4.3 Introduction to Institutional Theory 
    Institutional theory is divided by many to 'Old' and 'New' institutionalism, according 
to Selznick (1996). Selznick (considered the father of the institutional theory (Hatch, 
1997; 83)) argued that such categorisation is not adequate and that this might inhibit 
the theory to contribute to major issues. Nevertheless, he respected the work by 
DiMaggio and Powell (1991) in his argument on their notion of "new 
institutionalism"; however, he suggested a reconciliation of the old and new 
institutionalism and was against the labelling issues. The neo- institutionalism (as been 
generally identified) can be clearly viewed in the work of Zucker, DiMaggio and 
Powell and the work of Richard Scott, as they added the cultural and social dimension 
as significant factors to institutionalisation (Hatch, 1997). Institutional theory explains 
the influence of institutions on individuals and organisations and how their reactions 
are shaped by such influence (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Scott, 1995). Contrary to 
the tenets of population ecology, why there are many different kinds of organisations, 
Institutional theory tries to answer why they are similar (Hatch, 1997). DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) argued that these institutional forces influence organisations to act the 
same and look quite similar in a notion called 'Institutional Isomorphic Change'.  Then 
they identified three mechanisms that lead to this 'isomorphism', "coercive 
isomorphism that stems from political influence and the problem of legitimacy, 
mimetic isomorphism resulting from standard responses to uncertainty and normative 
isomorphism, associated with professionalization" (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 150). 
On the other hand, Scott categorised the institutional influences into normative, 
regulatory and cognitive (1995). Where the normative forces resembles the norms and 
the values in a society, the regulatory indicates the rules, laws and regulations and the 
cognitive reflects the cultural dimension of the society. Scott (1987) has also argued 
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that there is a process of "institutionalisation" within environments and that they differ 
in this degree of institutionalisation. 
     The use of institutional theory in emerging economies is not novel (Hoskisson, 
Eden, Lau and Wright, 2000; Bruton et al., 2005; Wright, Filatochev, Hoskisson and 
Peng, 2005a). The same institutions in different countries and societies would cause a 
different economic outcome and therefore institutions play a significant role in a 
country‟s economic activities (North, 1990). The behaviour of businesses in different 
countries could be explained by government policies, and common shared knowledge 
and culture (Kostova, 1997). Accordingly, institutional theory could be seen as a more 
appropriate analytical lens than pure economic theories for the analysis of markets in 
emerging economies (Bruton et al., 2005). Moreover, from an institutional theory 
perspective, current determinants in an industry, among economics, are the formal and 
cultural institutions that influence its economic activities (Bruton et al., 2010). In 
addition, Wright et al. (2005a) found that the most dominant theory used in emerging 
economies' strategy research was institutional theory and they referred this to its 
capability to explain the cultural dimension which rises to be a significant factor in 
those countries. According to Hoskisson et al. (2000) many researchers argued that 
Institutional theory is the most appropriate method of analysis in emerging economies, 
due to the facts of the changing environment and economic growth in emerging 
economies which makes it a good opportunity to 'capture' institutional changes. They 
added that institutional theory explains the impact of regulatory bodies on 
organisational behaviour and on the economic performance, and it can also be 
effectively used to analyse transition economies. According to Ramamurti (2000), 
transition economies are characterised by low personal savings, low property rights, 
weak financial system and legal systems. Since all this criteria fit the Egyptian 
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economy, and though it is usually characterised as developing and not transitional or 
emerging, yet the criteria is still applicable due to apparent similarities. 
 
4.4 Categorisation of Institutional Theory 
    According to Scott (1995), institutional forces can be grouped into three main 
categories: normative, regulatory and cognitive institutions. In this research the neo-
institutional analytical frame work developed by Scott (1995) will be employed to 
group the influential institutional pillars and reflect on them in the analysis. The 
framework will also enable better understanding of the effect of each group on the 
status of entrepreneurial finance and VC industry in Egypt rather than analysing each 
institution individually. It also assists in a better analysis of the different determinants 
and the multiple effects of different institutions. Such categorisation has been 
effectively used before such as the research by Bruton et al. (2002; 2005) and in the 
multi-country empirical study by Valdez and Richardson (2013) researching 
entrepreneurship on a macro-level. Table (4.1) illustrates the characteristics of the 
three pillars: normative, regulatory, and cognitive on the basis of compliance, order, 
and legitimacy. According to Scott (1995), such categorisation should be dealt with in 
the form of a conceptual framework within institutional theory and not as a theory on 
its own. 
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Table (4.1): Characteristics of the Three Pillars of Institutions 
  
  Source: Scott (1995) 
 
      4.4.1 Regulatory Institutions 
      Regulatory institutions are the legal and governmental institutions that regulate the 
industry (Scott, 1995). They are mostly the reward and punishment policies applied by 
governments based on economical incentives; they contain regulations, industry 
agreements, and industry standards (Scott, 2007). As an example of research of the 
significance of this pillar on entrepreneurial finance, is the work of Li and Zahra 
(2012) on the effect of formal institutions on the development of VC industries. Also, 
Baygan and Freudenberg (2000) highlighted the role of governments in encouraging 
risk taking investors. The importance of regulatory institutions and their development 
on different industries is present in its formal institutions initiated by its governments. 
According to McMullen, Bagby, and Palich (2008), it is evident that economic 
policies and regulatory matters as well as incentives do affect the decision to launch 
new ventures in different economies. In this particular research the regulatory 
institutions are commercial law and its enforcement, the Egyptian financial 
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supervisory authority (EFSA), General authority for investment (GAFI), and all other 
laws and regulations affecting entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial finance. In 
addition for what is regarding venture capital firms, specifically, the fund‟s legal setup 
and fund management firms regulations. The taxation system and its affect on the 
entrepreneurial finance system especially capital gain tax; as well as the intellectual 
property rights (IP) and how this is affecting the industry. Furthermore, it addresses 
the general requirements and regulations on investment decisions of entrepreneurial 
financiers. In addition it covers the laws regulating SMEs and investee firms in Egypt 
such as company formation and other legalities. Moreover, laws affecting the exit 
strategies, especially, dissolution and bankruptcy laws will be taken into consideration. 
The issue of bankruptcy laws are highly accountable in promoting entrepreneurship 
due to the effect they have on low fear of entry and repeated ventures creation and 
consequently on venture finance and the VC industry as a whole. Bruton et al. (2005) 
have discussed this institutional force and its differences among different economies 
and how it affects the industry under research. This institutional determinant will be 
affecting entrepreneurial finance activities as well as both the macro and micro 
perspectives on opportunities of VC industry to develop and the investment behaviour 
of the current VC firms. 
 
      4.4.2 Normative Institutions 
      Normative institutions indicate what is appropriate and what is acceptable within a 
certain society or industry reflecting values and norms to conform to others (Scott, 
2007). They are the professional's norms and common practices in the intended 
industry or profession (Bruton et al., 2005). Regarding entrepreneurial finance in 
Egypt, the effect of associations and organisations assisting entrepreneurs whether 
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financially or non-financially would be of importance to this pillar. In addition, the 
societal acceptance of entrepreneurship and preference of certain financial tools over 
others as well as the cooperative nature among family members are all taken into 
account. Regarding the venture capital industry, it is argued that such norms are 
carried on from common practices of the early professionals in the industry (Bruton et 
al., 2005). In addition, since the early practitioners of the venture capital industry were 
in the United States, the United Kingdom and Europe, therefore there is a great 
influence of their norms and customs on the industry worldwide (Bruton et al., 2005). 
Moreover, most of the VC professionals have worked, learned or trained in western 
countries and therefore they will have to carry those norms to their countries. 
Researchers demonstrated that this was valid in the Asian VC market (Bruton et al., 
2005) as well as the Latin American VC market (Bruton et al., 2009). In this research, 
it is of importance for the research‟s outcome especially on VC investment behaviour 
and the firm level analysis. This institutional determinant will also affect the stage of 
financing, fundraising, sector of investment, and deal selection. The effect of VC 
associations in the region such as MENA private equity association (MEPEA), Gulf 
venture capital association (GVCA), and Arab private equity association (APEA) will 
be taken into account. The Egyptian private equity association was formed in 2010 to 
be the body representing private equity and venture capital in Egypt. Also the fact that 
the association is still nascent and has recently started its activities and how this is 
shaping the industry is taken into account. The formation of this association will 
contribute to the norms of the industry and therefore will be a normative force to be 
captured in this research. 
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     4.4.3 Cognitive Institutions 
     These are the individual behaviours imbedded by cultures and beliefs in different 
societies; they represent the actions on the individual level in respect of such beliefs 
(Scott, 2007). Cognitive institutions are the result of the culture of the society where 
the industry is analysed (Bruton et. al, 2005). The cognitive pillar is different from the 
normative, as the normative reflects the collective behaviour of the society while the 
cognitive is what individuals believe and thus act upon (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Researchers have emphasised the role of the cultural dimension on both 
entrepreneurship and innovation activities (Hayton et al. 2002). In fact, the cultural 
perspective is argued to be an essential component in economic process (Lavoie and 
Chamlee-Wright, 2002) thus generates an understanding of the interconnectedness 
between culture and economics (Chamlee-Wright, 2002: p.18-19). Chamlee-Wright 
(2002) argue that the Austrian school of economics thought accounts for market 
decisions as a reflect of a complex personal interpretation of the decision makers based 
on the past experience, language, and culture and thus gives a cultural analysis to 
market processes and a better understanding for the field of entrepreneurship.  
      Regarding the case of entrepreneurial finance and VCs in Egypt as part of the 
MENA region, one would expect a significant effect of this institutional force. It is 
important to capture the topics relevant to the cultural values and beliefs on 
entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial activities in general and on a cooperative society 
such as Egypt. The dimension of Shari'a law compliance and its effect on fundraising 
and investments are separately addressed and highlighted as a significant component 
of the MENA region and Islamic societies where Egypt belongs. Another dimension is 
family values which are clearly found in family owned enterprises and the acceptance 
of VC investment and partnership concepts in general. The cultural and moral codes 
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governing the VC-Entrepreneur relationship is also of importance. The effect of social 
networks, reputation, and trust issues in investment selection will also be investigated 
as a major differentiating aspect of VCs behaviour worldwide.  
     In the scope of venture capital, Bruton, Fried and Manigart (2005), identified global 
differences between developed and emerging economies regarding the cognitive 
dimension. Bruton, Ahlstrom and Singh (2002; p. 205) identified those cultural forces 
in VC industries as  "moral codes, expectations of trust and reliability, the importance 
of non-contractual relationships and connections, regard for government and public 
sector priorities, and expectations of government support". Also it was found that the 
investment decisions of VC investors are influenced by the personality and cognitive 
structures of the VCs (Lim et al. 2010). Moreover, Li and Zahra (2012) identified two 
cultural determinants and their effect on VC development; they specified uncertainty 
avoiding societies and collectivist societies as the main cultural influences. According 
to Valdez and Richardson (2013), normative cognitive power was found more 
descriptive on macro-level entrepreneurship than the regulatory and legislative power. 
In summary, the cultural cognitive institutional determinant is of high significance to 
this research, it affects the entrepreneurship environment as well as the financial tools 
involved all through the investment decisions and investment cycle. The cognitive 
power is a major differentiating determinant across countries and thus in the MENA 
region and consequently Egypt with all the distinctive cultural characteristics in this 
part of the world. 
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4.5 Institutional Theory and Entrepreneurial Finance 
     Institutional theory as an analysing lens gives an opportunity to test all the 
influential institutional forces, especially the cultural dimensions, to assess the current 
situation of entrepreneurial finance, a potential VC industry, and the investment 
behaviour of entrepreneurial financiers. Also it helps evaluate the institutional 
development in Egypt compared to regional and global economies. The utilisation of 
institutional theory is rapidly increasing and becoming a popular foundation in 
entrepreneurial research where it has proven to be helpful (Bruton et al., 2010) and to 
assess the institutional determinants of macro-level entrepreneurship (Valdez and 
Richardson, 2013). There is a growing body of researchers utilising the institutional 
theory to analyse entrepreneurial finance and specifically the venture capital industry. 
For example the research by Isaksson, Cornelius, Landstrom and Junghagen (2004) on 
the contracting issues in the Swedish VC industry and their findings were conforming 
to the institutional theory since there were little differences between experienced and 
inexperienced VC firms in their contractual choice. In respect of international VC 
comparisons, Wright et al. (2005b) suggested that there is an important need for an 
institutional perspective to analyse development of VC industries and the behaviour of 
VC firms across countries. In this manner, on VC research in emerging economies 
specifically in Asia; Bruton, Ahlstrom and Singh (2002) researched VC in Singapore 
and found that the government (regulatory influence) has an important role in shaping 
the VC industry. In addition, Bruton and Ahlstrom (2005) studied VC in China to find 
that institutional influences affected VC actions along the VC cycle. Scheela and Van 
Dinh (2004) on the case of Vietnam identified major differences between the US and 
Vietnamese VC industry due to lack of fully-developed institutions. Zacharakis, 
McMullen and Shepherd (2007) also examined the institutional influences on VCs‟ 
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decision making in South Korea and China compared to VCs in the US. Moreover 
Bruton et al. (2005) on VC worldwide expansion, developed several prepositions 
testing the differences of behaviour of the VC industry in emerging economies, 
namely in Asia, compared to the US guided by institutional forces and Scott's 
categorisation. Similarly, Ahlstrom and Bruton (2006) studied VC and emerging 
markets while they focused on the value of networks and institutional changes in the 
Asian economies. Ahlstrom, Bruton, and Puky (2009) also utilised the institutional 
theory in examining the VC industry in Latin America and Asia to examine the impact 
of institutional clusters on the venture capital in those emerging economies. 
Furthermore it was employed on the case of Russia as an economy in transition, and 
how high growth enterprises could prosper in rapid evolving institutional changes 
(Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2010). 
 
 4.6 The Gap in Literature 
     Although there is a growing literature on entrepreneurial finance and the worldwide 
VC expansion and VC behaviour in emerging economies, it is apparent that many 
regions in the world are still under researched. Till the early 2000s, there was 
'virtually' no research on VC in Africa, Latin America and Oceania (Bruton et al., 
2005). Since then, there has been a sparse academic literature on the MENA region 
concerning entrepreneurial finance or venture capital. Apart from the difficulty or 
unavailability of data, such lack of research might reflect the underdevelopment or 
even sometimes the absence of a VC industry in the mentioned regions. Regarding the 
demand side of entrepreneurial finance represented in entrepreneurs, the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) published annual reports including the MENA 
region and a specialised report on Egypt by Hattab (2008). Some academic research 
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addresses the topic from different angles. Eid (2005; 2006) researched 
entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial finance in MENA region, with a public policy 
approach. In regard to Egypt, El-Said et al. (2013) address SMEs in Egypt and focus 
on access to finance from a banking perspective. Hassan (2010) has published an 
explanatory paper on PE/VC in emerging economies with evidence from Egypt. 
However, her work inclined towards the PE industry and late stage financing. Also 
data was gathered in 2005/2006 where the industry was in its very early stages and 
was heavily relying on PE and late stage financing. Moreover, Hassan and Ibrahim 
(2012) explored further the provision of financial information and its impact on the 
relationship between executives and venture capital managers in a study of the private 
equity market in Egypt. Therefore, once more, it is in many ways different to this 
research as being solely on the firm level, topic specific, and with high reference to 
late stage PE industry. There were other topic specific research on PE/VC industries in 
North Africa, such as the work by Hearn (2014) assessing the impact of institutions, 
ownership structure, business angels, venture capital and lead managers on IPO firm 
under-pricing across North Africa, he gathered a sample set of 86 IPO firms from 
across North African equity markets, namely Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria 
from 2000 to 2013. Furthermore, Montchaud (2014) explored the interest of PE/VC 
financing mode for supporting entrepreneurship in Africa, in reference to Morocco and 
South Africa. Montchaud (2014) argued that PE/VC industries could be improved to 
support SMEs. Moreover, some of the VC/PE associations and professional 
institutions are publishing professional reports in collaboration with business schools 
such as INSEAD with PWC in 2011 and INSEAD with Booz & company in 2010. 
Also annual analytical reports are published by MENA PE association, sometimes in 
collaboration with the British venture capital association (BVCA). The former set of 
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reports was found beneficial mostly in assessing the magnitude of PE/VC industries in 
Egypt and MENA region. Regarding policy dimension targeting SME financing, there 
are a series of reports by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) in business climate development strategy in MENA region 
(2008) with partial focus on SME policy and promotion (2010). In addition, there is an 
electronic platform issuing data on the industry such as Zawya.com and on 
entrepreneurship in general such as wamda.com.  
     Accordingly, it is a plausible assumption that there is a gap in academic literature 
for the concerns of entrepreneurial finance and VC/PE industry in Africa and the 
MENA region in general, and entrepreneurial finance and the VC industry in Egypt in 
particular. This research focuses primarily on early stage entrepreneurial finance 
covering the different available tools such as business angels, crowdfunding and 
venture capital in Egypt. It tests the effect of institutional determinants on shaping the 
domain of entrepreneurial finance and the propensity of developing a VC industry. 
Also it captures the Egyptian entrepreneurial environment during and after the January 
25
th
 revolution that took place in 2011 where the socio-economic and political 
environment in Egypt was heavily influenced. One can assume that this thesis is one 
of the early academic researches undertaken in Egypt as well as the Arab MENA 
region that focuses on early stage entrepreneurial finance and venture capital. Also, 
most of the professional bodies and industry associations concerning PE and VC were 
formed and started publishing data research from 2006 onwards as the industry started 
to grow. This positively affects the research for accessibility of this secondary data and 
also helps in validating the findings. 
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4.7 Research Questions 
    This research explores the current entrepreneurial finance domain in Egypt, it 
further explores the opportunity for a VC industry to grow and help develop the 
Egyptian economy. Other research earlier discussed shows the common themes 
affecting the development patterns of VC industries worldwide.  It also highlights the 
differences in international VC firms‟ behaviour and hence generates knowledge on 
international practices. Accordingly, analysing influential institutional determinants 
composing the entrepreneurial finance environment and VC industry in Egypt from an 
Institutional theory perspective prevails to be necessary. However, the research earlier 
discussed would lead us to believe that institutional development in a certain country 
improves its entrepreneurial activities and VC industry in different economies. This is 
explored in this research which leads to the main research question. 
The main research questions will be as follows: 
First Question: What are the main institutional determinants shaping                       
entrepreneurial finance in Egypt? 
1.1- What are the major constraints facing the development of entrepreneurial 
finance in Egypt? 
1.2- What are the conducive factors supporting the development of     
entrepreneurial finance in Egypt? 
 
Second Question: What is the prospect for the development of a venture capital 
industry in Egypt? 
2.1- What are the current institutional forces supporting the growth of a venture 
capital industry in Egypt?    
2.2-What are the current institutional forces encumbering the progression of a 
VC industry in Egypt? 
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     The first question explores the current situation on entrepreneurial finance in 
Egypt. It examines the environment of entrepreneurial activities and available sources 
of finance. In this question the institutional determinants will be the main examining 
lens, what are the main determinants, and how do they shape the field of 
entrepreneurial finance in Egypt. Moreover, the sub question is on the major hurdles 
affecting access to entrepreneurial finance. This question pinpoints the major obstacles 
facing access to finance and how are they shaping the current dynamics of 
entrepreneurial finance. The second sub question is on the conducive factors 
supporting the development of entrepreneurial finance. The first question is answered 
in chapter six, the first part of the chapter looks at the general context on 
entrepreneurial finance in Egypt and the second part of the chapter applies the 
institutional framework and its categorisation on the findings.  
      The second question explores the opportunity for a VC industry in Egypt. It 
explores the current situation of the VC industry and the propensity of this industry to 
contribute to entrepreneurial finance and the development of the Egyptian economy as 
a whole. Also it suggests whether the industry has the capability to grow in the first 
place under the current policies, regulations, and surrounding environment. This leads 
to the sub questions on the institutional development with the three pillars of 
regulatory, normative, and cognitive dimensions. This part aims to address the 
institutionalisation of the industry in the case of Egypt and the constraining and 
supporting factors shaping the industry‟s development and affecting its growth. It will 
also assess the institutional determinants on both the supply side, i.e. the VC firms, 
and the demand side of potential ventures and barriers to entrepreneurship, as well as 
the surrounding environment comprising of industry professionals, all in the light of 
norms, culture, and regulatory institutions. The second question is answered in chapter 
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seven, similar to the first question, the first part is the general overview on the VC 
industry in Egypt and the second part is further analysis using the institutional theory 
lens. 
 
 4.8 Research Direction 
     The value of entrepreneurial finance is indispensable for a country that seeks to 
promote entrepreneurship (Lerner, 2009). The VC industry has proven itself as an 
integral component of entrepreneurial finance (Dennis, 2004) and therefore a 
favourable factor stimulating economic growth (Jeng and Wells, 2000). Venture 
capital industries‟ growth patterns differed from one country to another (Wright et al, 
2005b). This exploratory study helps generate an understanding of the current situation 
of entrepreneurial finance and the VC industry in Egypt, as part of the MENA region. 
This study examines the VC industry‟s growth potential in Egypt and its capability to 
contribute to the development of the Egyptian economy. Moreover, it seeks 
explanations for the growth pattern of the industry; what is inhibiting the industry‟s 
development and what can be done to enhance its growth pace. Using institutional 
theory as the lens for analysis is found stronger due to the nature of this research and 
the market where the analysis is undertaken. This study assesses the effect of the 
institutional forces shaping entrepreneurial finance in Egypt and on the development 
of the VC industry. The effect of the Arab spring and its aftermath on Egypt and the 
whole region, and its effect on entrepreneurship are of value to this research. To be 
able to answer the research questions, the following chapter on methodology explains 
the rationale and justification on research methods, data enquiry, and data analysis. In 
brief, a qualitative approach takes place due to the lack of quantitative data and the 
exploratory nature of this research. A combination of participant observations and in-
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depth interviewing with the major stake holders of entrepreneurial financiers and VCs 
in Egypt is believed to create both the depth in knowledge concerning the industry and 
the breadth needed to comprehend the whole topic. The research then answers the 
research questions on the institutional determinants shaping the current situation of 
entrepreneurial finance and venture capital in thorough analysis and discussions. The 
effect and magnitude of Islamic finance and its fitness in the scope of venture capital is 
also examined.  
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Chapter 5: Research Design and Methodology 
 5.1 Introduction 
     The objective of this research is to generate an understanding on the current status 
of entrepreneurial finance in Egypt, while exploring the opportunities for a prospective 
venture capital industry. To understand the reasons behind the current position of the 
VC industry, it must be appreciated that it is still in its cradle, and a viable and 
sustainable course for its growth needs the support of all stakeholders. Moreover, it is 
vital to highlight the obstacles that might inhibit its development. This research 
chooses Institutional theory as a lens for analysis providing an opportunity to test all 
the influential institutional forces, especially the social and cultural dimensions. This 
provides a framework to assess the current situation of the entrepreneurial finance in 
general and the VC industry in specific; in addition to its investment behaviour and 
evaluate its development in the light of regional and international markets. 
Furthermore this research focuses on the roots of the rationale behind the current 
entrepreneurial finance position and VC structure in Egypt. Also it highlights the 
cultural dimension and other distinctive characteristics of the Egyptian market and 
economy. As a result, to be able to acquire such knowledge this research was designed 
as an exploratory research, with a qualitative method, and following a grounded 
approach in data gathering and analysis. It should be well noted that this research is 
not intended to formulate a theory; the benefit of the grounded approach, in a similar 
manner to grounded theory, to this research is in its methods to uncover phenomenon 
and process rather than theory formulation. Thus it proves to be most valuable in data 
gathering process. Hence, the research methodology allows themes and concepts to 
emerge from the data without predetermined conclusions. In this chapter the detailed 
rationale behind the research design and methodology is provided. 
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5.2 Research Design 
    According to Sekaran (2003), an exploratory study is appropriate when little 
research is undertaken and not enough information is available for the researcher. 
Sekaran added that this might as well be the case when some facts are known but still 
a great deal of information is needed to set a theoretical framework. She highlighted 
the importance of intensive interviews to get an idea of the situation and understand 
the phenomenon. All of which perfectly fits the situation of entrepreneurial finance 
and VC industry in Egypt. Moreover, most of the studies taking place in emerging 
economies followed the same exploratory route due to insufficient data in those 
regions and the little knowledge on entrepreneurial finance in developing and 
emerging economies, such as the work on the Asian venture capital industry by 
Bruton, Ahlstrom and Singh (2002), Bruton and Ahlstrom (2003), Scheela and Van 
Dinh (2004), Bruton, Fried and Manigart (2005), and Ahlstrom and Bruton (2006). 
     Accordingly, this research will take a qualitative, exploratory approach in the form 
of the traditional style of „one coherent research‟ format. The research will adopt a 
pure naturalistic-qualitative strategy using „Naturalistic inquiry‟ method to collect 
„qualitative data‟ in order to perform „content analysis‟. Naturalistic enquiry studies 
real world situations as they unfold naturally; with openness to whatever emerges and 
no predetermined constraints on findings (Patton, 2002). The purpose of the study is to 
understand the nature of entrepreneurial finance and the VC market and the behaviour 
of VC firms in Egypt and the problems facing the industry. In addition, this research 
uses Institutional theory as a conceptual framework to assist in the analysis of the 
current situation on entrepreneurial finance. Thus the study could be of support to 
financiers, VC professionals, and policy makers in the region and help provide policy 
suggestions. This criterion is in line with the „Applied Research‟ concept implemented 
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in this thesis. There are two types of business research; applied research and basic 
research (Sekaran, 2003). Applied research contributes to knowledge on a human or 
societal problem and thus helps in understanding the nature of the problem and 
interventions to solve this problem; while basic research generates a body of 
knowledge as an end in itself contributing to theory to understand and explain how the 
world operates (Patton, 2002). The units of analysis are „structure focused‟ in the form 
of organisations and institutions and in the same time „geography focused‟ in studying 
the case of Egypt as part of the MENA region.  
 
5.3 Grounded Approach 
    “Most qualitative methods allow researchers to follow up on interesting data in 
whatever way they devise. Grounded theory methods have the additional advantage of 
containing explicit guidelines that show us how we may proceed” (Charmaz, 2006: 
p.3). The grounded theory approach was developed by Glaser, Strauss, Corbin, and 
Denzin, among other founding scholars (Patton, 2002). It focuses on the process of 
generating theory, emphasising the steps, inductive and deductive constant 
comparisons, doing theoretical sampling, and testing the outcomes with additional 
fieldwork (Patton, 2002). It studies the phenomena closely and is grounded to the real 
world to generate alternative explanations via rigorous analysis. According to Cassell 
and Symon (2004), the data sources for grounded theory are interviews, participative 
observation, and analysis of documents. They added that such data is used for 
triangulation in grounded theory and it evolves from the emerging themes and 
concepts, until „theoretical saturation‟ is reached.  The grounded theory starts with no 
„predetermined conceptual framework or theory‟; however, it focuses on uncovering 
phenomenon and processes (Cassell and Symon, 2004). Contrary to the classic 
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grounded theory based on the work of Glaser and Strauss, Charmaz (2006) argues that 
neither data nor theories are discovered as emerging from the data separate from the 
scientific observer. She added that we are part of the world we discover and the data 
collected; thus, constructing grounded theory is through past and present involvements 
and interactions with people, perspectives, and research practices. “Grounded theory 
guidelines describe the steps of the research process and provide a path through it. 
Researchers can adopt and adapt them to conduct diverse studies. How the 
researchers use these guidelines is not neutral; nor are the assumptions they bring to 
their research and enact during the process.” (Charmaz, 2006: p.9).  This research is 
not intended to formulate a theory, the benefit of the grounded approach to this 
research is in its methods to uncover phenomenon and process rather than theory 
formulation. Thus it proves to be most valuable in data gathering process. Thereby, 
using a conceptual framework and theoretical framework of institutional theory for 
analysis purposes for this research is not contradicting to grounded theory guidelines. 
The research methodology still allows themes and concepts to emerge from the data 
without predetermined conclusions. “Theory is a spotlight. A useful theory illuminates 
what you see. It draws your attention to particular events or phenomenon, and sheds 
light on relationships that might otherwise go unnoticed or misunderstood” (Maxwell, 
2005: p.43). In a comparable manner, field studies with a similar approach to 
grounded theory research design and an institutional theory framework were used in 
analysing entrepreneurial finance, specifically the VC industries in Asia by Bruton, 
Ahlstrom, and Singh (2002) in Singapore by Bruton and Ahlstrom (2003); in China by 
Brutonn Ahlstrom and Yeh (2004) in East Asia, and by Ahlstrom and Bruton (2006) 
on networks and institutional change in East Asia. It has also been used by Bruton, 
Ahlstrom, and Puky (2009) in a comparison of VC industries of Latin America and 
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Asia. This research followed the same track of field study and data gathering in a 
manner similar to grounded theory; it took place between 2008 and 2013 to establish 
the current situation on entrepreneurial finance and VC industry, tracing it back to its 
origins and testing the institutional determinants. 
    The researcher used the three sources of data that are often used in grounded theory; 
namely, interviews, participative observation, and analysis of documents. The in-depth 
face-to-face interviews included the main stake holders of entrepreneurial finance 
domain in Egypt including existing VC firms‟ executives in Egypt. In addition, 
government officials and policy makers were interviewed to understand the reason 
behind the current regulatory institutions. Also a sample of entrepreneurs in Egypt 
covering different industrial sectors, sizes and growth stage was used to examine the 
demand side of the VC industry in Egypt. Furthermore, industry professionals and 
financial consultants were interviewed for an unbiased opinion and triangulation. 
Regarding the participative observant method, the researcher had access to a business 
association where he participated and advised SME financing initiatives and thus 
allowed him to first hand „complete participant‟ in the domain. In addition, other data 
were gathered at conferences and roundtables attended by the researcher that were 
relevant to the VC/PE whether global, regional or local (Egypt) to get an idea of the 
industry‟s magnitude and direction. Documents provided by NGOs, Associations, 
professional, and academic bodies were gathered and will be analysed among other 
data acquired.  
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5.4 The Qualitative Approach 
       Among other advantages of the qualitative approach, it is highly beneficial in 
exploratory studies in particularly when research objectives require in-depth analysis 
and why questions are the most important. “If a concept or phenomenon needs to be 
understood because little research has been done on it, then it merits a qualitative 
approach” (Neuman, 2005: p.22). Specific to this research, there are four more 
reasons for choosing qualitative methods over quantitative methods. First, is the 
relative newness of the industry in Egypt which is in the range of ten years or less. 
Thus quantitative analysis relevant to performance of VCs and tracking VC backed 
firms‟ performance or post IPO performance are not feasible. Second, the number of 
firms in the VC industry in Egypt is also relatively small, less than 15 actively 
operating firms where less than five are early stage VCs and the rest are PE which 
demonstrates infeasible of a population analysis. According to Wright et al. (2005b), 
small numbers of VCs in emerging markets disables industry analysis using 
multivariate techniques. Third, the general opaque nature of small and entrepreneurial 
ventures as well as of the VC/PE industry worldwide where obtaining financial data is 
highly problematic. Thus, the private nature of VCs in general and their limited 
disclosure of the data do not support using archival data for the industry‟s behaviour 
analysis (Wright et al., 2005b). Fourth, adding to the previous points is the nature of 
data collection in developing countries. Data sets and databases in most of the 
industries, especially the VC industry, are not officially available in the MENA region. 
Over and above this was the absence of a VC association in Egypt to provide data and 
statistical figures. The Egyptian Private Equity Association (EPEA) was launched only 
in 2011 in the fields of private equity and venture capital. This research explores 
entrepreneurial finance and the nature of the VC industry in Egypt in a comprehensive 
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and holistic manner. It also sets the initial foundation for further work on more 
detailed aspects of the industry and other quantitative longitudinal comparative 
studies. This is only possible when the industry is more mature and the number of 
firms increases to assess the industry‟s development and behaviour in the light of 
international markets. 
 
 5.5 Sampling Strategy   
     Random sampling is inappropriate for qualitative research; thus „rich‟ informants 
are more likely to provide insight and understanding to researchers (Marshal, 1996). 
The two main strategies are used in data sampling; „convenience sample‟ (in terms of 
time, effort, and money), and „purposeful sample‟ (selecting the most productive 
sample of informants to answer research question); the former is discouraged in 
qualitative methods unless unavoidable (Maxwell, 2005). According to Patton (2002), 
purposive sampling is when a specific type and number of cases are chosen that are 
information rich and reflects the purpose and resources of the study. Hence, the 
primary sampling strategy of this research has been purposive sampling. Sub-
strategies were as follows, regarding the VC firms in Egypt, „criterion sampling‟ is 
used which is considering all cases that fit the criterion (Patton, 2002). In addition, 
„chain sampling‟ or snowball sampling to take into consideration other VC firms that 
the researcher was not aware of, but been suggested by a reliable source was also 
applicable causing a snowball effect. Thus any firm that met the criteria illustrated 
ahead in this section or referred to as one was part of the Egyptian VC sample until 
knowledge on the topic was complete and additional information was insignificant.    
    The target group of this study is active licenced and un-licenced VC firms. 
Regarding the un-licenced, they need to be positioning themselves as purely venture 
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capital and must be advertising themselves this way. In addition, PE firms that invest 
in or consider investing in early stage financing were also included in this study to 
assess the likelihood that they might incline toward early stage financing. Other firms 
or organisations involved in entrepreneurial finance, such as, Business Angels, 
Business Incubators and Accelerators, Crowd Funding, and hybrids between the 
former were included in the study. The main reason of this inclusion is to give a better 
understanding of the bigger picture of entrepreneurial finance in Egypt and where the 
VC industry fits within this picture. A pilot study per se was not conducted due to the 
already very small sample of operating VCs in Egypt. 
     Regarding the sample of the entrepreneurs, a maximum variation sampling is 
considered to capture their opinions across different industries, stages and 
backgrounds to observe the demand side. Additionally, VC backed entrepreneurs were 
interviewed to show another perception of the demand side. The sample of policy 
makers, industry professional and consultants was chosen upon a combination of 
„stratified purposeful sampling‟ which shows the main characteristics of these groups 
to facilitate comparisons and „intensity sampling‟ that chooses information rich cases 
(Patton, 2002).   
  
   5.6 Data Collection and Inquiry Methods 
      5.6.1 Interviews  
    A semi-structured interview or „interview guide approach‟ is when topics and issues 
are specified; however, the wording and sequence are not and are left to the judgment 
and timing of the interviewer (Patton, 2002). Although it reduces the data‟s 
comparability, the interviews are conversational and situational (op cit.). “It could be 
argued that the semi-structured interview is the most important way of conducting 
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research interview because of its flexibility balanced by structure, and the quality of 
data so obtained” (Gillham, 2005: p.70). Using unstructured and semi-structured in-
depth open-ended interviews in the previously discussed manner with the policy 
makers and venture capitalists is argued (Bruton et al., 2002; Wright et al., 2005) to be 
the most appropriate data inquiry method for this research. In addition, unstructured 
interviews provide in-depth discussions and allow follow-up questions. In some 
developing countries questionnaires are ineffective for mailing reasons or resistance to 
reply (Wright et al., 2005). Moreover, both policy makers and VCs are hard to 
interview in the first place, whether because of their busy schedules or their reluctance 
to open up, therefore advantages of face to face meetings when arranged and approved 
emphasises its usage over questionnaires and surveys. In East Asia, questionnaires 
were not reliable, as senior managers in VC firms do not usually reply to them, over 
and above one must be referred by a person they trust to discuss business (Bruton et 
al., 2002). All of which favours the utilising of in-depth, face-to-face interviews as a 
primary tool of data enquiry in this research (See Appendix (A) for guiding questions). 
     All data were recorded using a digital voice recorder and the data was often backed 
up by a computer. The interviews were in English and Arabic languages 
interchangeably. Transcribing and translating the interviews were simultaneously done 
and took place at earliest time possible to ensure quality of the data and avoid data 
crashing. Last but not least, all the data were coded in a manner to facilitate data 
analysis. In total there were twenty eight interviews made in this research, seven 
entrepreneurial financiers and VCs, ten entrepreneurs, five policy makers and 
government initiatives, and six financial consultants and financial industry 
professionals. Follow-up data were further gathered on some topics to gain more 
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knowledge from some of the interviewees. Follow-up interviews took place through 
phone conversations, brief visits, and further clarifications were through emails. 
 
     5.6.1.1 Interviews with Entrepreneurial Financiers and VCs 
    Interviews with the Financiers including VCs were an hour to an hour and a half 
long; therefore it was better conducted, whenever possible, in an informal environment 
away from the office pressures.  The interview design of the VC executives in Egypt 
covered the whole investment cycle (Fundraising, Investing, Value-Adding and Exit) 
and the effect of the three institutional categories on each phase of the cycle. An 
emphasis on the work by Tyebjee and Bruno (1984), Gorman and Sahlman (1989) and 
the work of MacMillan et al. (1989) (see section 2.8.3) was implicitly covered in the 
VCs interviews. Moreover, the interviews covered the demographic data and generic 
strategies of the firms such as fund size, specialisation, investment stage, number of 
employees, and qualifications of senior management. The interviews also covered the 
number of years in the business, deal completion rate, IRR, and geography. In total 
there were seven interviews in this set, of which only two companies with pure VC 
activities, one PE firm with a dedicated fund for SME financing, one PE/Holding 
company which is one of the biggest in the region, one VC/PE investment model, one 
Holding/VC investments, and one crowd funding portal.  
 
     5.6.1.2 Interviews with Policy Makers 
     This set of interviews was 30 minutes on average, due to the tight schedules of the 
interviewees. They include high level policy makers as well as senior executives in 
government bodies and initiatives. The interviews were performed in an unstructured 
manner concentrating on the general direction of the policy makers regarding 
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entrepreneurial finance activities in Egypt and their opinion on the VC tool and how to 
promote it. Some of these interviews were during workshops and conferences with key 
figures. The five interviews with policy makers and senior executives were first with 
the ministry of investment, ministry of finance, Bedaya Fund, and two senior 
executives from the Social Fund of Development (SFD). 
    5.6.1.3 Interviews with Entrepreneurs 
    The interviews with entrepreneurs were less formal and were more structured. The 
focus will be as prior mentioned on the perception of VC and other tools of available 
entrepreneurial finance in Egypt. The set where entrepreneurs are backed with VC 
investments was more in-depth highlighting the VC- entrepreneur relationship. In total 
ten interviews took place, seven with entrepreneurs from ICT sector, retail, 
manufacturing, trading, and business services; and the other three were VC backed 
companies. The reason for the small sample is due to the availability of data from 
several questionnaires and reports on the same topic. The interviews made were to 
match the primary data gathered with the secondary data available by the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) on Egypt and MENA which were found reliable and 
representative and are widely used by researchers in the domain of entrepreneurship.  
    5.6.1.4 Interviews with Industry professionals 
    The main purpose of this sample is for triangulation purposes and data validation. 
However, new ideas and suggestions arising from these interviews were also included 
in the analysis part of the research. The value of this set falls mainly on the policy 
recommendations part of the research and how to promote the VC industry in Egypt. 
Six interviews were made with three financial consultants and other industry 
professionals from the Egyptian Junior Businessmen Association, the Egyptian Private 
Equity Association, and the Egyptian Credit and Risk Association.  
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    5.6.2 Participant Observation 
    “The terms „observation‟, and in particular „participant observation‟ usually refer 
to methods of generating data which entail the researcher immersing herself or 
himself in a research setting so that they can experience and observe at first hand a 
range of dimensions in and at the setting” (Mason, 2002: p.84). According to Patton 
(2002), fieldwork observation varies in six dimensions: the role of the observer, 
insider versus outsider perspective, who conducts the inquiry, disclosure of the 
observer‟s role to others, duration of observations and fieldwork, focus of observation. 
Reflecting the six dimensions of Patton (2002: p. 277) on this research, the researcher 
was a „full participant in the setting‟. He was engaged in the daily operations and 
meetings of the SMEs committee in the business association from which he interacted 
with the stake holders; entrepreneurs, financiers, development agencies, and policy 
makers. The researcher attempted a balanced perspective regarding „insider (emic)‟ 
and „outsider (etic)‟ perspective dominance. The researcher is an insider in the sense 
of the cultural dimension in being Egyptian living in Egypt, as well as a business 
person aware of the business environment and culture in Egypt. He was also an insider 
in the association where he actively examined the hurdles facing SMEs and 
entrepreneurs and searched for solutions to assist them. On the other hand, the 
researcher was aware of the research setting and made effort to maintain his outsider 
status as a researcher for objective observations. The researcher was a „solo‟ 
researcher and he conducted the research solely by himself as there was no team 
participating in the research observation. There was a „selective disclosure‟ whenever 
it was ethically needed to disclose the possibility of taking notes or inclusion of data in 
the research. The duration of the observation was for almost a year; thus was an 
„ongoing over time‟ to have a general understanding of the entrepreneurship 
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ecosystem in Egypt and entrepreneurial finance. The focus of the observation was of 
„evolving, emergent‟ on the micro-perspectives among the entrepreneurs‟ behaviour, 
and financiers‟ appetite and services; observing their behaviour, interaction, 
expectations, and preferences of the different groups. On a different level, a „broad 
focus: holistic view‟ observation for the macro-perspectives part of the entrepreneurial 
finance and VC environment along entrepreneurship ecosystem in general. The 
observations included the regulatory and policy dynamics with policy makers, the 
developmental agencies objectives and support programmes, as well as other 
initiatives taking place in the entrepreneurship ecosystem. 
    Regarding the role and exposure of the researcher as a participative observant of the 
research undertaken, the researcher was head of a small enterprises unit in a leading 
business association for almost a year with access to many entrepreneurs and small 
business owners and assisting with their financial and non-financial needs. Also, he 
was involved in a national business incubation project with the ministry of youth. 
Moreover, the researcher organised and chaired a high profile conference titled “The 
Existing and Innovative Financial Mechanisms for SMEs in Egypt” with panel 
discussion on all available and innovative financial tools and policy recommendations. 
The conference consisted of 3 panels other than the opening panel. The first panel was 
for the banking sector and leasing companies. The second panel was on developmental 
agencies and financing companies with a developmental dimension. The third panel 
was on innovative and alternative sources of financing, including venture capital, 
business accelerators, and crowd funding. On the opening panel was the Minister of 
Investment, the head of the Social Fund of Development (SFD) and the Islamic Bank 
of development. On another level, the researcher was on the advisory board of an SME 
financing company from idea inception and strategy formulation. The researcher was 
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also closely linked to a VC firm that was established after Jan 25
th 
2011 revolution and 
had in-depth access to its investee companies. The responsibilities in this association 
gave contact to meetings with most of the development agencies in Egypt who have 
programmes in the domain of entrepreneurship and SMEs, such as, the USAid, the 
European Bank for Restructuring and Development (EBRD), and the Spanish Agency 
for International Development Cooperation (AECID). The unique exposure of this 
association gave the researcher the opportunity to recognize and interact with most of 
the stake holders in Egypt regarding entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial finance. In 
addition there were many roundtables and workshops with industry professionals in 
the same domain that added to the gathered data over the scope of the year.   
     The researcher was specifically observing the dynamics of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem and the status of entrepreneurial finance, developmental agencies and 
financiers. The observations allowed capturing the perception of the stakeholders and 
expectations of each side of the table. Further observations of the dialogues between 
entrepreneurs and financiers pictured the power struggle beyond dialogues. All this 
enabled a larger understanding over an extensive period of time to stand on the current 
status and reflect on the findings and other secondary and primary data gathered via 
interviews.  
  5.7 Data Analysis   
     The research adopted an „analytical framework‟ approach organised as „issues‟, 
which in this case was organised on the macro and micro levels. On the macro level, 
topics such as institutional categories, normative, regulatory, and cognitive institutions 
are used to group the findings. On the micro level, activities and VC firms‟ behaviour 
are categorised mainly under, fundraising, investing, value- adding, and exiting. In 
assistance of standard analysis, QSR NVivo (a software programme commonly used in 
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qualitative research) was used to code the data and analyse it. It is used to help find 
trends, patterns while also organising the coded data for easiness and efficiency of 
retrieving and recalling the needed information. According to Bazeley (2007), the five 
principles NVivo supports in analysing qualitative data are to manage data, manage 
ideas, query data, graphically model, and report from the data. Using a computer 
analysis also helps to add rigour and might help working more „methodological‟, more 
„thoroughly‟, and „attentively‟ (Bazeley, 2007). The NVivo software was found of 
particular benefit in combining the primary data gathered and the secondary data under 
themes „codes‟ and sub themes „child nodes‟ which was found invaluable in the 
retrieval and analysis of the data. A screen shot illustrating how the nodes and child 
nodes looked during the course of the study with NVivo is illustrated in figure (5.1). 
 
Figure (5.1): Nodes and Child Nodes in QSR NVivo 
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    The research uses a manner consistent with a grounded theory approach; thus an 
„inductive analysis‟ takes place through establishing themes, patterns or categories, 
from being „grounded‟ and „implanted‟ in the data where embedded meanings and 
relationships emerge (Patton, 2002). When the data patterns and categories are clear 
and meaningful a re-check via „deductive analysis‟ takes place to make sure that the 
findings are consistent with the hypothesised theory (op cit.). In the case of this 
research, the part concerning deductive analysis was only to justify the findings along 
with the main research questions and existing knowledge and theories. However, the 
interest in grounded theory approach lies in its process and of its data gathering and 
rigorous analysis technique of continuous „checking‟ and „re-checking‟ on the 
emerging topics.     
 
  5.8 Data Validation  
     Validity is an objective rather than a product; it is relative to the purpose of the 
research and through evidence rather than methods that a researcher meets this 
objective (Maxwell, 2005). Among the validity threats in qualitative research are 
researcher‟s „bias‟ and „reactivity‟ (Maxwell, 2005).  It is not the primary concern of 
the qualitative researcher to eliminate bias and reactivity, yet it is important for the 
researcher to understand how he influences on participants‟ behaviour and 
interviewees (Maxwell, 2005). To ensure quality and credibility of data several 
measures were taken into consideration. Patton (2002) detailed the validity criteria as 
follows; objectivity of the enquirer, validity of the data, systematic rigour of fieldwork 
procedures, triangulation, reliability of codings and pattern analysis, correspondence 
of findings to reality, generalisability, strength of evidence supporting causal 
hypothesis, and contributions to theory.  
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      „Triangulation methods‟ are argued to be a consistent tool for data validation, 
amongst other tools (Mason, 2002; Maxwell, 2005). Concerning data triangulation 
methods, quality of data, credibility, and validation are all essential in this research. 
Triangulation depends on several sources in solving a problem. In which difference in 
methods, data collection and analysis ensures data consistency and therefore validity. 
Patton (2002) identified four kinds of triangulation, methods triangulation, 
triangulation of resources, analyst triangulation, and theory/perspective triangulation. 
In this study, „methods triangulation‟ and „triangulation of resources‟ were used. First, 
the data enquiry methods were based on interviews, participative observation, and 
secondary data of indices, documents, and reports. Second was the data resources 
collected with interviews, VC executives were compared to industry professionals, 
consultants, and policy makers. As well as a comparison of the data collected from VC 
firms with the brochures and documents collected from them prior to the interviews. 
Also in the case of the entrepreneurs and VC backed set of interviews the same 
methodologies were used and data compared to both VC firms and policy makers to 
ensure quality and credibility. 
         Validity of interpretation is another perspective of data validation; how the 
researchers interpret the findings might affect the „validity‟ of these findings. 
However, in this research there are no claims for „ultimate truth‟ and all data were 
objectively analysed to the best of the researcher‟s ability. “Validity of interpretation 
in any form of qualitative research is contingent upon the „end product‟ including a 
demonstration of how that interpretation was reached” (Mason, 2002: p.191). 
Furthermore, a detailed and objective „demonstration‟ of how the findings were 
reached was presented in the findings and analysis chapters six and seven.  
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  5.9 Study Timeframe      
     The timeframe of the fieldwork was between the years of 2008 and 2013. The 
research started with interviewing entrepreneurial financiers in Egypt, followed by the 
policy makers, the demand side (entrepreneurs), and then the industry professionals 
and consultants. The information gathered covered both the first and second questions 
which are: What are the main institutional determinants shaping entrepreneurial 
finance in Egypt? And what is the prospect for the development of a venture capital 
industry in Egypt?  
     Worth to mention is timing of the data gathering which took place before and after 
the January revolution in 2011. The huge upheavals during that period had directly 
affected the economy of Egypt and consequently the domain of entrepreneurial 
finance. Moreover, it had both positive and negative effects on entrepreneurship in 
general which are further illustrated over chapters 6 and 7. 
  
  5.10 Data Accessibility      
     The nature of entrepreneurial finance and specifically the VC/PE industry is quite 
different from most of other industries. The lack of disclosure and opacity on 
investments makes it even more complicated to gain access to information. However, 
good referrals are almost proven to grant access to those companies. The researcher 
was born and has lived in Egypt for most of his life thus is familiar with the culture, 
norms and language. This facilitated gaining access, and thus networking was not an 
obstacle. Moreover, the researcher has over fifteen years of experience in the Egyptian 
business environment and has access to influential associations in the country which 
enhanced networking opportunities. The researcher has also been close to the 
industry‟s network during the last five years. He has attended several conferences and 
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seminars on VC in Egypt which gave him some influential contacts who served as 
good entry points to access information. Along with research experience, business 
experience and knowledge on the subject, the researcher was chosen as a head of small 
enterprises unit in a prominent business association. Such an access was highly 
valuable and even opened more doors to the researcher and gained further access with 
industry professionals and members of development agencies. Furthermore, the 
researcher gained access to an SME financing firm as a member of the advisory board.  
     5.11 Conclusion 
     This study is an exploratory study with a core focus to generate an understanding of 
the current situation of entrepreneurial finance and the VC industry and its 
environment in Egypt, as an integral part of the MENA region. It examines the status 
of entrepreneurial finance and the VC industry‟s growth while relating to developed 
VC markets. Moreover, the research seeks explanations for the growth pattern of the 
VC industry; what is inhibiting the industry‟s development and what can be done to 
enhance its growth pace. This study assesses the effect of the institutional forces on 
the development of entrepreneurial finance and the VC industry as well as on the 
investment decisions of the present venture capitalists in Egypt. The in-depth 
interviewing with the major stake holders of entrepreneurial finance and the VC 
industry in Egypt is believed to have created both the depth in knowledge concerning 
the industry and the breadth needed to comprehend the whole topic. A key intention of 
this study is to provide benefits to VC professionals, entrepreneurs, industry 
consultants, and policy makers; while  adding to the literature on entrepreneurial 
finance, VC international expansion, entrepreneurship in developing countries, and 
last but not least the utilisation of institutional theory in industry analysis of emerging 
economies. 
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Chapter Six: Findings and Discussions on Entrepreneurial 
                     Finance in Egypt 
6.1 Introduction 
   This chapter discusses the findings on entrepreneurial finance in Egypt. It is based 
on the primary data gathered by interviews and notes from observations as well as 
secondary data findings from GEM and other professional reports. The discussions 
will relate to existing literature on the same domains of entrepreneurship and 
entrepreneurial finance knowledge and international experiences. This chapter is 
divided into two main sections; first is an overview on the current entrepreneurial 
finance status in Egypt, and second is an institutional framework analysis affecting 
the development of entrepreneurial finance in Egypt. The first section will start with 
an analysis of the available sources of funding for SMEs in general and entrepreneurs 
in specific. Discussions are grouped into capital structure preferences of entrepreneurs 
in the scope of available debt tools, bootstrapping, governmental initiatives, and 
equity financing. The analysis will focus more on equity entrepreneurial financing 
tools rather than SMEs, therefore the debt financing will be illustrated while further 
in-depth analysis will be on Angel financing, crowd funding, and VCs. Debt finance 
options in the Egyptian market are SME banking, leasing, factoring, and the 
supporting activity of credit guarantee. The governmental initiatives promoting SMEs 
and entrepreneurial finance are mainly the Social Fund for Development (SFD), and 
BEDAYA fund. After, is the analysis on equity financing tools containing the Nile 
Stock Exchange (NILEX) catering SMEs, and alternative sources of funding such as 
business angles and crowd funding, while venture capital is separately explored in 
chapter seven. An institutional theory lens is used to examine the institutional „pillars‟ 
supporting and impeding the growth of entrepreneurial finance. 
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6.2 Debt Finance in Egypt 
     From previous discussions on debt financing in Egypt (see section 3.8.1), it was 
apparent that debt finance in general and SME banking in specific was 
unaccommodating to SMEs. According to interviews with industry professionals, 
financial consultants, and a board member of the Egyptian Credit and Risk 
Association (ECRA), it was found that the banking sector is very strong and cash rich. 
The excess in bank deposits was 52% directed to loans and deposits and 48% towards 
treasury bills; which was affected by the current economic uncertainties after January 
2011 uprising. The experts added that the banks have very low risk appetite and are 
currently reluctant from serving sectors such as tourism, ICT, services, real estate 
except for budget housing and commercial projects, education, and hospitals. They 
indicated that such sector reluctance is not helping the overall performance of the 
Egyptian economy.  
 
“It sure harms the economy, some of these sectors for instance real estate is a major 
driver of the economy. They [the banks] can‟t continue supporting the government‟s 
budget deficit and ignore the private sector” (Industry Professional). 
 
    The banks are currently concentrating on big clients, mostly manufacturing 
companies, in areas such as cement, petrochemicals, and infrastructure. They even 
prefer governmental and private public partnership (PPP) even when they are less 
profitable with interest rates reaching 10.5% when they can lend individuals (retail) 
for over 18% on personal loans, credit cards, and car loans. Retail lending is 
considered one of the growing interests of the banking lending portfolio.  The experts 
explained this conservative lending approach to the history of the banking sector in 
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1990s. Board member of ECRA indicated that non-performing loans (NPL) reached at 
some point 180% of the total capital of some banks, mostly because they over lent the 
real estate sector. He added that they currently don‟t need to venture in risky projects, 
they have a high bargaining power, have very high profits, and most of them won‟t 
venture into SMEs. This was apparent for SME banking in Egypt, although it started 
to pick up in years 2004 and 2005 as a national strategy direction; only half of the 39 
banks in Egypt are currently involved in SME banking (Poldermans, 2011). And even 
though the CBE passed a regulation in December 2008 reducing the reserve 
requirements for SME lending in an effort to provide a financial incentive to the 
banks (Poldermans, 2011), still there is no significant contribution by the banks 
towards SME financing. Elaborating on the CBE incentives ECRA board member 
viewed it relatively positive. He pointed that this incentive triggered the SME banking 
sector and indeed had a positive impact on the market.  
 
“When the 14% required deposit is cancelled, it will decrease the cost of lending to 
SMEs by approximately 1.4%. This is quite significant considering the average net 
spreading income of banks [in Egypt] is of a 3.2%”. 
 
     Through two different meetings with two of the SME heads of leading banks in 
Egypt, the researcher was requested to promote their services to SMEs in the 
association. They both indicated that they have unutilised SME dedicated funds, they 
insisted that it‟s very hard to find „suitable‟ deals. 
      Regarding the major impediments facing SME banking, it was found that banks 
deal with SMEs the same way they deal with large corporations. Industry 
professionals suggested that an approach similar, yet more advance, to personal 
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lending should be implemented. An industry professional pointed that the 
international experiences in SME banking have multiple automated screening 
methods that enables quick and efficient decisions. In the case of Egypt, it‟s a very 
lengthy procedure that would take at best 1.5 months for acceptance. Moreover, with 
such high rejection rates over 90%, it will be very consuming to deal with all cases on 
a similar level as larger corporations.  
 
“To fully serve SMEs you must increase human capacity under the current situation. 
It‟s very difficult to do it this way and also very costly... I think it‟s even impossible to 
deal with start-ups this way. I believe I-Score can help with this problem when 
properly operational”. 
 
    Other initiatives to enhance credit to SMEs such as the Credit Guarantee Company 
(CGC) took place; however in 2009 the company guaranteed just 45 transactions 
(Rocha et. al, 2011). Moreover, the company had just started its SME programme in 
2011 (CGC, 2013), and hence the data on SME guaranteed transactions is not yet 
sufficient. In addition, credit rating is a necessity for any economy to enhance and 
facilitate its access to finance, especially SMEs (OECD, 2010b). In this respect, I-
Score was established as a credit rating company and started operations in 2007. All 
these initiatives in addition of the introduction of leasing and factoring are believed to 
enhance the debt financing for SMEs. However, to date most of the experts believes 
that banks and regulatory bodies need further improvement and further flexibility with 
SMEs. Industry professionals suggest that banks should not approach SMEs the same 
way they approach large corporations and they need to ease the restrictions. Any 
registered company needs to have a minimum of 2 financial years to submit for a 
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loan. They must have enough physical collateral to cover and this would exclude the 
vast majority of service oriented businesses. The experts interviewed indicated that 
SMEs are not helping the banks to serve them properly. It was found that some 
financial statements are not indicative of their real trading and are used to decrease 
their taxes. In such cases banks could not accept any other form of financial 
statements and won‟t lend the business. Other problems were found that some SMEs 
lack professional accountants and a reliable accounting system. In addition, many 
SMES are incapable of preparing a realistic business projection to their business 
plans. The problem with SME banking and access to debt finance is thoroughly 
discussed in literature (sections 2.3 and 2.6). It is an inherited trait regarding the size 
and age of the ventures, caused by information opacity, weak cash flows, and lack of 
collaterals (Berger and Udell, 1998). However, in the case of Egypt, the case might be 
more stringent regarding sector reluctance and the low appetite of risk for private 
sector lending in general; and lack of banking „capabilities‟ in setting realistic 
selection criteria and weak supporting credit guarantee and credit rating for SMEs in 
particular. 
     From a demand side perspective, most of the interviewed entrepreneurs showed 
apprehension regarding banking finance. It is important to stress that the statistical 
benefit of interviews is not the objective of this study due to the small sample as well 
as the variance upon age, size, type, and personal preference of the businesses among 
other variables. The value of this study remains to answer the why questions; hence 
the qualitative nature of the study. The objective in this section is to explore why 
entrepreneurs would prefer one type of finance over another. The first sample which 
was five entrepreneurs, three out of five showed little or no interest to approach banks 
and preferred equity in the form of partnerships. A further sample of ten entrepreneurs 
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was interviewed for further understanding on the same topic. Eight out of ten, 
totalling eleven out of fifteen (both samples combined), considered banking finance to 
be their least preference to finance their business. Out of those eleven, three chose 
religious grounds and fear of legal consequences in case of distress and the other eight 
showed only fear of legal consequences and no religious motivation. The types of 
business of those entrepreneurs were deliberately chosen to be bankable businesses, in 
other words, from the retail and manufacturing businesses that are most likely to 
possess tangible assets and collaterals.  
     The overall findings, suggests that the negative outlook towards bank finance 
might partly be counted for an important regulatory (fear of legal consequences) as 
well as normative (fear of a negative societal perception) and cognitive (religious 
preference) determinants, which might partly assist the rationalization behind small 
numbers of SMEs applying for banking facilities. There was also a conception that 
banking regulations are „too complicated‟. It was apparent in most interviews that 
entrepreneurs feared the legal and societal consequences of bank faulting more than 
cognitive and religious reasons.  
 
An entrepreneur mentioned:  
“Despite the so many difficulties of partnership, partners usually cooperate together 
for good and for worse... yet banks have no mercy and if the investor is unable to 
return the loan with the interest he is completely ruined". 
 
     First, banks usually ask for multiple personal guarantees in the form of cheques 
and other abiding commercial papers that are capable of imprisonment without going 
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through commercial courts. Second, the stereotype on not being able to repay the debt 
is highly degraded by the society.  
 
“In the back of their mind is this stereotype. Nobody differentiates whether the 
businessman is distressed or a thief. Everyone will call him a thief and he might end 
up in prison” (Industry professional). 
 
    Indeed, the negative media effect on businessmen and bank loans were highly 
topical in the early 2000s, famous cases of businessmen imprisonments were highly 
exposed and scrutinised in all means of media, mentioned an industry professional. A 
different point of view was presented by a different entrepreneur regarding his 
preference for bank loans versus partnerships as a mean of growth, his preference to 
debt was clearly evident  
"of course dealing with banks is much easier than having a partner as long as the 
project is thoroughly studied and the profit margin is reasonable, partners usually 
have different opinions and work priorities… on the contrary the bank is a silent 
partner who invests the money and reaps the profit at the end without interfering". 
     Yet, the conceivable preference of equity financing by entrepreneurs over debt 
financing, specifically bank lending, prevailed to be more observed. This was well 
summed in the following quotation by a VC/PE director:  
“the norm in Egypt is not to get a loan from the bank, it‟s part because of Shari‟a and 
the other part fear and unfamiliarity with banks... it‟s a mix... some don‟t care for 
Shari‟a compliance, they would care more on that banks can „sell your clothes‟ 
<<can leave you with nothing>>...”. 
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   Those initial observations could be supported by the SMEs access to finance report 
by El-Said (2010) indicating that 92% of the interviewed SMEs would prefer a 
venture capital over debt type of financing and over 50% of the SMEs sample did not 
apply for loans whether short or medium-long term facilities in 5 years. In addition, a 
study by El Kabbani and Kalhoefer (2011), using questionnaires for 190 SMEs in 
Egypt, found out that over 32% responded with yes for considering VC as a mean of 
finance and over 51% with maybe while only 8% answered no or don‟t know. 
However, their findings were more evident in smaller firms than larger ones. 
     From a cultural-cognitive perspective, interestingly none of the industry 
professionals‟ interviewees mentioned anything on banking and Shari‟a or Islamic 
finance preference of SMEs. However when they were asked on what they think of 
the effect of Shari‟a compliance on banking, they all agreed that it is important to 
some business owners and not all of them. One of the financial consultants indicated 
that approximately 20 to 25% of his clients would only use Islamic banking and the 
75% had no preference whether Islamic or commercial.  
     Regarding non-banking debt tools, industry professionals saw a growing 
opportunity for SMEs with leasing and factoring. It was found that factoring is 
currently not covering SMEs in Egypt, with one company operating and serving 
businesses with an annual turnover of 40 million (EGP) (approx. 3.6 million GBP). 
According to the Egyptian leasing association, there are currently 10 major market 
players in the financial leasing market accounting for more than 90% of the new 
contracts (ELA, 2013). A financial consultant indicated that the market in Egypt only 
works with financial leasing and not operating leasing. The difference is that with 
financial leasing the customer has to pay for the whole financing and then own the 
asset at the end of the contract while operating has a main objective of renting and 
127 
 
using it and hence not paying the full amount of financing the asset. Furthermore, it 
was found that leasing companies are capable of an 8 times leverage and are mostly 
partnered with major banks, this affects the industry resulting in higher costs for 
financing and higher influence of the banks. This also leads to the same restrictions 
and requirements applied by the banks in regard of SMEs.  
“The banks are highly involved in the [leasing] sector; the vast majority are backed 
by banks. You won‟t be surprised if they ask for the same banking requirements...  It 
[leasing sector] is improving and it is still in its early stages” (Industry Professional). 
    The leasing sector is growing and it reached 6 billion (EGP) in 2012 (approx. 550 
million GBP), with 3500 transactions the average transaction is around 2 million 
EGP, therefore it can well fit within the context of SMEs, however the size and 
volume of the Leasing market is still below expectations yet improving, according to 
industry professionals. 
     From a demand perspective, an entrepreneur indicated that leasing was one of the 
best financial tools for his business. The value increase of the asset, especially with 
high inflation rates and currency fluctuation, was found an extra benefit for his lease 
decisions on the long run. Another entrepreneur complained about the excessive 
guarantees required by leasing companies. He mentioned that the leasing company 
asked for suppliers‟ personal guarantee, in addition to two board members‟ personal 
guarantee, on top of collateral guarantee of the machinery he was buying. He argued 
that personal guarantees in the form of personal promissory notes are inadequate for 
such business deals particularly when the leasing company gets the machinery as 
collateral. However, he appreciated the Islamic compliance of the leasing industry and 
believed it suits well his business type and his personal preference.  
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 6.3 Bootstrapping in Egypt 
    Kabbani and Kalhoefer (2011) found that the majority of SMEs would internally 
finance their businesses. From findings from interviews with industry professionals 
and entrepreneurs, bootstrapping was a significant source of financing to the vast 
majority of entrepreneurs in Egypt. The sample of entrepreneurs showed that all 
entrepreneurs used one way of bootstrapping at some point in their businesses. A 
common method for small amounts of capital was personal loans and personal credit 
cards. This might suggest that smaller personal loans were more acceptable than 
larger business loans. Although the primary reluctance to bank financing was fear of 
legal consequences, small personal loans were found less risky for entrepreneurs. 
Deferred payment was another common method whenever it was possible. In small 
ventures, deferred payment was mostly found in regard to office equipment, 
computers, and air-conditioning equipment. In addition, regarding manufacturing 
firms and trading companies, deferred payment was mostly to suppliers of machines, 
goods, and raw material. Although this was not novel to the Egyptian market, what 
was noticeable is the tool used regarding such payment deferral. The case was usually 
paying a down-payment and the rest of the amount by deferred cheques or promissory 
note. According to an industry professional, deferred cheques were most commonly 
used among manufacturing companies, specifically for purchasing raw materials, and 
retail outlets for buying merchandise. Further investigation on this concept from a 
legal perspective took place. An interview with an industry professional with an 
elaborate legal background took place. It was found that there was no legal 
description for a deferred cheque, and all cheques were due on the date of issuance. 
However, traders do write cheques with future dates and the cheques were „closed‟ to 
be only withdrawn from the beneficiaries‟ account (not over the counter) and thus 
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could only be admitted on the date written on the cheque. It is believed by many 
industry professionals that, unlike many countries, this tool is very common in Egypt. 
Moreover, according to the legal consultant, the strength and credibility of the cheque 
lies in the fact that a rejected cheque is a petty crime punished by imprisonment for up 
to three years and/or a fine of up to 50,000 Egyptian pounds (approx. 4,000 GBP).  
Unlike other commercial paper, such as promissory notes which would in worst cases 
lead to bankruptcy, a cheque is a well established tool for credit in the Egyptian 
market. Thus regarding the main methods of bootstrapping by Winborg and 
Landstrom (2001) (see section 2.7), the most commonly used methods in Egypt would 
be personal loans and credit cards, in addition to delaying payments to suppliers. The 
use of deferred cheques might be a method particular to the Egyptian case. 
 
6.4 Governmental Initiatives 
   Two governmental initiatives regarding SMEs and entrepreneurial finance took 
place over the past two decades, the Social Fund for Development (SFD) as a debt 
financing tool (section 3.8.2), and on the equity finance side was Bedaya Fund 
established by the Ministry of Investment (introduced in section 3.8.3.2).  
    Regarding the SFD, an SFD official indicated that a joint programme between SFD 
and the World Bank is underway. This initiative is to establish a VC pilot fund which 
will be replicated with larger amounts if found successful. The SFD chairperson also 
highlighted the role of the SFD in future equity financing programmes. She believed 
the SFD should have a significant contribution to equity financing as it currently had 
in MSME lending. With an interview with a policy maker, he suggested that the SFD 
can play a major role in entrepreneurial finance and can initiate joint programmes in a 
government-private partnership. On the other hand, industry professionals were 
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sceptic about the role of the SFD. An industry professional indicated that there are too 
many red tapes with dealing with the SFD. He added that they give very little 
technical support to their borrowers. An industry professional stated:  
 
“Some government initiatives like the SFD are dedicated to SMEs... it is not very 
clear how?... SFD say they finance up to 2 million pounds [EGP], but we never saw 
that...never heard of it... specially that the SFD finance through banks and this 
allowed banks to apply their own criteria...”. 
 
    The SFD uses some of its credit lines to be lent by banks to SMEs. This was also 
observed in the field work. Two of the banks that were offering their SME finance 
services to the association had an SFD programme of lending within their SMEs 
financial products. An industry professional argued that this approach was not to the 
benefit of SMEs, for the SFD should have more lenient criteria regarding SME 
lending than commercial banks. Moreover, he argued that it would increase the cost 
of lending to SMEs with further intermediaries. Most of the industry professional 
believed that the SFD is hiring new high calibres and would expect its services to 
improve as it is already noticeable. In addition, the capacity and reach-ability of the 
SFD in most of the Egyptian governorates would entitle it to play the largest role by 
the government towards enhancing SME and entrepreneurial finance. 
     The second government initiative was found to be Bedaya fund. Industry 
professionals interviewed were not clear about the strategy and mandate of the 
BEDAYA fund. This could be the result of the newness of the fund and the lack of 
known deals at the time of the interviews. The fund, however, was actively seeking 
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deals through the Ministry of Investment and the fund management company.  
According to an industry professional:  
 
“Bedaya fund is not obvious whether they finance start-ups or not... but knowing them 
they are not very interested to finance new ventures... they want a venture that is 
trading for 2 to 3 years and is successful and in the growth stage and then they can 
finance in this case <<in a sceptic tone>>...”. 
 
    A further interview with a senior advisor at the Minister of Investment indicated 
that they needed to promote this fund. He mentioned that this fund was meant to be 
much larger and could have acted as a fund of funds. He added that banks were 
encouraged to invest in the fund and were expected to have larger contribution in the 
future. Moreover, the fund managers found it challenging to select deals that would 
match the fund‟s criteria. The role of this fund in entrepreneurial finance domain in 
Egypt is still early to assess, yet the initiative of an equity fund remains of substance 
to the entrepreneurial environment in Egypt. 
 
   6.5 Equity Finance 
    External equity finance is through public markets, private investors, formal and 
informal venture capital. Regarding public markets, it was found that the NILEX 
stock exchange for SMEs offering equity finance in Egypt was still in a very early 
stage. There are currently 23 listed companies of which 22 are trading. Two were 
listed in 2008, three in 2009, a record high nine in 2010, three in 2011, three in 2012, 
and four in 2013 of which one is not traded yet. The current numbers and volume are 
not what was expected from the launch of the NILEX, however the obvious effect of 
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the political situation visible in 2011 through 2013 maybe a good explanation 
specially with the record high of 2010. On another level, only two companies out of 
the 24 listed companies are in the technology business. 
     The interviewed industry professionals viewed the NILEX as a potential exit 
mechanism that is not yet fulfilled, rather than a growth equity source. A PE/VC 
director argued that the NILEX is at a complete halt and for the time being did not 
prove reliable as an exit option.  
 
  An industry professional had this opinion on the NILEX:  
“The NILEX up till now is in the pilot phase... as a pilot project it is successful... as a 
stock market and a mean to finance SMEs it is definitely not... it would be a failure 
project... we have twenty something company with an average of 5 million paid in 
capital... this is not bad... there are smaller and larger but this is the majority... the 
other point is the subscription regulations... there must be profitable balance sheets... 
with a profit of 5% minimum for the last year as a percent of the capital... this means 
we can‟t accommodate start-ups...”. 
    He further added that the regulations for the NILEX are changing as they they‟re 
currently un-inviting for the brokers and investors alike. This causes the NILEX to 
have a very small volume of trading and this needs further encouragement. Moreover, 
he argued that the NILEX should also change the regulations to be more 
accommodating to entrepreneurial ventures and start-ups. The remaining, more 
significant, external equity financial tools were found to be through partnerships, 
family and friends, or angel investors. In addition, the tool of crowdfunding as a 
newly introduced concept to the Egyptian market was further explored. Finally, the 
option of venture capital is discussed in more details. 
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    6.5.1 Informal Finance and Angel Investment 
       6.5.1.1 Love Money 
     “Love money” is when investors expect no return at all, mostly invested in family 
member‟s businesses; it was estimated to be approximately 2.8 billion EGP (250 
million GBP) (Hattab, 2008). Similar findings to the existence of large sums of love 
money were found all over the MENA region reaching approximately 25% of 
informal angel investors (Stevenson et al., 2010). According to an industry 
professional:  
 
“Entrepreneurs, like any other start-up company, face very big problems to access 
finance... Especially the conventional ways, the biggest part is the banks... they [the 
banks] don‟t see them. Especially when the ventures have no tangible assets, like IT 
and technology related or services... they won‟t be able to access anything from these 
regular channels... They would be left with social, friends and family finance... those 
are the only ones that would help them start their business”. 
 
    Family ties and social networks are highly appreciated in the Egyptian society as 
well as MENA region, it stems from both a cultural and religious motivations that are 
in favour of strengthening those ties. Through interviews with entrepreneurs, the 
majority indicated that they have used family finance whether on a debt or equity 
basis at some point in their business. Friends finance came in as a second choice. 
Family financing is a well established source of funding for entrepreneurs all over the 
world, and in the case of Egypt it was no exception. However, the majority of 
entrepreneurs showed that family financial support with no return is „natural‟. 
Furthermore, some indicated that it was „normal and expected‟ for their families to 
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support them whenever in need and the family‟s financial conditions permitted. The 
family members who were expected to support entrepreneurs were even extended to 
uncles, aunts, and cousins. It was expected from the „well off‟ family members to 
support other members. This was found true on all levels of support; whether on a 
charitable basis or on a business agreement and venture financing basis. Family ties in 
Egypt were very strong, however it is argued to be weakened over the past 30 to 40 
years due to „rapid social mobility‟ among Egyptian social classes (Amin, 2000: 
p.25). Amin (2000: p.9), argues that economic liberalization caused by the „Open-
Door‟ policies in the 1970s are “the most common explanation for these various 
manifestations of economic, social, political, and intellectual malaise” which by its 
role had affected the social structure of the Egyptian society and accordingly 
weakened family ties.  
     As examples for „love money‟, an entrepreneur indicated that the seed capital for 
his start-up business was a loan from his father with 30% profit share for a period of 
three years right after his graduation. On the other hand, another entrepreneur stated 
that his father would lend him on a short term basis and the entrepreneur found the 
notion of a return on this money absurd. The aspect of „love money‟ was noticeable in 
Egypt and the MENA region; it was also evident along many developing countries in 
GEM reports, what could be distinctive in the case of Egypt was the „taken for 
granted‟ attitude for family support noticeable in entrepreneurs‟ interviews. 
      
    6.5.1.2 Partnership and Cooperative Finance 
    According to industry professionals, the business culture in Egypt was found to 
have a very high emphasis on partnership. There is a high respect and appreciation for 
partnerships. However, it remains difficult to gain trust that would lead to form a 
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partnership. It was commonly resembled to marriage as a long term commitment by 
many entrepreneurs. Most partnerships took place among family members, extended 
family, friends and colleagues. All the same, adversity, problems, and control struggle 
were among the common negativities established over partnerships. For many 
businesses the purpose of partnership was found to be primarily as a mean of finance. 
It might as well be the most common way to finance a start-up business in Egypt. 
Whether there is any value added, apart from finance, by joining the venture is 
questionable. An industry professional emphasised how partnerships are common as a 
means of finance:  
 
“People are different... some don‟t like banks... they want a partner... I noticed they 
don‟t like institutions... they want someone to invest and have no say... this itself kills 
the purpose... their success rate is low..... They just don‟t someone to supervise them 
and force contracts on them and interfere with their decision...”. 
 
    Passive cash partners and control struggle was an important factor in many of the 
interviews with entrepreneurs. In an entrepreneur interview, for him a partnership 
needs to be regulated and controlled in the form of a joint-stock company otherwise it 
would lead to financial problems. It should have no concern over friendships, he 
added, thus if one partner ceases to invest in the project, his share can be reduced 
while the share of the other partners increases accordingly by raising extra capital and 
hence the business will continue. He continued to argue that partners should be sought 
for their expertise or effort; when it‟s for the sole purpose of money, banks could be a 
better alternative. He added that the partner could be beneficial if he is a businessman 
with excess money to invest, and seeking a reliable trustworthy partner while he 
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himself remains a silent partner. The whole idea is that partners should not interfere in 
each other's job which is quite difficult to accomplish, he mentioned:  
"It will never work when all partners are trying to steer the wheel!". 
    The whole concept on partnerships as a mean of finance was highly visible; 
however, the control struggle and the optimum profile of the cash partners were the 
key concern of entrepreneurs. Thus partnerships taking place in Egypt might take 
place for the sole reason of finance. With very little alternatives and apprehension 
over bank lending, partnerships are heavily used as a cooperative form of equity 
financing. It might be argued that non-value-adding partnerships lead entrepreneurs to 
give away valuable equity stakes for the lack of alternatives in the form of debt 
finance.   
     According to entrepreneurs and observations, cooperative financing took place 
among traders who partner in groups to import goods, in case a single trader can‟t 
afford to purchase a full vessel container of merchandise. In the course of 
entrepreneurs interviews, a different cooperative financing method was further 
observed called „Gami‟a‟ translated to „association‟, where a group of traders (mostly 
12 members to fit a calendar year) or business owners paid monthly, weekly, or even 
daily amounts of money and a member of the group received the whole sum on a 
rotational basis according to their needs. Each trader could subscribe with a full 
month or more, or share half a month with another trader. Although, this concept is 
well established in Egyptian households, more evidently in the lower income 
segments, little was known on its applicability in businesses in Egypt. In particular, 
this concept was more noticeable among traditional businesses and small traders; 
nevertheless, the amounts varied significantly from very small amounts to up to 
137 
 
100,000 EGP (approx. 9,000 GBP) monthly where a trader can benefit from a larger 
sum of 1,100,000 EGP (approx. 100,000 GBP) over a calendar year. It was further 
explained that the least in need among the group would tend to collect the sum further 
to the end of the „Gami‟a‟, while those in high need for the money collects them first 
and those are most probably the initiators of the „Gami‟a‟. Moreover, after reviewing 
academic literature on the topic, similar observations were found in other developing 
countries under the concept of „Rotational saving and credit associations‟ (ROSCAS) 
in Africa, Asia, and New Guinea (Callier, 1990). Several researchers explored this 
concept; such as in the case of rural East Africa by (Kimuyu, 1999), in Cameroon by 
(Tankou and Adams, 1995), and in Nepal by (Chhetri, 1995). The role of informal 
financing in developing countries in the form of group lending and ROSCAS were 
believed to be highly significant within countries of weak formal financial institutions 
(Christensen, 1993; Ghatak, 1995; Anderson, Baland, and Moene, 2009).  The role of 
trust and networks are among the determinants of this method of rotational saving and 
lending.  
 
     6.5.1.3 Business Angels 
     Until recently, there were no professional Angel financiers as known in other 
developed markets. From observations of the researcher in the field work, it was 
found that some of the well known Egyptian business persons tend to play a similar 
role. However, it was found that some angels were motivated by charitable and 
cooperative acts for entrepreneurs in need of finance. Other angels were found to 
support complementing businesses to their core activities through other 
entrepreneurial ventures. Yet they might not be the habitual conventional business 
angel type, and they don‟t even position themselves as such. 
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According to a PE/VC director:  
 
“Business angels are not so many... they don‟t even see themselves as such... they are 
mostly successful businessmen who sees a good opportunity of any kind and decides 
to go for it... it is never a planned activity, it is not intended to be a business angel 
activity... the composition of entrepreneurial finance in Egypt is highly unstructured”. 
 
    Although, angel financing was evident in Egypt (Hattab, 2008); however, an 
organised initiative was non-existent until the formation of „Cairo Angels‟. After the 
January revolution and the increasing entrepreneurial activity, a group of young 
businessmen tried to organise their efforts of angel investments. They formed Cairo 
Angels (CA) “Egypt‟s first formal network for business angels” in early 2012 
according to their website (Cairo Angels, 2013). “The idea for The Cairo Angels was 
in mid 2011 and we hosted our first angel pitch session in February 2012, angels to 
invest in interesting and high potential start ups and enjoy the satisfaction of guiding 
entrepreneurs and participating at [a non-] executive level.  We started with about 10 
[angels], today we have 50 registered [members], within 18 months I‟m hoping to 
have 100 active angels at which point it will probably not be effective to have any 
more. Instead I hope other angel groups will emerge.” (Founder of CA: Aysha, 
2012). Each member of the network makes his own investment decision, yet they 
collectively work on the due diligence of their investees. The size of investment 
ranges from 250,000 EGP (approx. 20,000 GBP) to one million EGP (approx. 90,000 
GBP). Their investment strategy is to get a minority stake and hands-off approach and 
expect a multiple of 3 to 5 times in 3 to 5 years, assuming that a multiple of 10 for the 
same period is achievable in Egypt.  
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       “Conventional wisdom says that an angel should always seek some level of 
[non]executive participation but we are relaxing this requirement until deal flow is 
more steady. In the meantime we have some angels who simply want the capital 
exposure while others want to be involved in grooming the entrepreneur before an 
investment has even been made!” (Aysha, 2012). They position themselves as 
generalists yet the majority of their investments are in technology businesses. They 
advertise that they wish to invest in the agricultural, logistics and energy sectors, and 
hope to see more women entrepreneurs applying (Cairo Angels, 2013). Syndication is 
within their scope whether internally in their network or with other early stage 
financiers. They meet once every quarter and receive around 4 to 5 pitches via their 
main deal sourcing partners who are mainly Egypt‟s incubators, accelerators and 
universities, and from direct approaches and often from more mature 
entrepreneurs. The geographic focus is mainly in Cairo; however they do welcome 
regional entrepreneurs and have been approached by pitches from Jordan, Lebanon, 
and Yemen. It is noticeable that Cairo Angels invested in six ventures in less than two 
years, of which four executed deals and further two with committed capital. The first 
four collectively amounted to 1.1 million EGP (approx 100,000 GBP) which is an 
average of their minimum investment requirement, yet the later two ventures amounts 
to one million EGP which shows an increasing appetite for risk. An example of their 
investments is Iqra‟ali (meaning: Read for Me), which is a mobile app that reads 
selected magazine and news papers articles, mostly dedicated to long hours drivers in 
Cairo traffic. It is an example of using technology to overcome a specific local 
problem. An entrepreneur who is angel funded argued that it took him over 12 months 
to raise funds for his venture. He added that 41% of entrepreneurs, according to a 
MENA region survey, found access to finance as the major hurdle towards 
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entrepreneurship in the region. The culture of angel investments is missing in Egypt, 
he added, and even family and friends are not encouraged via tax bracket exemptions 
such as in the United States for instance. He continued to argue that raising a second 
round is even harder if possible at all.  
“Our case is the exception... this is not the general rule [to access funds]... We are 
very very lucky to do so, many entrepreneurs whom I‟d consider much better than us 
couldn‟t raise any!”. 
 
    6.5.2 Crowd Funding 
    Crowd funding is one of the latest entrepreneurial finance vehicles worldwide. 
„Shekra‟ is a crowd funding platform that was established in Egypt in November 2011 
after the January revolution (Wyne, 2013). The word „Shekra‟ stems from the two 
Arabic words „sharek‟ and „fekra‟ meaning „share‟ and „idea‟. Shekra‟s management 
team are a group of four. They all share high level of international education and 
experiences from the United States, Germany, and the UK. The idea is that Shekra 
prepare new ideas and assist them with their business plans until they manage to raise 
the required funds through Shekra‟s platform. In return, Shekra acquires a small 
equity in the new venture, in addition to a minimum fee charged for services such as 
business plan support, due diligence, and monitoring (Shekra, 2013). The business 
proposal of Shekra is  “Conventional funding sources such as family and/or friends, 
venture capital funds or banks  are often not the right choice due to a number of 
drawbacks such as limited funding being "too small" for the big investors or not 
willing to take funding based on interest due to the burden or religious 
considerations. Shekra solves this problem by supporting entrepreneurs to fund their 
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start-ups through its crowd funding platform relying on a network of validated and 
reliable investors” (Shekra, 2013).  
    According to one of the founding partners of Shekra, they target youth and student 
entrepreneurs aiming to increase the success rate of start-ups. He added that Shekra 
values itself for being Shari‟a compliant, socially responsible, and sustainable. Until 
June 2012 the platform managed to raise funds for three venture out of 150 applicants 
with an average of 150,000 EGP each (approx. 14,000 GBP) (Wyne, 2013).         
     Founding partner pointed that the idea came from the high entrepreneurial activity 
in the region and its positive economic impact. He mentioned:   
 
“15% of young Arabs wish to start their own business which has a high economic 
impact... SMEs in Egypt contribute to 38% of the employment and 38% of the GDP.” 
    
    He further illustrated the major obstacles facing entrepreneurship and 
entrepreneurial finance and stated that the regulatory dimension is  
 
“typical... lack of policies simplifying and speeding the processes”. 
 
   Regarding entrepreneurial finance he argued:  
“There is a need for entrepreneurial ecosystem, and most importantly funding, the 
missing middle and lack of profit and loss sharing equity in SME financing. It‟s 
usually too big for micro-finance and too small for private equity funds and too risky 
for banks”. 
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   The three levels of involvement of Shekra with entrepreneurs, according to their 
founding partner, are grouped to pre-funding, funding, and post-funding. The 
prefunding phase includes, viability, business education, due diligence, valuation, and 
business planning. The funding stage includes pitching and fund fulfilment. And the 
final stage of post funding includes, legal structuring, mentoring, and monitoring. He 
added that their deal sourcing primarily depends on their own outreach, NGOs, 
incubators, and competitions. He mentioned that their investors are from all sizes, 
they can be locals, expats, institutions, business associations, or from GCC countries.               
     Industry professionals suggested that crowd funding could be successful in Egypt. 
According to an industry professional:  
“Crowd funding is a good idea… although abroad [in developed countries] the sweet 
spot of CF is 20000 USD... this model can be applied in Egypt but with larger 
amounts... and there would be a hub that receives the money for certain ventures... 
people are willing... if anyone had an idea with a good return people are in it... the 
number of people who seeks a return on their money are higher than those who seeks 
investments...” 
 
      Worth to mention is that there are no laws or regulations governing crowd funding 
in Egypt. A platform could be managed from Dubai, legally setup in South Africa, 
and invests in Egypt. The nature of crowd funding as an electronic platform doesn‟t 
restrict the physical existence to its legal setup. The same case applies to all crowd 
funding platforms in the MENA region. According to Ideation Centre (a think tank of 
Booz & Co. in the Middle East), “Middle Eastern players seem to be working slowly 
but surely on importing this model [crowdfunding] into the region. These players, 
such as eureeca.com for equity investing, zoomaal.com and aflamnah.com for 
143 
 
creative projects – just to name a few, seem to have found their way around the lack 
of regional regulatory frameworks that support or govern various Crowd funding 
models. Other players have alternatively decided to only have a local presence, but 
offshored the payment side of their operation outside the Middle East to eventually 
avoid having to face off with any eventual regulations that could emerge and have a 
direct impact on their business model.” (Khalil, 2013). 
 
6.6 Summary 
    From previous discussions, it is apparent that there are many concerns regarding 
banks‟ support to SMEs and start-ups. From the supply side, SME bank finance was a 
humble 5% (Rocha et al., 2011) with less than half of SMEs dealing with banks (El-
Said et al., 2013). Moreover, banks were argued to be risk averse towards SME 
banking, especially with the availability of alternative profitable opportunities. On the 
demand side, not surprisingly SME firms‟ imbedded difficulties in the form of scale, 
lack of collaterals and opacity were among the hurdles to match banking 
requirements. Furthermore, fear of legal consequences, negative social image, and 
religious preferences were among the reasons why entrepreneurs might be 
apprehensive towards banking finance. Further debt tools were also present; however 
the leasing industry was found the most significant and growing tool. It was positively 
perceived by industry professionals and entrepreneurs alike. Shari‟a compliance was 
among the positive factors making leasing a favourable option. On the other hand, the 
high involvement of the banking sector in the industry was argued as to be a negative 
aspect due to the perceived stringency in banking selection criteria by industry 
professionals.  
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    Further financing options were explored, and bootstrapping was found to be an 
important common practice among entrepreneurs in Egypt. Besides personal loans 
and credit cards, deferred cheques were common in delaying payments and gaining 
credit from suppliers. It was argued by industry professional that the extent and 
significance of deferred cheques in Egypt is a distinctive feature of the Egyptian 
market.  
    Governmental initiatives were found to be the SFD and Bedaya fund. The SFD was 
mostly involved with micro enterprises and was criticised for red tapes, low level of 
technical support, inclined towards micro loans, and once more high bank 
involvement. The SFD was strategically getting involved with equity finance while 
developing its human resources. On the equity side, Bedaya fund and the NILEX 
were found to be in an early stage with little impact on the entrepreneurial finance 
arena in Egypt. 
     To compensate for the insufficient formal sources of finance, the informal 
financing and love money were found significant. In respect of „love money‟ there 
was a „taken for granted‟ attitude for financial family support that would extend 
beyond direct family members. Entrepreneurs were found as likely to pay return on 
money borrowed from their family as not paying any return at all. Among other forms 
of informal financing was partnership as a source of finance and not for any other 
value adding activity. Other forms were evident, such as the rotational saving and 
lending „Gami‟a‟ model. It was a well-established household activity that was applied 
mostly among small businesses signalling a cooperative approach based on trust and 
close social networks.  
    The business angel concept was found to be different from the habitual model. 
However, a group of angels recently formed a consortium of angels that was found 
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similar to the western model found in Europe and Anglo-Saxon economies. 
Furthermore, crowdfunding was also present in Egypt reflecting a globalisation effect 
and high pace of knowledge transfer.  
    However, it remains that potential high growth enterprises (HGE) are facing more 
challenges over and above the challenges facing start-ups and entrepreneurial ventures 
in general. Indeed, it has been argued that HGEs are the most significant to a 
country‟s economic development and the highest contributor to job creation; 
sufficient funding among other factors is vital for their growth (OECD, 2013). 
Therefore this thesis deliberately focuses on the role of VCs in Egypt and their 
capability to support the growth of HGEs. Hence, the VC industry in Egypt is 
separately explored in chapter seven in thorough details. 
 
6.7  Institutional Determinants of Entrepreneurial Finance in Egypt 
    Using an institutional theory lens and the three categorisations: regulatory, 
cognitive, and normative (Scott, 1995) as a conceptual framework, are utilised in the 
analysis part. It is worth mentioning that some of the normative and cognitive 
determinants are intertwined and over lap at some points. And thus the illustration of 
this analysis was made indicative for analysis purposes and not to find a 
categorisation of institutional determinants regarding entrepreneurial finance. This 
section builds on previous discussions, after the overview on the environment of 
entrepreneurial finance in Egypt, and answers the first of question of this research: 
What are the institutional determinants shaping entrepreneurial finance in Egypt? 
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     6.7.1 Normative Forces on Entrepreneurial Finance in Egypt 
     The normative perspectives are the social values and social norms affecting the 
behaviour of an individual, organisation, or society (Scott, 1995). It implies what is 
socially appropriate and thus abiding to the societal expectations. The basis of 
compliance to this pillar is through „social obligation‟ and thus it is „morally 
governed‟ by the society. It is noticeable that the majority of the normative 
determinants were regarding entrepreneurship in general. However, the effect of the 
demand side (entrepreneurs) on entrepreneurial finance was found of importance in 
the course of primary data gathering.  
 
   6.7.1.1 Education 
   The importance of education on shaping entrepreneurship was signalled by the 
majority of interviewees; it emerged to be an important determinant concerning the 
demand side of entrepreneurial finance. A crowd funding director stated: 
“there is a shortage in high quality formal and informal education, students don‟t 
think entrepreneurship”. 
    This was also evident in other interviews with entrepreneurial financiers. A PE/VC 
director argued that there is a lack of proper education that qualifies the major 
supporting activities such as accountants, financial managers, and legal personnel. 
The role of education on entrepreneurship and the need for entrepreneurship 
education are evident in the literature (Peterman and Kennedy, 2003; Kirby, 2004). In 
OECD report (2013) regarding HGEs in the MENA region, it signalled an urgency to 
introduce curricula on education and training for entrepreneurship to all educational 
level. GEM reports addressed education as an essential factor to entrepreneurship in 
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different economies; the national experts in Egypt believed that Education is the most 
important constraining factor towards entrepreneurship. It is believed that the 
Egyptian educational system on all levels is relatively poor and insufficient, which is 
reflected in the overall rank falling last on education and training in 2008 and 2010 
(Hattab, 2008; 2011). In the MENA region it was found that less than 5% received 
any form of education on how to stat their business in formal education (Stevenson et 
al., 2010).  
     6.7.1.2 The Role and Influence of Associations       
    Another normative determinant would be the associations currently involved in 
promoting entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial finance activities in Egypt. It was 
found that there were limited initiatives regarding associations for business 
incubations and venture capital activities. There exists an Egyptian Incubator 
Association (EIA) which was established in 1995 after the incubation concept had 
been initiated in Egypt in 1992-1993 through a UNDP initiative, yet its efforts were 
directed to support the SFD incubators (ESCWA, 2013). However, an association that 
represents the newly established business accelerators is non-existent. Worth to 
mention is that Flat6Labs (a leading venture accelerator in Egypt) is a member of 
Global Accelerator Network, which is a networking hub for over 50 accelerators in 63 
cities all over the world (Gan.co). This shows that normative determinants would be 
externally affected by international practices rather than local. Several NGOs, 
associations, and electronic platforms are working on improving and enhancing the 
entrepreneurial environment in Egypt. Such initiatives would include, Alexandria 
Business Association (ABA), Egyptian Junior Businessmen Association (EJB), 
Middle East Council of Small business and Entrepreneurship (MCSBE), Egyptian 
Business Development Association, Alrowad, Injaz Egypt, Silatec Egypt, Endeavour 
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Egypt, TechWadi Egypt and Egypreneur. It is observed that a western, specifically 
North-American, impact was apparent in entrepreneurship supporting association 
Egypt. Some of the major associations such as Alrowad and Injaz Egypt were 
suppored by the USAid with financial and technical assistance. Other international 
associations such as Ashoka and Endeavour are international associations based in the 
US. As well as the efforts exerted by Canada‟s CIDA on promoting SMEs. This could 
lead to transferring some of the norms of the mentioned countries to the Egyptian 
entrepreneurship ecosystem. And eventually cascade towards entrepreneurial finance 
activities especially in the absence of influential indigenous associations. The concept 
of westernisation in the Egyptian society is already evident through the work of Amin 
(2000), it was during Nasser‟s regime and onwards that escalating westernisation took 
place. It is plausible to add that the age of information technology and globalisation 
accelerated such concept. Knowingly westernisation is affecting the whole Egyptian 
society; however entrepreneurship might be further influenced by the foreign financial 
and non-financial support in the form of developmental financial institutions.  
 
   6.7.1.3 Family Enterprises and Governance 
      According to a PE/VC director: 
“First thing we look at is governance because without control things will be messed 
up... and in Egypt it‟s the norm not to have governance... very very very few have 
governance... it‟s a culture thing... there is no legislation that enforces governance... 
except for board meetings and activities that people adjust on paper and not really 
implemented...”. 
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    Another PE/VC director argued that lack of corporate governance is the second 
biggest hurdle that faces their business in Egypt, he added that this is due to the many 
family businesses that exist. It was discussed that it is very difficult to apply 
governance in SMEs and same applies to family businesses due to their imbedded 
culture of control and doing things their own way. Family businesses do constitute to 
a large number of enterprises in the private sector and even a larger number in the 
SMEs, according to industry professionals. The family ties and extended family 
networks culture in the society plays a role in the existence and continuity of family 
enterprises. It is based on family trusts and support. The culture of supporting family 
members extends to the children even when they start to work; family dependency 
was considered as a cultural barrier by policy makers.  
 
“We have a high family dependency here in Egypt and the type of education! These 
are all cultural barriers for entrepreneurship” (Policy maker). 
 
    Therefore, lack of governance in general and family enterprises in particular was 
found a barrier for entrepreneurial financiers to find potential investees. 
 
        6.7.1.4 Perception of Entrepreneurship 
     The perception and status of entrepreneurship would be a contributor to this pillar 
as it affects the demand side of entrepreneurial finance. Egypt was ranked 12
th
 among 
the 43 GEM countries with adult population considering entrepreneurship as a career. 
The adult population perceived status of successful entrepreneurs highly in 2008, 
which even improved in percentage in 2010 to become the 14
th
 among 59 countries 
ahead of many efficiency and innovative driven countries (Hattab, 2008; 2011) . With 
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90% of the Egyptian population believes that a successful entrepreneur gets a high 
status in the society and 70% thinks the media gives an adequate coverage on 
entrepreneurs (op. cit.). This positive perception on entrepreneurship would encourage 
the choice of an entrepreneurial venture and thus the inflow of opportunities for 
entrepreneurial financiers.    
        
  6.7.1.5 The Dynamics of Networks 
     Networks were found to be „extremely important‟ in developing countries (Acs 
and Virgill, 2010). It is argued that networks fill the gaps during institutional 
transitions in emerging economies (Peng and Zhou, 2005). The absence of formal 
networks was substituted with informal networks in many aspects of entrepreneurship 
and its financing tools. Regarding sources of funds, the amount of informal finance 
and specifically love money among family members might be indicative. Importance 
of networks and trust was also apparent in deal sourcing activities. Financiers were 
mostly dependent on a small circle of network, their circle of entrepreneurs, and close 
friends and family members. This might also explain the geographical proximity 
towards their investees. It allows them to easily find information on investees from 
their closed circle. Further observations were found in the cooperative financing 
among traders and rotational lending. Such networks were based on personally 
knowing the members of the group and trusted referrals. The level of trust among the 
networks is paramount and gaining trust was not easily granted. Further explanation 
on cooperative behaviour in Egypt was through researching the differences among 
societies. Such differences were extensively discussed in the work of (Hofstede, 
2001) which was found beneficial to this topic. Societies range from individualist 
societies to collectivist societies; individualism indicates that relations between 
151 
 
societies are loose, while collectivism is relevant to societies with strong informal 
relations and cohesive groups (Hofstede, 2001). In the case of Egypt, with a low score 
of 25 on the individualism index is considered a collectivistic society (Geert-hofstede, 
2014). “This is manifest in a close long-term commitment to the member 'group', be 
that a family, extended family, or extended relationships. Loyalty in a collectivist 
culture is paramount, and over-rides most other societal rules and regulations. The 
society fosters strong relationships where everyone takes responsibility for fellow 
members of their group.” (Geert-hofstede, 2014).  
      Although the heavy reliance on personal networks might inhibit the number of 
business transactions (Peng, 2003), one would suggest that the informal networks 
would fill the gap and strengthen the ties among groups. In other words, informal 
networks might have some negative transaction costs, yet they serve as an invaluable 
substitute in emerging economies with under-developed formal institutions.  
 
   6.7.1.6 Indigenous Developmental Organisations 
   It was also noticeable that local NGOs were involved in the field of entrepreneurial 
finance. NGOs such as Nahdet El Mahrousa  established in 2003 focusing on 
innovative social enterprises (Nahdet el Mahrousa, 2013), Alashenek ya Balady 
focusing on economic empowerment of marginalised communities (Alashenek ya 
Balady, 2013), and Alexandria Business Association offering small sized loans for 
micro and small enterprises, they all contribute in incubating and financing 
entrepreneurs. These local charitable and developmental activities may complement 
government initiatives and compensate for under serving SMEs and entrepreneurs in 
Egypt. The charitable practices might add to the existing informal finance to attempt 
fulfil the need of entrepreneurial finance. It was also found that Islamic related NGOs 
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were also involved with entrepreneurial finance. They collaborate with interested 
parties in supplying small amounts to new venture on equity or Islamic financial tools. 
The emergence of charitable institutions along the side of informal angel investors 
and love money are forming parallel informal institutions for lack of alternatives and 
limited government support. Thus, it is possible to consider developmental and 
charitable associations a favourable factor contributing to entrepreneurial finance. It 
could once more be explained as a reflection of the co-operative nature of the societal 
norms in collectivist societies that might as well be partly influenced by Islamic 
charity practices (see section 6.7.2.4).  
 
  
6.7.2 Cognitive Forces on Entrepreneurial Finance in Egypt         
   The cognitive-cultural pillar explains the beliefs and imbedded cultural values of 
individuals that are projected on the individual‟s or societal behaviour (Scott, 1995).  
 
  6.7.2.1 Legitimacy of Entrepreneurship 
   In 2008 the GEM report signalled a very low fear of failure rate ranking Egypt 
second after Iran indicating a surprising appetite for risk, however it changed to rank 
Egypt 11
th
 among the 53 GEM countries in 2010 (Hattab, 2011). This is still a 
positive aspect in Egypt indicating a good mindset for entrepreneurship and low fear 
of failure. Moreover, it was found that 63% of the Egyptian population believes they 
have enough knowledge and qualifications to start their own business, however, on 
the other hand only 25% would consider starting their own business in three years‟ 
time (op. cit.). Although, it is relatively a high percentage of confidence in having the 
desired skills, the national experts in Egypt believes that Education is the most 
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important constraining factor towards entrepreneurship. It is believed that the 
Egyptian educational system on all levels is relatively poor and insufficient, which is 
reflected in the overall rank falling last on education and training (op. cit.). This is 
again a conflicting indicator between the experts and the general perception of the 
population. This could be partially explained as an overconfidence stemming from 
inadequate education and learning process. The general perception could be lacking 
what are the required knowledge and skills to start a business. The fact that only 25% 
would consider starting a business might support a fear of starting a business and not 
a „fear of failure‟. It reflects a fear of the cumbersome regulatory system (elaborated 
in the regulatory pillar section 6.7.3). Moreover, the inherited culture of the secured 
state job could still prevail. A state job was a highly favourable option in Egypt till the 
1970s when the private sector started to emerge and became widely accepted in the 
80s and 90s (Amin, 2000); hence the Egyptian proverb: “If you cannot have a „miri‟ 
[government] job, wallow in its dust”.  However, it has changed significantly in the 
society and a „good family‟ could now give their daughters in marriage to young men 
in a private venture, which could have seldom happened in the near past (Amin, 2000: 
p.73).  This falls under the argument of legitimacy as been discussed by Scott (1995) 
and here it explains whether there is legitimacy for entrepreneurs to start their 
business or not. Legitimacy towards entrepreneurship in Egypt could be a hybrid 
between the positive perception on entrepreneurs and low fear of failure on one hand, 
and on the other hand is the fear of entry and the imbedded attachment to the security 
of the state job. Further evidence on the cultural barrier was through Hofstede‟s 
(2001) „uncertainty avoidance‟ dimension as a socio-cultural determinant. Egypt 
scored 80 on this dimension and thus has a high preference for avoiding uncertainty; 
“Countries exhibiting high uncertainty avoidance maintain rigid codes of belief and 
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behaviour and are intolerant of unorthodox behaviour and ideas..... Security is an 
important element in individual motivation.” (Geert-hofstede, 2014). In the case of 
Egypt, legitimacy to start a business could be well supported; however, the cultural 
barrier is still evident. This would also affect the general domain of entrepreneurial 
finance and understanding the cultural mind-set that might inhibit the supply side of 
entrepreneurial ventures.  
 
     6.7.2.2 Significance of Innovation     
     Entrepreneurs in Egypt can be classified as small and micro business owners 
contributing to the vast majority of SMEs in Egypt, and the relatively innovative 
enterprises. The later is more dependent on technology and differentiated ideas than 
the rest of the market. Still, the vast majority of this category follows a „me too‟ 
model imitating international successful ideas. Most of the nascent enterprises tend to 
be in the sectors of retail, hotels/restaurants and whole sale trading with a general 
tendency towards services with a greater tendency to business services rather than 
personal services (Hattab, 2008). As for innovation and growth expectations, Hattab 
(2008) indicated that the vast majority of the businesses in Egypt are not technology-
oriented nor differentiated in their product market combinations leaving the country in 
the bottom four of the GEM countries in 2008. It was argued that in HGEs, innovation 
and not high technology that determines high growth of enterprises (OECD, 2013). 
    Egypt was ranked 120
th
 out of 148 countries in the Global Competitiveness Report 
(2013-2014) for the innovation pillar, earning 2.8 on a scale of 1 to 7 (Schwab and 
Sala-i-Martin, 2013). Noticeably, within the factors of innovation pillar „Availability 
of scientists and engineers‟ was ranked 55th. Policy makers do admit that innovation 
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needs larger efforts, though many initiatives are already taking place. According to a 
policy maker: 
 
“It is the most important issue; it is affecting the whole topic [entrepreneurship] and 
accordingly the industry [entrepreneurial finance]. Lack of innovation and 
entrepreneurial spirit is a big hurdle...”. 
 
   A PE/VC director echoed the same concept, he argued that the culture in Egypt is 
not ready and it can‟t be compared with South-East Asia. He added that is very 
difficult to support an entrepreneurial finance sector in Egypt with the current mind-
set; innovation is totally missing and supporting universities, innovation and 
entrepreneurial education is the best way forward. Industry professionals see that 
there is a lack of synchronisation between innovation programmes and very little 
awareness exists even among the different programmes themselves. They also 
suggested that innovation needs to be tackled in the early stages of university 
education.  
     Entrepreneurs shared the same point of view and agreed that innovation 
programmes should be introduced at university level and a greater attention should be 
given to the commercialisation of innovation. According to Xavier et al. (2013), an 
economy has to invest in R&D and innovation for entrepreneurs to be „agents of 
creative destruction‟ and that policy addressing firm creation alone without 
investment in education and innovation will not help in economic growth. In GEM 
reports on MENA (Stevenson et al., 2010) and Egypt (Hattab, 2008), it was clear that 
most entrepreneurial ventures are neither innovative nor technology based. Research 
and Development (R&D) and Transfer ranked Egypt last in 2008 and 50
th
 in 2010 
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(Hattab, 2008; 2011). Noticeably, according to the Global Competitiveness Report, 
the „Quality of scientific research‟ was ranked 127th, „Company spending on R&D‟ 
123
rd, „University industry collaboration in R&D‟ 133rd, and Government 
procurement of advance technological products 116
th
 out of 148 countries (Schwab 
and Sala-i-Martin, 2013). From the policy makers‟ and industry professionals‟ 
perspectives, entrepreneurship should include a high innovative component to be 
appealing to entrepreneurial financiers. It is suggested that limited innovation might 
affect the strategies and sector choice of entrepreneurial financiers. 
 
    6.7.2.3 Islamic Influence  
    The influence of Shari‟a was evident along the cycle of entrepreneurial finance, 
from source of finance selection, to the operations of the venture itself. Source of 
finance were inclined toward equity rather than debt. Besides the other reasons of fear 
of bank regulations or the reluctance of banks to finance SMEs, there was a tendency 
to prefer „partnership‟ over bank debt. It was also found that the importance of 
Shari‟a compliant financing was relatively more important to the 
individuals/entrepreneurs than it was to the industry professionals and financiers. 
Most of the industry professionals, contrary to the entrepreneurs, did not address the 
Islamic finance issue unless they were explicitly asked for its impact on 
entrepreneurial finance. Interestingly, they almost all agreed on its significance and 
that it could support many financing tools such as leasing, crowdfunding and venture 
capital. It was noticeable that the Islamic finance influence varied among social 
classes and ideologies. Islamic finance model prohibits interest based loans and 
emphasises on risk sharing in the form of partnership. The mechanism and impact of 
Islamic finance on Egypt on entrepreneurial finance domain will be later elaborated in 
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section (7.6). The findings emphasise the importance of this aspect in Egypt and 
partly explains the preference of equity financing by entrepreneurs over debt 
financing, particularly banking debt finance. Although it is hard to generalise the 
effect of Islamic finance on all businesses in Egypt, yet a „noteworthy‟ outcome, from 
primary observations and estimations by industry professional, would prefer Islamic 
banking. Generally, it was noticeable that in less developed countries with a Muslim 
majority have a strong reservation about receiving or paying interest, and they choose 
personal sources of funding or Islamic tools over commercial banks (Stevenson et al., 
2010). The Islamic cultural component might support the development of equity 
financing tools in general, and angel, crowdfunding, and VC, in particular. Therefore 
it would be considered as a contributing cognitive factor in support of entrepreneurial 
finance in Egypt. 
 
    6.7.2.4 Charitable Practices  
     In addition to Islamic finance, the charitable nature of Islam is clear in the notion 
known as „Zakat‟ (alms) which is a religious obligation on all financially capable 
Muslims to give a small portion (usually a 2.5% annually) of his wealth to the poor 
and less privileged and „Saddaqah‟ which is a voluntarily act of charity with no set 
amount yet highly religiously rewarded (Kochuyt, 2009). Besides the two mentioned 
charity acts of Islam, there is the notion of „Waqf‟ where someone would dedicate a 
certain amount of their wealth for a social cause usually in the form of land or 
building for the purpose of building mosques, schools, orphanages, or charities; all the 
above forms of charity in Islam are being used in modern days in forms of charity 
activities and social welfare of the Muslim societies (Clark, 2004). This kind of 
practice has an effect on the contribution of NGOs towards financing entrepreneurs 
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and also might partly explain informal financing and motives behind „love money‟ 
among extended family members.  
 
  6.7.2.5 Problem Solving Behaviour 
   The researcher‟s early interviews with PE/VC firms in 2008 signalled lack of 
entrepreneurial opportunities and ideas, yet it was noticeably decreasing towards later 
interviews in 2011 onwards.  Research observations would suggest that many of the 
new innovative enterprises in Egypt were „technology enabled‟. This term was used 
by VCs and entrepreneurs alike, the new social networks and mobile applications 
helped them develop businesses that are differentiated, relatively innovative, and 
using new technologies to reach new clients. Most of such new ventures were 
focusing on solving local problems, such as traffic updates and news platforms. Other 
ventures focused on design such as personalised and interactive designs in furniture 
and apparel. The „technology enabled‟ ventures were attempting to substitute the lack 
of breakthrough innovative technologies which needs significant R&D and substantial 
investments with a simpler model to create value via differentiation. The scene of 
entrepreneurship is rapidly changing, more noticeable after the January revolution and 
in the whole region after the Arab spring uprisings. In November 2013, the Mayor of 
London announced an intention to launch 100 million GBP fund dedicated to 
entrepreneurs and innovators from Arab and Muslim world (Taylor, 2013a). This 
might be a realisation of the current momentum that is happening in the region.  The 
current technologies and communications have facilitated the connectivity among 
entrepreneurs and the easiness to employ technology in their everyday life and 
problem solving. According to Schroeder, author of “Start-up Uprising” exploring 
entrepreneurship in MENA region “I realised that I had been stuck in my own 
159 
 
narrative trap about hopeless cycles of violence and corruption in the Middle East. 
When I went there and looked for myself, I saw just how much the new infrastructure 
of connection makes possible, even when the larger structures are crumbling. I began 
to see how the enormous potential of bottom-up problem solving is taking hold and 
changing everything” (Joni, 2013). Schroeder (2013) argued that top-down 
institutions have problems understanding the nature of many problems; he suggests 
that local entrepreneurs on the ground are more capable in solving their own 
problems. Moreover, the unprecedented technological advancement, in particular 
social media, and mobile devices are changing the power dynamics. Hence, bottom-
up problem solving and innovative approach based on local knowledge and 
application of new technologies to solve indigenous problems was found valuable in 
Egypt and the MENA region entrepreneurship. This research suggests the problem 
solving nature of the Egyptian entrepreneurs to be a conducive cultural aspect 
enhancing entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial finance in Egypt.  
 
  6.7.3 Regulatory Forces on Entrepreneurial Finance in Egypt 
   Regulatory institutions are the legal and governmental institutions that regulate the 
industry (Scott, 1995). They are mostly the reward and punishment policies applied 
by governments based on economic incentives; they contain regulations, industry 
agreements, and industry standards (Scott, 2007). It is evident that economic policies 
and regulatory matters as well as incentives do affect the decision to launch new 
ventures in different economies (McMullen et. al., 2008). According to Scott (2002), 
the regulatory dimension is the easiest to change and is very well observed as an 
institutional determinant.  
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     6.7.3.1 Business Environment             
     According to O‟Sullivan et al. (2011), the MENA-OECD Investment Programme 
Working Group on SMEs and Entrepreneurship substantiated three main factors 
restricting entrepreneurship in MENA region: „First, high barriers to doing business, 
particularly for smaller firms (e.g., corruption, complex licenses, rigid labour laws, 
high taxes, and unfair competition); second, cultural norms in which entrepreneurial 
activity is seen by young graduates as second-best compared with employment in the 
public sector, which offers more job security; and finally, the very low participation 
of women in the labour force and in entrepreneurial activity‟ (O‟Sullivan et. al., 
2011: p.7). Egypt is no exception regarding its business climate and regulatory 
framework (see section 3.3). This would directly affect entrepreneurial finance and 
how they do business with investee companies. This effect would be on the legal 
setup of the entrepreneurial financiers, the setup of investee companies, business 
permits and licensing, regulations on bankruptcy laws, intellectual property rights, 
taxation (in investee companies and financiers), and the enforcement of laws and 
contracts. Another PE/VC director indicated that the main factors hindering the 
development of entrepreneurial finance were government corruption and the lack of a 
consistent regulatory and strategic vision; he added that the government bureaucracy 
and the time needed to establish companies was very time consuming compared to 
other MENA countries. An industry professional argued:  
 
“the external factors that don‟t help supporting the SMEs are regulations, taxation, 
and surprisingly the understanding of the different bodies that claim they are 
supporting SMEs, don‟t understand SMEs”. 
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   Many studies had found that a supporting legal framework and low level of 
corruption are highly important to develop entrepreneurship (Li and Zahra, 2012); 
moreover, it will affect the quality of entrepreneurs and thus will deter high growth 
entrepreneurial entry rates and the employability of those companies (Xavier et al. 
2013).  It was found that many entrepreneurs and financiers opted to establish a mixed 
model of on-shore/off-shore to overcome the complications of establishing companies 
and funds. Others signed shareholders agreements (SHA) under foreign regulatory 
laws to protect their rights and ensure law enforcement. However, dealing with 
corruption, which most studies pointed its high impact on business and 
entrepreneurial finance (Bergara et al., 1998: McMullen et al., 2008), and intellectual 
property rights were still problematic. Once again the red tape to start a project and 
acquire the essential licences is not supporting the entrepreneurship ecosystem in 
Egypt. The cumbersome and complicated labour laws, multiple taxations, and social 
insurance laws are creating entry barriers for entrepreneurs. Moreover the legal 
consequences in cases of dissolving or bankruptcy are very high, which is argued in 
this research to create a fear of entry rather than an entry barrier. Further investigation 
on bankruptcy laws due to their significance are discussed in the following section.  
 
   6.7.3.2 Bankruptcy Laws 
    Armour and Cummings‟ (2006) work on legal aspects on VC in Silicon Valley, and 
the effect of bankruptcy laws on entrepreneurship in Europe and North-America 
(2008), found that „forgiving‟ personal bankruptcy laws  that are more „entrepreneur-
friendly‟ had a positive effect on the rate of self employment in tested markets and 
accordingly the level of entrepreneurship. They argued that it was more statistically 
significant than economic determinants. Relating to Kirzner‟s (1997) arguments on 
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the role of entrepreneurs, where most of the time markets are in disequilibrium due to 
errors caused by other entrepreneurs and the alert and imaginative entrepreneur takes 
the opportunities and act to correct the market. Hence learning experiences from 
failure and success is suggested to be a prerequisite for a vibrant entrepreneurial 
environment. Accordingly it is plausible to suggest that forgiving and speedy 
bankruptcy laws enabling entrepreneurs to start their business quickly and efficiently 
would create a vibrant entrepreneurial activity. 
     Further investigation regarding the Egyptian bankruptcy laws took place. 
According to a legal industry professional, the laws on bankruptcy in Egypt were 
applicable on traders who proves incapable or in the risk of being incapable of paying 
off their debts. The court of law manages the assets of the trader by assigning an agent 
on behalf of debtors. He indicated that the process of bankruptcy are lengthy and can 
take years to resolve. Furthermore, the declared bankrupt trader is punished by being 
prohibited from any trading or investment activities and loses his political rights and 
according to the law is not entitled to witness in courts of law. He further added that 
bankruptcy laws can also be applied on chairpersons and CEOs of limited liability 
companies, as well as all board members who are proved actively managing the 
company. The bankruptcy laws are capable of imprisonment punishments if the trader 
was found fraudulently or intentionally bankrupt his trade. It was found possible for a 
trader to reclaim his commercial and social rights after three years of paying off his 
debts. The industry professional commented that the law is relatively harsh and 
outdated. Furthermore, the minister of investment and the chair of the SFD pointed 
that there was a real need to revise bankruptcy laws in Egypt. In fact, they indicated 
that a project of a new law was ready and should be soon submitted for approval from 
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the parliament. However, it has been delayed due to the political situation and 
priorities of the current government. 
    The current bankruptcy laws are considered a major regulatory hurdle and the need 
for an „entrepreneur-friendly‟ bankruptcy law is eminent. According to academic 
studies, entrepreneurship reports, industry professional, and policy makers, a new 
„forgiving law‟ is believed to support entrepreneurship in Egypt.   
 
  6.7.3.3 Laws Governing Entrepreneurial Finance 
    During the course of this study, it was found that there are no laws or regulations 
that govern crowdfunding in Egypt. The same applied to business incubators or 
accelerators as well as PE/VC firms. The only law which was supposed to govern 
PE/VC is law no.95 for the year 1995, yet very few of the active PE firms and none of 
the VC firms work under this law.  
According to a PE/VC director: 
 
“The problem with the PEs in Egypt is that the legislation does not confess its 
existence. They only know investment companies and holding models, equity (stock 
market) funds... yet PE for them does not exist... the risk capital law is an investment 
company with specific goals, I established one before and it‟s a normal company with 
a paid in capital of 10 million pounds (EGP)... it has no privileges what so ever”. 
 
    Moreover, there are no laws that would promote angel investments or rewarding for 
the risk taken by VC investors. There were also no laws that exempt for capital gain 
taxes for angels or VCs. Further discussion on the importance of those regulatory 
aspects on the VC industry will take place in section (7.5.3). 
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   6.7.3.4 Intellectual Property Rights 
    According to the Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014 Egypt was ranked 94
th
 
over 148 countries on IP rights protection (Schwab and Sala-i-Martin, 2013). The 
weak rule of law and intellectual property rights laws are adding to the burden of 
starting new enterprises. One PE/VC director indicated that IP rights and trade mark 
registration was a major hurdle. It was observed that most of the entrepreneurs 
perceived IP rights highly complicated in Egypt and that the procedure to acquire a 
patent was very lengthy and tiresome. From field observations, some of the 
entrepreneurs opted not to go through this procedure in Egypt in the first place. This 
group of entrepreneurs could afford to register their company in Europe to make sure 
that they are able to protect their patent according to international laws in a reasonable 
time frame, according to them. It was found that this was an option for many other 
entrepreneurs in Egypt with valuable innovative ideas.  
 
   6.7.3.5 Financial Sector Development 
    There were apparent efforts from the Government of Egypt over the past two 
decades to improve its financial sector. Starting with the banking sector reform, 
introducing new SME banking CBE regulations, all through establishing a credit 
rating company and credit guarantee factoring are positive steps towards enhancing 
the banking sector and SME banking in specific. Furthermore, new programmes were 
established on equity and debt financing to support entrepreneurship and SMEs, such 
as SFD, NILEX, and BEDAYA centre. The promotion of leasing, factoring, 
mortgage, among other EFSA supervised non-banking financial activities were also 
evident. According to industry professionals and development reports (OECD, 2010a; 
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2010b), although the impact of these efforts were not up to expectations, they are 
anticipated to have a larger impact within a larger scope of regulatory reforms. 
  
  6.7.3.6 Technology Infrastructure  
   Among the regulatory efforts and governmental initiatives are the promotion of the 
ICT sector and the infrastructure developed for this industry (STFD, 2012). 
Furthermore, innovation support through technology funds and universities were also 
evident yet highly inefficient and limited, according to industry professionals. 
However, they remain evident attempts of the efforts undertaken by the government 
and thus a platform that can be enhanced and built upon to promote entrepreneurship 
in Egypt.  
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6.8 Conclusion  
 
Table (6.1): Institutional Forces Affecting Entrepreneurial Finance in Egypt 
     
      
 
 
Normative forces 
Cultural-
Cognitive Forces 
Regulatory 
Forces 
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1- Poor level of 
Education, training, and 
entrepreneurship 
education. 
1-Weak legitimacy 
towards 
entrepreneurship career. 
 
1- Unfavourable and 
cumbersome business 
environment and weak 
rule of law. 
2- Lack of professional 
associations and 
westernised influence. 
 
2- Low levels of 
innovation. 
2- Unsupportive 
bankruptcy laws 
toward 
entrepreneurship. 
3- Abundant family 
owned enterprises and 
lack of governance. 
3- Lack of inviting 
laws governing 
entrepreneurial 
finance. 
 
4- Inefficient 
intellectual property 
rights laws and 
protection. 
 
C
o
n
d
u
ci
v
e 
F
o
rc
es
 
1- Positive perception 
towards 
entrepreneurship. 
1- Islamic finance 
influence supporting risk 
taking and equity 
financial tools. 
 
1- Efforts on 
restructuring and 
development of the 
financial sector. 
2- Viability of informal 
networks compensating 
lack of formal. 
 
2- Charitable practices 
induced by Islamic and 
cultural behaviour. 
2- Attempts on 
creating a favourable 
ICT infrastructure. 
3- Indigenous 
developmental 
organisations supporting 
the domain. 
 
3- Bottom-up problem 
solving behaviour. 
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      An institutional analysis on entrepreneurial finance in Egypt showed that 
normative, cultural-cognitive, and regulatory forces shaped the domain with both 
obstructing and supporting determinants. Illustrated in table (6.1), institutional forces 
are grouped into conducive forces and obstructive forces. The table summarises the 
findings on the general domain of entrepreneurial finance in Egypt using an 
institutional theory framework and thus answers the first question of this research 
“What are the main institutional determinants shaping entrepreneurial finance in 
Egypt?” 
       The findings regarding the first question of this research suggest that all 
institutional determinants are intertwined and have multiple effects on the different 
determinants. It remains plausible to argue that the regulatory pillar is held most 
accountable for the under development of entrepreneurial finance in Egypt. The 
normative and cognitive pillars both have supportive and inhibiting factors. However, 
the overall effect of normative and cognitive pillars could be positive if policy makers 
were able to factor in the cultural and normative forces in policies promoting 
entrepreneurial finance.   
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Chapter Seven: Discussions on Venture Capital in Egypt                          
7.1 Introduction 
    This is the second and final chapter on the findings and discussions of this thesis. It 
will be summarised along with previous findings in following concluding chapter. 
After exploring the entrepreneurial finance environment in Egypt in chapter six, it 
became perceptible that a thorough investigation on the VC activities was necessary 
to further study the opportunities of a VC industry in Egypt as a fundamental 
component of entrepreneurial finance. An overview on the evolution on the PE/VC 
industry in Egypt was found important to understand the industry. It is followed by 
further analysis of the current situation and prospects for the VC industry in Egypt in 
the light of existing literature on VC worldwide expansion and behaviour. The chapter 
is divided into two sections, first is an overview on the VC industry in Egypt and the 
second section is an institutional framework analysis for the VC industry in Egypt. 
    The first section will be grouped in two categories, macro-perspectives of the VC 
industry and micro-perspectives of the VC industry. The macro-perspectives will 
include the current regulations and policies that are shaping the VC industry. 
Regarding the micro-perspectives, a study on the current behaviour of the VCs in 
Egypt and the current institutional forces shaping their behaviour and investment 
decisions. It will be followed by situating VC activities within the Islamic finance 
domain for its perceived impact on Egypt and the region. Finally, discussions on 
opportunities for a VC industry to develop in Egypt are presented, in the light of 
policy recommendations. 
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7.2 Venture Capital in Egypt 
    According to the Egyptian Financial Service Authority (EFSA), currently there are 
19 licensed Venture Capital firm under the law 95 for year 1995 governing financial 
services (EFSA, 2013). However, most of those firms were found inactive and were 
subsidiaries of banks and other holding companies that acted as special purpose 
vehicles. The Arabic terminology for venture capital is word-to-word translated to 
„Risk Capital‟ and thus the law would cover PE investments as well as other 
investment vehicles. The key Private Equity firms in Egypt are Citadel, EFG-Hermes, 
Beltone Capital, Grand View, Al-Ahly for Development and Investment (ADI), Nile 
Capital, Actis, and Concord. Only three companies covered SME financing: Beltone 
capital as it manages an SME fund, ADI which also manages BEDAYA fund initiated 
by Ministry of Investment (MoI), and Grand View which focuses solely on SMEs. 
However, other than Nile Capital, none of those companies directly finance star-ups 
and early stage entrepreneurs in Egypt. Only two of the mentioned PE firms are 
licensed under Egyptian law, and the remaining licensed firms are either bank owned 
investment companies, or privately held investment companies. The second set of 
companies that finance high growth innovative start-ups and/or early stage 
entrepreneurs are separately identified as follows: Sawari Ventures, Ideavelopers, 
Tamkeen Capital, Sofico, and Nile Capital. Noticeably, none of the five VC firms are 
regulated under the „risk capital‟ Egyptian law.  
     The evolution of the VC industry started in the late 1990s with the establishment 
of Al-Ahli for Development and Investment (ADI). According to industry 
professional and PE/VC directors, ADI was the pioneer initiative for VC in Egypt. 
However, it was indicated that it was not a great success and it might have affected 
the growth of the VC industry as it became negatively associated with this experience. 
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Another initiative was IT-Ventures which stemmed from ADI and managed to raise 
„considerable‟ funds, however, its success was once more perceived to be limited. 
Around the years 2003/2004 there was a second wave of larger PE firms that were 
primarily exploiting the privatisation process taking place at that time by the Egyptian 
government. Their activities solely concentrated on late stage, mature, and large 
opportunities. Some of those companies turned out to be a huge success and managed 
to raise „substantial‟ amounts of funds, especially from the GCC. The PE industry 
continued to grow until there were limited opportunities left and hence jeopardised the 
sustainability of the model counting on privatised firms. By early 2000s, the 
Government of Egypt (GoE) started to support funding for SMEs and promote 
innovation on the demand side. GoE with one of the leading investment banking firms 
established „IdeaVelopers‟ to manage a public fund initiated by the Ministry of 
Communications and Information Technology (MCIT). The size of IdeaVelopers‟ 
fund is 265 million EGP (approx. 25 million GBP). It solely focuses on IT solutions 
and collaborates in many projects with MCIT. Other small initiatives took place 
starting from 2005/2006 from private family investors. Those firms were a hybrid of 
BAs and VCs and were capturing the need and opportunities for SME financing. 
Furthermore, some of the PE firms established separate funds to cater SMEs; 
however, they were still inclined towards medium enterprises. After the January 
revolution, a new set of VC financiers emerged, along the side of business 
incubators/accelerators and business angels.  
     It is possible to group VC/PE firms in Egypt into three categories. The first group 
would be pure PE, solely catering late stage and large opportunities. The second 
would be a hybrid of PE/VC firms; those are PE firms that consider early stage 
financing and/or SMEs. The third group would be firms solely financing early stage 
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and SMEs; those would be a hybrid of VC/Angel or VC firms. The hybrid VC/Angel 
firms are mostly business persons and family offices that invest in start-ups and early 
stage with some level of habitual systematic behaviour, yet they don‟t necessarily 
plan on exit scenarios. In addition, VC/Angels would in most cases manage their own 
funds and resources. It was found that one of the VC firms integrated an accelerator 
programme. In general VC firms managed their own funds and funds on behalf of 
HNWIs and Institutional investors. This set VC firms had emerged right before the 
revolution and became more evident and visible after the revolution. The primary data 
of this research has been built on the second and third category of the VC/PE firms in 
Egypt for their relevance to the topic of entrepreneurial finance.  
      It was noticeable that in early interviews (before January, 2011 revolution) 
concerning opportunities for VC development in Egypt, PE/VC directors and industry 
professionals identified that lack of business incubators are a primary cause for lack 
of opportunities and thus inhibits VC industry to grow. There could be some 
complementarities between incubation and venture capital industry (Callegati, Grandi, 
and Napier, 2005). In fact, the concept of business incubators is not novel to Egypt, it 
started with the governmental Social Fund for Development (SFD) as a national 
programme (STFD, 2012). After the January revolution, the landscape of venture 
incubators had dramatically changed, and there is a growing interest in accelerators 
programmes. One of the leading initiatives, holding the largest no. of graduates is 
„Flat6Labs‟. It is a joint venture of „Sawari Ventures‟ (A venture capital firm in 
Egypt) and the American University in Cairo (AUC). Flat6Labs funds technology and 
technology-enabled start-ups, it accommodates 36 ventures enrolled quarterly in an 
exchange for a minority share of 10 to 20% and an investment of 10000 to 20000 
USD (Flat6Labs, 2013). They currently expanded their operations regionally to open 
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a second accelerator in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia with further expansion in plan. Even 
though the AUC collaborates on Flat6Labs, it started its own incubation project in 
2013 „The AUC Venture Lab‟. It is the first and only on campus business incubator in 
Egypt. They select 3 to 5 companies per cycle twice a year and the business has to be 
highly innovative to provide place and funding (AUC, 2013). There are other smaller 
initiatives such as „Tahrir Squared‟ which started in April 2011 in Alexandria and 
they position themselves as „Technology accelerators‟ (Tahrir2, 2013). As of April 
2012, they have launched two companies; however they deliver mentorship and 
access to finance to over 10 companies per intake (Tahrir2, 2013). Other initiatives 
are also taking place at the time of this research. A new accelerator named 
„JuiceLabs‟ was announced to open in early 2014 (Taylor, 2013b). The software 
focused „Juice Labs‟ plans to incubate four start-ups each year, and will receive 
22,000 USD in funding for an equity stake not to exceed 15% (Taylor, 2013b). The 
latest initiative was the ambitious project of “Tahrir Alley Technology Park” (TATP). 
It is another initiative by the founder of Sawari Ventures and Flat 6 Labs. The founder 
leased a downtown (close to Tahrir square) unutilised famous campus of the 
American University in Cairo, the Greek campus which was later rebranded as 
GrEEK. The founder envisions TATP to become the mini Silicon Valley of Egypt. (El 
Dahshan, 2014).  
    Graduating from an accelerator might provide a venture opportunity for VCs; 
however, it does not ensure funding for the entrepreneur. An entrepreneur argued that 
even ventures that graduated from prominent accelerators could not raise any VC 
funds in Egypt. He added that without funding, Egypt will end up with plenty of 
promising prototypes that would never be able to scale up. The need for a vivid VC 
industry was argued to be essential for the entrepreneurial ecosystem. The trend 
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towards entrepreneurship in general and business accelerators in specific in Egypt is 
growing at a high pace. However, for how long this will stay and their impact on 
entrepreneurial finance and VC in Egypt needs further assessment in the future. 
 According to a policy maker: 
 
“VC is still a very new concept in the Egyptian market, it is considered in its testing 
phase. Though there is perceived demand, there is less awareness about the concept 
from both sides of demand and supply… There is a relatively higher interest in the 
[VC] mechanism following the revolution, which could be noticed from the new funds 
that are established”. 
 
Regarding the reasons for the increasing interest in VC, an industry professional 
indicated:  
“Nowadays there is an acceptance for this idea (VC)… especially with the more 
educated youth… and are more open on the west especially those who work in 
technology… all those interested in IT would look at what Google or Facebook did... 
how it starts with an angel and then a VC and a larger VC and so on till IPO… it 
showed them that these are the means for bigger money”. 
 
    On the other hand, a director of an already existing PE/VC firm saw that the 
January revolution actually hampered the growth of the industry that was “rapidly” 
improving; he added that it was much harder to work under such economic and 
political circumstances throughout the whole cycle of the VC/PE operations. An 
industry professional argued that after the January revolution, and for the past three 
years the PE industry is dead, there are no realistic opportunities and the current 
economic situation is adding to the pressure. He noted that the global financial crisis 
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right before the revolution was another factor where PEs are struggling with in 
fundraising activities and exit. He pointed that the future in Egypt is for SMEs and 
entrepreneurial finance; with the reluctance of PEs to increase their scope to 
accommodate SMEs they won‟t be able to survive. 
     From a demand perspective, entrepreneurs had a positive outlook towards venture 
capital as a mean of raising capital for their new projects. An entrepreneur mentioned 
that venture capital can help grow a business at faster pace than conventional sources 
of finance, providing that a VC firm guides the entrepreneur yet their advisory 
services should not be compulsory.  
 
“VC will be very useful when the entrepreneur is not eligible to take a loan from the 
bank...” (Entrepreneur). 
 
     Regarding the concern over control, an entrepreneur argued that VC is much better 
than conventional partnership hence more or less it‟s a temporary partnership and 
VCs would exit at some point when the business matures. However, an overall 
appreciation for the strategic value adding services of VCs was observed. 
  
“The VC firm will provide help through consulting services, marketing services and 
new ideas” (Entrepreneur). 
 
     It was noticeable that not all entrepreneurs, specifically in non-technological 
ventures, were aware of the nature of VC firms; although they might have heard of the 
term before. When the nature of VC was introduced, the majority gave a positive 
feedback. An entrepreneur argued that many of the traditional industries here in Egypt 
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still yield very high rates of return, and he believed that VCs should be interested in 
non-technological ventures in Egypt. Another cultural dimension was raised by an 
entrepreneur who is a second generation in his family‟s business. He indicated that 
things are changing now and people are becoming more profit oriented and emotional 
attachment to businesses is considered a thing of the past; 
“What I care about is to maximise my wealth, my father wouldn't have thought the 
same... he is very reluctant to partnerships”. 
    It is plausible to argue that there is a demand for VC in Egypt. Supported by 
findings of El-Said (2010) indicating that 92% of the interviewed SMEs would prefer 
a venture capital over debt type of financing and the study by El Kabbani and 
Kalhoefer (2011) with over 32% responded with yes for considering VC as a mean of 
finance and over 51% with maybe while only 8% answered no or don‟t know. Further 
investigation on the opportunities for a VC market in Egypt takes place in chapter 
seven. It explores the current macro-perspectives on the market level and micro-
perspectives on the firm to further understand the prospect of this industry in Egypt. 
 
7.3 VC Macro-perspectives: Industry’s’ Growth Patterns 
 
      7.3.1. Macro-level Determinants 
  
     This part examines the VC industry in Egypt from a macro-level perspective. The 
findings are discussed in relation to the literature on country differences in VC 
development patterns worldwide. Many scholars and developmental organisations had 
drawn together the determinants of VC growth. Baygan and Freudenberg (2000) 
emphasised the significance of supply of capital willing to finance risky enterprises, 
existence of promising ideas and suitable high potential entrepreneurs, in addition to 
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sufficient number of specialists with the necessary expertise to evaluate and fund high 
risk ventures. They argued that government policies must address these concepts to 
enhance its VC industries; accordingly, different implementation strategies are the 
primal cause for country differences in growth patterns. Figure (7.1) identifies three 
aspects causing country differences, differences in growth patterns, differences in VC 
activity, and differences to barriers to entrepreneurship. 
 
Figure (7.1): Simple framework of underlying factors and the impact of VC 
Source: (Baygan and Freudenberg, 2000), [N.B: in grey are the covered areas of their research] 
 
      
     Furthermore, Kenney, Han, and, Tanaka (2002) in their report to the World Bank 
on the VC industry in East Asia, identified conditions and preconditions for a VC 
industry to succeed. They have built their criteria on the successful US industry and 
relatively successful Taiwanese and Israeli industries to evaluate Asian nations. 
Another OECD report on risk equity by Thomson and Wehinger (2006) concluded 
analogous concepts affecting the rates of development of VCs in different countries 
and suggested public policies to enhance its growth. The former set of work signals a 
consensus regarding influences on VC development.  
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      Extracting the common themes from previous research identified the major 
institutional forces shaping the VC in Egypt. The main themes are as follows, first the 
demand side: 1) Entrepreneurial activities, idea generation and willingness to take 
risk. 2) Investment opportunities that yields high returns in short time. And from the 
supply side: 3) Sources of funds willing to take high risks, especially pension funds. 
Regarding the environment and its institutions: 4) Strong capital markets and second 
tier markets to facilitate exit. 5) Legal environment and government policies regarding 
law enforcement, tax incentives, shareholders minority rights and bankruptcy laws. 6) 
Political support and VC industry awareness. 7) Technology base and clusters. 8) VC 
specialists that are capable of handling VC investments, and finally 9) Excellent 
universities that implement high technology research. The nine main themes set as the 
major institutional forces shaping the VC industry worldwide are used as guidelines in 
the analysis of the VC industry in Egypt in this research. 
 
     7.3.2 VC/PE Attractiveness Index 
      The previous macro- level determinants were also covered in the work of Groh, 
Liechtenstien, and Lieser (2010) in developing a VC/PE index to assess country 
attractiveness. Groh et al. (2010) started the VC/PE country attractiveness index with 
27 European markets. Their efforts were to quantify the VC/PE determinants and rank 
their readiness accordingly among other economies in the world while benchmarking 
to the US market as the 100% of the index. Groh and Liechtenstien (2012) were 
introducing more emerging markets to the set of countries as well as an increasing 
number of other countries across the world. They grouped the criteria of a VC/PE 
success factors into six sub-headings, each representing one of six “key drivers” of 
country attractiveness for VC/PE investors as follows: Economic activity, depth of the 
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capital market, taxation, investor protection and corporate governance, human and 
social environment, entrepreneurial culture and deal opportunities. In the 2013 report, 
it included 118 countries from all over the world; they have also disaggregated the PE 
from VC while keeping a third PE/VC overall index (Groh et al., 2014). According to 
this index, Egypt was ranked 57
th
 out of the 118 economies included. Surprisingly, it 
improved from 58
th
 in 2009 and 2011 rankings albeit the economic and political 
turbulences. It performed best in the depth of capital market and economic activity, 
while it performed worst on human and social environment, taxation, investor 
protection and corporate governance.  
The Index showed that the PE industry in Egypt had higher readiness than the VC 
industry. It also showed that in 2009 both the PE and VC were close, while in 2010 an 
apparent gap for PE development and a sharp decline in VC readiness took place. In 
2011 the gap decreased as the PE declined and VC started to pick up. From 2012 till 
2013 both indices were improving with a higher growth for the VC readiness. Graph 
(7.1) is an illustration of both indices separately and aggregated.  
 
Graph (7.1): Historic development of PE and VC index in Egypt 
  
 
                                           Source: Groh et al., (2014) 
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      In a comparison with the African continent performance, Egypt over performed in 
depth of capital market, economic activity, entrepreneurial culture and deal opportunities 
respectively. It matched the average performance of Africa on taxation, investor 
protection and corporate governance; while it underperformed only on human and social 
environment. The following diagram (7.1) shows where Egypt stands in comparison to 
the African market and benchmarked to US. 
 
Diagram (7.1): PE/VC index of Egypt in comparison with Africa 
 
                                        Source: Groh et al., (2014) 
 
 
 
         It was evident that Egypt was the last in the North African region, apart from Libya 
which was not included in the index, and was ranked 7th on the 10 MENA region 
countries included. In the MENA region Saudi Arabia was ranked first among the region 
and 26th in the world, followed by UAE 34th, Oman 46th, Bahrain 49th, Tunisia 50th, and 
Morocco 55th.  Egypt outperformed Jordan which was 58th, Kuwait 61st, and Syria 100th.  
This was also evident from the interviews with PE/VC directors and industry 
professionals. They agreed that Egypt‟s PE/VC industry is less developed than the rest of 
the MENA region. One industry professional argued that it is more developed yet less 
regulated.  
 
180 
 
A PE/VC director indicated:  
 
“The VC industry as a whole is lagging behind most of the MENA region if not all of it. If 
one compared the population to the number of funds in many of the MENA region, Egypt 
will be surely in the bottom. Yet the size of funds [in other MENA] is usually far smaller 
than the targeted funds in Egypt. Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Qatar, Lebanon, Dubai, and 
Saudi Arabia are all ahead of us [Egypt]…”. 
 
    Egypt is one of the largest recipients of PE investments in the region. The PE industry 
in the MENA region had always invested across the whole region, with a majority in 
Egypt for its well developed and mature economy (Morales et al., 2011). However, PE 
firms in Egypt are highly dependent on funding from the GCC. Thus it shows its 
connectivity to the region in regard of PE and VC and the vulnerability and dependency 
of the industry in Egypt on the GCC.  
 
    7.3.3 Sources of Fundraising  
     From a VC supply side, sources of funding are found an important differentiating 
component for VC industry growth. According to Mayers et al. (2005) fund sources 
were found to affect the investment patterns of VCs across countries of Germany, 
Israel, Japan, and the UK, though not the major explanation for VCs activity 
differences. In addition, Megginson (2004) found that pension funds are one of the 
main sources of VC funding thus an important distinguishing factor across countries. 
According to Ooghe et al. (1991), the most important source of funding in Europe 
was Banks, predominantly Swiss VCs while almost absent in Denmark, Ireland and 
UK, followed by pension funds and insurance companies. Moreover yet again, 
favourable capital gains tax rate was an important element in increasing supply of 
181 
 
capital to VC industries (Gompers and Lerner, 2001). Fund raising in Egypt was 
found to be highly dependent on HNWI and primarily from the GCC countries. Figure 
(7.2) shows that this is also true for PE/VC in MENA region; it shows that 
institutional investors are almost equal to HNWI which is a unique aspect for the 
region. In the case of Egypt pension funds were not allowed to invest in PE or VC 
activities, according to VC/PE directors. It might be due to the reason that they are not 
regulated or because of the bad experience of heavy losses of the pension funds in 
equity stock markets. Regarding the VC industry Egypt, it was found that the newly 
established VC funds rely heavily on personal sources of funds by the fund managers. 
This had a crucial effect on their growth capacity and deep pocket capabilities 
required for their success. The PE/VC firms indicated that their primary source of 
capital was HNWI except for Ideavelopers, which is government backed and funded 
through banks. Ideavelopers might be the only VC case that managed to raise funds 
via local banks. According to a PE director: 
“The biggest source of investors is from high net worth individuals it's like a 60 to 
70% of HNWI to 30 to 40% institutional investors... I know this might be specific to 
the region… it is because you don't have a strong institutional investor… banks are 
there but they don't enter PEs… In the region only Egypt would have a proper 
pension fund and they are not entitled to invest in such vehicles…we have many 
HNWI in the GCC, plenty... Saudis, Emiratis, Kuwaitis, Qataris, and Egypt... but 
HNWI in Egypt are not many... or those who would invest in PE..”. 
    This was almost the case with all the PE/VC firms. It also shows the differences 
among HNWIs in the region; HNWIs from the GCC would accept investing in PEs or 
VCs while the HNWIs in Egypt would tend not to. The Egyptian mentality might be 
more inclined towards a business owner/manager model while the GCC would accept 
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an ownership or investment without the management aspect. Also it might be for the 
reason that HNWIs in the GCC are to larger extent more affluent than Egyptian 
HNWs, the GCC was found to be one of the highest regions with HNWs and Ultra 
HNWIs, 400,000 HNWI and 3,600 UHNWI in the region (Morales et al., 2011). 
Accordingly, they can afford to forego control of some of their excess wealth to be 
managed by PEs and VCs. An industry professional indicated: 
“Banks and pension funds don't invest in VCs… so we're left with HNWI… In Saudi 
for instance they are all HNWI… so they can participate… they want to partner and 
don't want to manage…”. 
 
Figure (7.2): LP Mix in Middle Eastern PE 
 
                                  Source: Balze et al., (2010)     
 
    In the case of Egypt, another distinctive factor for VC fundraising was found to be 
developmental financial institutions (DFIs). An SME dedicated fund managed by one 
of the leading PE firms was majorly funded by the European Investment Bank (EIB). 
Moreover, in the first quarter of 2013 the American Egyptian Enterprise Fund was 
announced to finance start-ups and early stage ventures that was backed up by 
developmental agencies. The fund will launch with $60 million, and will add an 
additional $60 million over the next few months, in hopes of reaching $300 million in 
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three years (Solayman, 2013). In addition, before the end of 2013 a fund of funds was 
announced to be established by the SFD fully financed by the World Bank. It was 
discussed that it will fund current VCs in Egypt. Furthermore a VC director indicated 
that a USAid programme is also being developed to match current VC funds in terms 
of funding and capital guarantee. This would explain the limited options for 
fundraising for VCs in Egypt as well as the realised positive economic effect and 
urgency to stimulate the VC industry in Egypt by DFI vehicles.  
       VC fundraising in Egypt could be one of the biggest challenges facing the 
Industry. From observations in the SMEs financing company, personal experience, 
and interviews, there was an evident lack of risk appetite among investors in addition 
to the high opportunity costs for other rewarding investment opportunities. In an 
SMEs financing company, investors highly realised the importance of VC activities, 
yet they opted to dedicate 5 to 10% of the capital for start-up early stage VC financing 
with the remaining capital distributed among franchising and supply value chains. 
This conservative appetite reflects a lack of confidence in VC profitability and 
success. Regarding opportunity costs, it was apparent that since the early 2000s, 
Egypt went through unique financial opportunities. Such opportunities ranged from 
real estate, to the unprecedented growth of stock market, and the privatisation 
opportunities that flourished PE activities. According to a PE/VC director, it was not 
possible to find VC opportunities that compared to the profits of PE. This was in 
2008, where the company acquired a state owned enterprise (SOE) and managed to 
sell it at double the price in around 18 months. Moreover, an industry professional 
argued that the capital stock exchange market yielded 137% in 2004, 143% in 2005, 
14% in 2006 and over 50% in 2007 and therefore chances are much higher that a VC 
will succeed in a downturn of the economic cycle as an alternative route for investors. 
184 
 
According to an Egyptian HNWI, the real estate is a safe haven and till 2009 he 
managed to double his gains in 2 to 3 years. The high gains that were present in Egypt 
till the year 2010 might have hampered the appetite for VC investments. It might have 
postponed recognising the industry as a potential viable investment option. This also 
reflects the opportunity based funds and a herd effect that occurs when such 
opportunities arises in less developed economies. After 2010, the privatisation 
activities seized, the capital market was performing below average, and real estate 
was in a noticeable slow down. As a result, VC might be able to prove itself as an 
alternative profitable source for investors. A plausible theoretical explanation would 
be resource dependency theory in this case. As Investment companies compete for 
resources (i.e. Funds) to be able to survive through management fees and gains, they 
would be more generalist and follow the appetite of investors more than their own 
strategy or focus.  
“We don't have any venture capital fund, it just never happened... start-ups are not 
within the appetite of our investors... the realm of VC, angels, and development fund 
are not in our scope… we thought of a fund for infrastructure… we even started the 
setup... but we were faced by the financial crisis so we postponed it... it was because 
of a fund dedicated to the infrastructure for Mediterranean countries… so we were to 
manage a billion pounds…” (PE/VC director). 
    The absence of institutional long-term investors, and a high opportunity cost for 
HNWIs (the major source of VC funding), imposes serious challenges to VCs in 
Egypt. The option of DFIs, as earlier discussed, might recompense for the shortage of 
funding in the VC industry in Egypt.   
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     7.3.4 Financial Markets and Regulatory Framework 
     From a financial markets perspective, Black and Gilson (1998) stressed on the 
vitality of a stock market centred economy over bank centred ones to accelerate the 
exit of VCs investments via IPOs. They believed that it is more important than the 
cultural differences and risk taking behaviour in order to develop a vigorous VC 
market. On the other hand, Jeng and Wells (2000), agreed on the importance of stock 
market vitality especially on fundraising activities to guarantee a dynamic investment 
cycle. However, they perceived government policies both by setting regulatory stage 
and by „galvanizing‟ investments during downturns as a more important aspect to 
enhance a VC industry. They argued that IPOs are only more important for late stage 
investments than to VCs catering early-stage ventures and start-ups that are more 
affected by „labour market rigidities‟. Furthermore, Armour and Cumming (2006) 
argued that the legal environment matters as much as the vitality of stock markets. 
They added that liberal bankruptcy laws stimulate entrepreneurial demand for venture 
capital and that government programmes hinders PE more than it benefits it, 
concluding that legal reforms are vital for a VC industry to flourish.  
       The depth of capital market performance in Egypt was mostly found positive by 
PE/VC index (Groh et al., 2014). However, it was found to vary significantly among 
the sub indicators. It was noticeable that some of sub categories varied significantly 
along the years from 2009 till 2013. The size of the stock market decreased drastically 
in year 2011 after the political and economic instability after the January revolution; 
however the trading volume was not much affected. The index highly rated the debt 
and credit market (14 over 118 countries). Although the strength of banks was 
evident, yet its contribution to SMEs was found negligible (see section 6.2.1). 
Moreover, non-performing loans were one of the indicators that Egypt lagged behind 
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most of world economies ranking 97
th
 over 118. Even though some of those indicators 
might be descriptive, it was found through the primary gathered data that neither 
banks nor stock market was sufficiently supporting SMEs or VCs. On the other hand, 
PE firms were found to highly benefit from leveraged capabilities through banks and 
IPOs prior to the January revolution. Moreover, the NILEX was expected to act as 
both a financing and exit vehicle for SMEs and entrepreneurial ventures; however, it 
is still in a developing phase far from its potential objectives. It might be plausible to 
argue that the depth of capital markets was more favourable to PEs more than VCs in 
Egypt. This argument would be supported by Jeng and Wells (2000) findings, 
suggesting that depth of capital market would be more important to late stage (PE) 
than VC early stage activities.  
           Regarding the regulatory perspective, tax incentives and administrative 
burdens were found negative according to the index Egypt was ranked 83
rd
 over 118 
counties which is also the same rank regarding corruption and bribing. It was well 
noted that Egypt performed poorly on both World Governance Index (WGI) and 
Economic Freedom Index (EFI). According to the WGI, Egypt scored an overall 
26.5% on the scale of 100% on the worldwide governance indicator. In addition the 
EFI indicates that the Egyptian Economy is mostly un-free scoring 54.8 out of the 
maximum 100 index. In the PE/VC index, labour market rigidities ranked Egypt 82
nd
, 
while ease of starting a business 47
th
. Regarding ease of closing a business Egypt was 
ranked 100
th
 over the 118 countries. All previous indicators and earlier discussions on 
the regulatory pillar on entrepreneurial finance (see section 6.7.3) indicate that the 
regulatory framework is cumbersome and non-hospitable for a VC industry to 
develop in Egypt. VC/PE directors and industry professionals persevered that other 
MENA countries are improving their regulatory system to become highly welcoming 
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for financial institutions and VC activities. This would create a competition among 
the region, noticing that they operate in the same markets, and VCs might opt to base 
their activities in those countries while operate regional. For example, Dubai in the 
UAE and Bahrain are among those countries who managed to create a highly 
favourable environment for financial institutions in general, PE and VC firms in 
specific. Institutional and sophisticated investors were expected to support on the 
regulatory changes by continuing the pressure on the regulators to implement crucial 
changes towards a hospitable regulatory framework in MENA region (Morales et al., 
2011).  
 
7.4 VC Micro-perspectives: Differences in Firms’ Activities 
    This section analyses the findings on the VCs‟ activities and their firms‟ behaviour 
in Egypt and relate it to the international literature on micro-perspective country 
differences. Following a Gompers and Lerner (2001) explanation of the VC cycle will 
help in organising and illustrating the findings and relating to existing literature. First 
are the differentiating factors in „fundraising‟, then „investing‟, followed by 
„monitoring and value-adding‟, and finally „exiting‟. Building on the literature on VC 
firms‟ behaviour in an international setting, it was found to cover the whole 
investment cycle and the major themes arising from it. First,  
 
     7.4.1 Fundraising Activities 
       Starting with fund establishment forms, as part of the fundraising activities, 
Megginson (2004) found the US fund setup different than that of Europe. He figured 
that the major differences are related to the structure and funding of their investment 
vehicles; US VC funds mainly take the form of independent limited partnerships 
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while in Europe they tend to be investment companies divisions of larger financial 
institutions. Therefore, the sources of funds tend to differ, the US counts on pension 
funds while Europe considers banks as its primary source of funding (Ooghe et al., 
1991; Megginson, 2004). In the case of Egypt, it was found that in PE/VC firms the 
main source of funding was HNWIs, while VCs tend to rely more on the personal 
wealth of the GPs. Due to the flexibility of HNWIs and personal funding, VCs and 
PEs tend to adopt an offshore fund policy to avoid cumbersome regulatory system in 
their home countries. Moreover, they chose complex combinations to legitimise their 
presence and activities in home country by establishing holding/investment 
companies and advisory firms to set an LP/GP model and SPVs for their investee 
firms to mirror their offshore activities.  
 
“The world structure of LP/GP is not in the Egyptian law… and this is why we resort 
to offshore, we establish the GP offshore however we can establish the fund in Egypt 
and this what we did… we do this in the form of regular stock joint companies and 
according to the law it's permitted that I invest in other companies that work in the 
same field.. So mostly we adapt to the requirements of the fund [requirements] we 
work with…” (VC/PE Director). 
 
    According to another VC/PE director, they are structured as an Investment 
company according to law no. 8, and not as a fund. They increase the capital 
according to the opportunities and the appetite of investors. However, they still 
created a fund management company where all the payroll and employees are hired 
upon. They actually use the investment company the very exact way as a fund 
structure. Nevertheless, the option of British Virgin Islands (BVI) judiciary base was 
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the most favoured among VCs and PEs. The primary reason for choosing such setups 
was to avoid capital gain taxes. An industry professional added that to overcome 
capital gain taxes issues one needs to create novel solutions.  
 
“After all this time and until now we can't say the government understands what VC 
is and how it works… and that shows in how VCs work… they [VC funds] either 
establish a fund abroad or establish a company that invest in other companies... no 
one chooses the route of the VC… Anyone wants to establish a VC they'd set a BVI 
fund or other funds abroad even GCC started to compete in this part… or establish a 
regular [investment] company to get out of this story [issue]...” (Industry 
Professional). 
 
    Similar findings were discussed in the Booz & Co/INSEAD report on PE in MENA 
region. The regulatory sophistication varies across the MENA region; fund structure 
and target investor will affect the extent of regulation. It‟s typical to find BVI, 
Cayman etc. setups to be able to raise funds, as there‟s no differentiation with deposit 
taking meaning that fund management will often require a full banking licence 
(Morales et al., 2011). “It is worth noting that many of the ME states do not have a 
sophisticated regime which distinguishes between institutional investors and other 
investment professionals on one hand and less sophisticated investors on the other, 
meaning that no regulatory relaxations apply with respect to offering fund 
investments to institutions or high net worth individuals.” (Morales et al., 201: p.15). 
The same applies to Egypt and it might be stricter than many of the GCC countries 
such as UAE and Bahrain. The onshore/offshore setup was preferred to enable VCs to 
freely receive capital and to avoid tax gains, in addition to allocate an LP/GP model 
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which is not recognised in Egypt avoiding cumbersome regulations by the regulatory 
bodies. 
       Regarding other topics on fundraising, Barnes and Menzies (2005) identified in 
their study on European LPs-VCs relations that limited partners (LPs) used systematic 
investment decisions related to those used by VCs. They discovered that „ratification‟ 
among other LPs, reputation and history gathered from entrepreneurs as well as early 
informal relations with VCs all affected their investment decisions. The LP-GP 
relationships are highly dependent on a small network of highly closed trust circles.  
 
“There‟s something called an investment club... I have a group of investors that I 
always deal with and those are what investments rotate around...” (VC/PE Director). 
 
    Reputation is paramount to do business in the MENA region, networks are never 
enough, and since many of the VC/PE firms are relatively new (as the whole industry 
is) they tend to rely on the reputation of an umbrella firm such as a large investment 
company or a reputable bank (Morales et al., 2011). Moreover, VC funds tend to rely 
on the reputation of the LPs themselves, who are mostly well renowned HNWIs, 
which strengthen the authority of LPs over VC fund managers (op. cit.). The VC 
fund's historic track record and team‟s reputation along with local market experience 
were found to be a determining factor for LP investments all over the world (Groh 
and Liechtensien, 2011). However, in Egypt and MENA region, due to the lack of 
sufficient track records, reputation alone might be the main determinant for LPs 
choice. 
        Regarding compensation issues, Gompers and Lerner (1999) figured in their 
work on the US market that compensation is sensitive to performance in older VC 
191 
 
firms. They argued that performance in new VCs is due to their keenness to build a 
good reputation regardless to their compensation schemes. Other factors governing 
the relation of LPs and general partners (GP) or VC firms are restrictions in the form 
of covenants such as prohibiting raising other new funds, limiting investment sectors, 
and funding firms earlier financed by the same VC from other funds (Gompers and 
Lerner, 2001). Those restrictions were found lenient when there is a high flow of 
capital to the VC industry. The influence of LPs was found high in Egypt and all over 
the MENA region. Due to the limited options for fundraising, HNWIs have a high 
bargaining power over GPs. This would be also transferred to the management fees 
and imposing certain covenants and agreements with the fund managers.  
 
“We live on management fees and carries, it differs some funds the fees barely cover 
my salaries, barely... 2 + 20 is over now since the financial crisis... Now the investors 
involve in all expenses and they try to decrease it… there is some reshaping now” 
(VC/PE Director). 
  
      7.4.2 Investment Activities 
      Second, are the investing activities, which include screening, due diligence, 
valuation and deal structuring. Gompers and Lerner (2001) identified four major 
aspects in VC investments in the US that helped them overcome information 
asymmetries. First is staging of finance over time, second is syndication among other 
VCs, third is a seat on board of directors, and fourth is a compensation arrangement in 
the form of stock options. Accordingly, differences among countries regarding those 
investment aspects and how in their own way do they overcome information 
asymmetries, might be shaped by institutional factors. Staged financing was found to 
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be the norm in VC investments in Egypt; however syndication with other VCs was 
insignificant and hardly occurred among VCs. 
    Bruton and Ahlstrom (2003), figured that the VCs in China tends to fund firms 
closer to their region and rely on relations rather than accounting information because 
of weak regulatory institutions.  
 
“Deal sourcing is done through many ways... one is through referrals with current 
investment banks and boutiques...we also go and screen ourselves and approach by 
ourselves... depending on the criteria of the fund... we have someone who is dedicated 
for this job… yet we all do that... me as a partner as well as the other partner 3/4 of 
our time we do business development... between business development and monitoring 
our investment..” (PE/VC Director). 
 
    It was found that some deal sourcing was through PR activities via seminars, word 
of mouth and referrals. However, contrary to larger PE/VC firms, most of the referrals 
in smaller VC firms were through a small circle of family and friends depending on 
their personal networks. Heavy reliance on networks was found to be a key aspect in 
most deal sourcing activities. Building trust among VCs and entrepreneurs was a 
critical determinant in deal sourcing. The weight of trust is an important factor in 
investment decisions in developing economies, trust is paramount in weak legal 
systems, and therefore it is important to be built in the VC-Entrepreneur relationship 
before deal selection (Bruton et al., 2005). According to a VC director trust issues are 
of great importance and one has to know the potential investee in a personal way to be 
able to decide to invest in his company. Moreover, a VC director added that they rely 
to a great extent on trust and long term relations with their investees and believe such 
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qualities were an essential ingredient for protecting their investments. Trusted 
networks and relationships are of high importance in the MENA region, it might be 
due to lack of information and the family business nature of the region (Morales et al., 
2011).  
 
“Trust is the base, it's the most important thing we do... we discuss this as the first 
thing….from our experiences the most important factor that makes an investment 
successful is the partner, it's not the performance or the market... if you get along with 
your partner and we understood each other well and we started to respond well it 
goes well... we have problems, ups and downs… you can do all agreements in the 
contract and still you can go bust… with other partners you can ignore all this and it 
flies.. It can apply on our investors too but it is not a personal thing it's more of 
comfort...” (PE/VC Director). 
 
     In a paper by Zacharakis, McMullen and Shepherd (2007), the influence of 
economic institutions on the VCs in US, Korea and China was tested. They figured 
that the US as a mature market economy relies more on market information than 
Korea and China and that China weight human capital more heavily than the US and 
Korea. Moreover, they argued that although professional institutions may dictate 
which information to include in VC decision making, the extent emphasised is partly 
determined by the economic institutions where VCs are located. The effects of 
legislative systems are obvious in many countries as well as the level of legal 
enforcement. Investments in low legal enforcement, civil law countries, depend on 
common stocks and debt while maintaining board control instead of contractual and 
convertible shares and covenants adopted by high legal enforcement, common law 
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countries (Lerner and Schoar, 2005). They added that transactions in high law 
enforcement countries have higher valuations and returns as a result of the favourable 
regulatory environment. Thus in Egypt, as a country adopting civil law and with a low 
legal enforcement, it is not surprising to rely on human capital rather than market 
information and depend on common stock and maintain board control.   
      Regarding the required rate of return in VC investments, Manigart et al. (2002) 
studied this aspect across the US, UK, Netherlands, Belgium and France. They found 
that VCs who are more intensely involved in their investments, have a short holding 
period, and being located in the US and UK, compared to the Netherlands, Belgium 
and France, generally require higher rates of return due to institutional differences. 
They also figured that early stage VCs require higher returns if they invest in later 
stage ventures, which found consistent with resource based theory, on the other hand, 
buyout specialists require lower returns when investing in expansion companies, 
which found consistent with financial theory. Moreover, diversified VCs require 
higher returns than specialists, and independent VCs also require higher returns than 
captive or public VCs (Manigart et al., 2002). In the case of VC and PE firms Egypt, 
the expected IRR was found relatively high in the range of 25-30% annually and 
specifically in early stage VC firms it was an expected minimum multiple of 3 over 5 
years. This was also the case with most VC/PE firms in the MENA region. According 
to MEPEA (2013) association‟s survey in 2012, 74% of fund managers are targeting 
an IRR over 20%.  
      Regarding contracting methods of PE/VC firms in MENA region, Eid and Romieh 
(2005) researched this area and found that some sections of the contracts were 
relevant to the environment of the origin of the contract, while other sections take the 
form of bilateral agreements. They added that the types of securities such as ordinary 
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common shares vs. convertible preferred shares and the sizes of deals are more 
affected by the level of GNI per capita than by the origin of the local legal system. In 
Addition, many exit rights and other protective covenants were not indigenous to 
local legal systems have been used by PE firms which signals the transition of those 
covenants from developed VC markets. This was also the case in Egypt, some of the 
covenant agreements were made according to foreign judiciary systems. Preferred 
shares through SPV establishments as well as convertible Debt or Equity structures 
were evident. This goes in line with the findings of Eid and Romieh (2005), signaling 
the transition of VC covenants from developed VC markets. 
    In respect of the valuation dimension, a comparative exploratory study of the US, 
Hong Kong, India and Singapore by Lockett, Wright, Sapienza and Pruthi (2002), 
identified significant differences in the various sources of information for ventures 
valuation which are the use of business plan data, due diligence, sales and product 
information, and information related to entrepreneurs. They also found significant 
differences in the use of asset valuation, such as EBITDA, and option based 
evaluation methods. In addition, they identified that there are generally no significant 
differences in the common use of DCF and other widely used important valuation 
methods suggesting that evaluation science is easily transferred across countries while 
sources of information VCs can trust are more culturally determined. This is quite 
different than the findings in Europe, according to Manigart et al. (1997) there were 
differences in the widely used valuation techniques across European countries. They 
figured that UK mostly used multiplication of past or future earnings with price-
earnings ratios while Netherlands and Belgium uses DCF and France mostly used net 
worth book values. In the case of Hungary, VCs are seeking venture control more 
often, they were also found less reliant on DCF (Karsai et al., 1997). On VC in 
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Estonia, Sander and Koomagi (2007) argued that Estonian private equity and venture 
capitalists to some extent use valuation methods differently than their use in Western 
European and American VCs, still they use multiples, discounted cash flow (DCF), 
and book-value techniques. They also found that human capital was the most 
important criteria. Anti-dilution issues were found not important, syndication was 
insignificant, while staged investments and minority holdings were in practice. 
Furthermore, there are also differences among the Asian countries which indicate 
heterogeneity in spite of system similarity (Lockett et al., 2002).  
 
“We don't follow one valuation method... we use PE multiples EBITA multiples... 
they're important… we use DCF in growth cases where potential is in growth and not 
existing operations... These are mostly the two most frequent methods…” (PE/VC 
Director). 
 
     A VC director argued that the most important aspect is the entrepreneur and his 
idea, secondly comes the turnover of the company and cash flows. He continued, in 
start-ups and early stage it‟s almost impossible to follow a simple evaluation method, 
it‟s a matter of evaluating how much this company could be put up for acquisition 
when ready. Through his argument, it was noted that he related the success and 
potential of some of the investee companies by the number of subscribers and its 
Facebook page followers; indicating the importance of the number of users in 
valuating different technological ventures.   
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       7.4.3 Value Adding Activities 
        Third is the research relevant to monitoring, governing, and value-adding 
practices. In the context of value-adding, Pruthi et al. (2003) figured that in the Indian 
market VCs tend to be more involved on operational level such as in introducing new 
customers, suppliers and marketing plans. In contrary to the findings of MacMillan et 
al. (1988) where VCs in US market are most involved in financial matters of new 
ventures and acting as a sounding board to their ventures, while least involved in the 
operations of their investee companies. Moreover, Gorman and Sahlman (1989) found 
that the most common activity for US VCs is to help raise additional funds followed 
by strategic analysis and management recruiting. In addition, Asian boards of VC 
backed firms were found larger than US boards with the largest percentage of 
insiders; the financier role was found more important in Europe and in bank centred 
economies than in capital markets; strategic and interpersonal roles were more 
important in US and in countries valuing entrepreneurship, whereas the networking 
role was to an extent more important in Asia than in the US and Europe (Bruton et al., 
2005). Sapienza et al. (1996) showed that in US and UK VCs are more involved in 
their ventures and added more value than in France or Netherlands, while the 
activities were not different among the four countries. According to Farag, Hommel, 
Witt and Wright (2004), the CEE PE industry was distinctive in the risk factor that 
was apparent in their contractual and monitoring extensive practices. In the case of 
Asia, VC firms in China utilise proper connections and close monitoring regarding 
them as more reliable than complex contracts thus substituting regulatory controls 
(Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003); similar to the case of Vietnam (Scheela and Van Dinh, 
2004).  Uniquely in Vietnam, networking with government officials was perceived a 
value-adding activity (Scheela and Van Dinh, 2004). Moreover, VC-CEO relationship 
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in countries with higher dependency on social networks is not perceived in the agency 
context and is relatively stable (Bruton et al., 2005). Bruton et al. (2005) argued that it 
is not judged by time efficiency economic reason as in other countries of lower 
dependency on social networks hence spent twice as much time with their investees 
than their US counterparts. Worth to mention, value-adding activities in China in the 
form of advice must be handled diplomatically for „face‟ issues which are highly 
respected in this part of the world (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003). In the case of Egypt, 
it was also found that networking, access to decision makers and growth partners were 
among the top activities of VCs. Acting as a financier was also important and could 
be as important as access to regional and international markets and larger corporations 
in developed VC markets such as Silicon Valley and hi-tech corporations. According 
to industry professionals, value can be created by adjusting organisational charts and 
applying corporate governance, proper financial restructuring and proper 
management. In addition, an industry professional argued that VCs biggest role is 
financing, other roles could be incubation, development, and support functions, 
allowing entrepreneurs to focus on their core activities. A VC director indicated that it 
was unfortunate that VCs‟ primary role in Egypt was financing. He added that 
entrepreneurs have no other alternative for financing, this leads to a high bargaining 
power for the limited number of VCs in Egypt. It is supposed to be the other way 
round, he argued; yet lack of alternatives still makes finance the primary reason to be 
approached by entrepreneurs.  
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“Entrepreneurs consider raising funds [from VCs] a success in itself... it‟s very 
competitive... they [entrepreneurs] might fail to see what VCs can really offer them... 
which VC best suits their needs... they should focus on the past experience of other 
entrepreneurs [with VC funding] and not be tempted with who puts in more cash” 
(VC director). 
 
Regarding the late stage financing in the form of PE;  
 
“Our team with our major investor would believe that our main value adding would 
be our philosophy on what we are going to do with this investment... it's not just 
money... we will bring people and adjust the company... enlarge... merge... a bigger 
spectrum of services and products..” (PE/VC Director). 
 
    Another PE/VC director added that the major value adding activities are strategic 
guidance, financial activities such as budgeting, cash flow, and expenditures, and exit 
options and evaluation methods upon such exits respectively. From a demand side, 
VC backed entrepreneurs were focusing on the synergies and connections of the VCs. 
Among their objectives were found to be building on existing ventures of the VCs 
portfolio companies for integration and team synergies. Finance was evidently the 
main reason for IT based ventures to seek VC funding before considering value 
adding activities. It was explained by the apparent lack of alternatives in Egypt. 
     Regarding investment strategies, most of the firms were found to be generalists. 
Some funds were specialists yet an overall generalist approach was most dominant. 
Early stage VCs were inclined towards „technology enabled‟ or „technology driven‟ 
ventures, however they still consider other non-technology based ventures. Thus they 
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remain generalists in their broader strategies. Board representation was a must and 
close monitoring was the most prevailing. Moreover, early-stage VCs had a 
considerable number of entrepreneurs as in house tenants within their premises, 
although it was optional. On the other hand, some VCs tend to have a regional reach 
to explore further opportunities in different countries. For example one VC firm‟s 
main strategy was being generalist. They started as an IT Industry specific and then 
shifted by time to more consumer businesses. They invest anywhere between 1 to 10 
million L.E (900,000 to 9 million GBP) per transaction and they have a very hands-on 
approach towards their portfolio companies. Another VC director indicated:  
 
“Typically, we invest $250K - $1M initially and expect to invest $2M to $5M over the 
life of a company”. 
 
In early stage VC activities, a minority stake was the norm yet varied significantly to 
be anywhere between 15-30%. 
     Many PE/VC companies were getting quite larger as they seek opportunities 
beyond Egypt, in MENA region, and the Mediterranean including Turkey as an 
example. However their major concern was to avoid countries with political or 
economic instability. This was also evident with early-stage VCs; they were actively 
seeking expansion in the more stable GCC countries as well as Jordan and Turkey. A 
regional expansion was notably high in the late stages of the research after the 
increasing economic and political challenges in Egypt. 
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  7.4.4 Exit Strategies 
     Finally is the topic on exit strategies and harvesting, which is the fourth and last 
part of the VCs cycle before renewing themselves with another round of fundraising. 
According to Gompers and Lerner (2001), the highest return on exits is realised via 
IPOs in the US market and other developed VC markets. They also discussed issues 
such as pricing of VC backed firms in IPOs and timing to go public concerning the 
US VC industry. They figured that under-pricing occurs less in VC backed firms and 
that timing is usually in the peak of the market, they explained that this relies on the 
experience of VCs which otherwise causes „grandstanding‟ (the pressures to be able 
to raise new funds compel new VCs to liquidate their ventures and thus exit quickly 
and prematurely). They added that a „lockup‟ period of VC shares takes place to avoid 
negative signalling. In emerging economies, a second tier market can be helpful for 
smaller firms to exit; however, the VCs in developing countries have very little 
experience with taking their ventures through IPOs adding to the point that some 
countries as Singapore are not willing to liquidate their investments completely 
(Wright et al., 2005b). In CEE markets, lack of viable exits, other than trade sales, 
was found hindering the PE industry (Farag et al., 2004). East Asian counties such as 
China have limited IPO exit practices and rely more on trade sales (Bruton and 
Ahlstrom, 2003). According to Wright et al. (2005b), the trade sales option is the 
most common in emerging markets; still they are slowed down by minority and 
majority stakes regulations and the right to sell to foreigners. It was evident in Egypt 
that the most common exit strategy is trade sales which in fact corresponds with the 
findings of Wright et al. (2005b), and Bruton and Ahlstrom (2003) regarding 
developing countries. It was also found that exit was the most challenging aspect 
among the VCs investment cycles. Moreover, the current political and economic 
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challenges that are facing the business environment added to the pressures of 
profitable exits. Early stage ventures were found with the only option of trade sales. 
Furthermore, technology ventures were targeting „acqui-hiring‟. „Acqui-hire‟ is a term 
used by entrepreneurs meaning acquisition and hiring of the entrepreneurial team by 
the acquiring companies. During interviews, entrepreneurs referred to success stories 
of acquisition and hiring by major international technology players and looked highly 
for such success stories. Thus VCs with connections to Silicon Valley and major 
technology firms was highly sought after by entrepreneurs and was considered a huge 
asset to VC firms.  
      Regarding the public markets, during the years of 2011 till 2013 there was not a 
single IPO in the Cairo and Alexandria Stock exchange (CASE), in addition to the 
slow pace of the NILEX. According to a PE/VC director, exit strategies were found 
very challenging as well, especially that the NILEX is almost at a complete halt. An 
industry professional indicated: 
“I would consider the biggest problem as exit… if I don't know how I'd exit why I 
would enter... and this is the primary problem... as for regulations there are surely 
many things missing here… SHA… rights... agreements... opportunities are there, 
many have ideas and looking for investors... investors hold back because they don't 
know how'd they exit… the exit notion is still not there… this will create a market for 
other investors who are willing to enter in this secondary phase... if NILEX was 
stimulated it will be a good chance for exiting… but you'll face the problem of 
evaluation... the company will be evaluated on its current performance and not future 
projections… also there is a lockup period for I think a year or so… they can 
overcome that since only the establishing shareholder who can't sell but a regular 
shareholder..”. 
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    This was also evident in the report by Morales et al. (2011; p. 14): “There are three 
broad categories of exit which are available: IPOs, trade sales and secondary 
buyouts or refinancing. To date, the ME region has seen a prevalence of trade sales, 
in part because regional IPOs have tended to be of large state enterprises. This 
reflects both the emerging nature of those markets and the legislation around IPOs, 
which tends to envisage large flotations by public subscription and consequently 
reduces the availability of IPOs as a possible exit route.” 
      A different approach emerged through the course of the interviews. Industry 
professionals suggested that diminishing partnership, which is Shari‟a compliant, 
could be an alternative exiting vehicle for the region in the absence of the current IPO 
opportunities and economic challenges. The concept of the Diminishing Partnership 
(DP) is further elaborated on section (7.6) regarding VC and Islamic finance. Thus 
lack of exit alternatives could be argued a major alarming hurdle facing VC 
development. Novel and unconventional exit tools should be explored to overcome 
this major obstacle.  
 
7.5 Institutional Analysis on VC Industry in Egypt 
    From an institutional perspective, Bruton, Fried and Manigart (2005); and Bruton, 
Ahlstrom and Yeh (2002), showed how VC industries were different across countries 
due to the differences in institutional forces in each country or region. Ahlstrom and 
Bruton (2006) studied the effect of informal institutions in emerging economies as 
formal institutions become more established, they drew attention to the impact of 
networks and changing institutional environments on VC industries in different 
phases of economic transition in emerging economies. On analysing VC in Singapore, 
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Bruton, Ahlstrom and Singh (2002) found that the regulatory environment created by 
the government and its agencies helped explaining the differences between the VC in 
Singapore and Asia, they also highlighted the importance of cognitive (cultural) 
institutions and its impact on the Singaporean industry and how foreign VC adapted 
to local culture; similarly, in the case of India (Wright et al., 2002). Also, different 
environments imply different interventions to assist the emergence of a successful VC 
industry as concluded from the Indian VC experience (Dossani and Kenney, 2002). In 
the MENA region, Eid (2006) argued that lack of 'institutional complementarities' 
among the triad of finance, regulations and education is what is hindering the 
potential of the PE industry to act as a 'growth engine' to the region. She highlighted 
the availability of human capital in the region in the form of fresh graduate potential 
entrepreneurs willing to take risk and eager to establish themselves, in addition to the 
underutilized successful professionals who succeeded around the world and are 
willing to come back home and assist in the development of their home economies. 
      Regarding the level of institutionalisation, Bruton, Fried and Manigart (2005) 
explored the different levels among VC industries in the regions of the US and UK, 
Europe, and Asia. They argued that in emerging economies less formal institutions 
substitute for formal ones, which creates opportunities and obstacles for VCs 
operating in them. In their exploratory study, they grouped the US and UK markets as 
they share more similarities than that of the UK and continental Europe. They pointed 
that both countries share a common law legal system and are both capital market 
centred. Regarding entrepreneurship, they identified „status of entrepreneurs‟ as 
willingness to take risk attitude among different countries. The findings of their 
research is summarised in table (7.1). The normative dimension in Asia was found to 
have strong normative values from the US due to training and interconnections.  
205 
 
    It should be well noted that institutional determinants affecting entrepreneurial 
finance discussed in chapter six would indeed affect the VC industry in Egypt. 
However, in this section and the section on micro-perspectives were for the most part 
concerned to elaborate on VC specific institutional determinants. 
 
 Table (7.1): The Institutionalisation of Venture capital  
       Source: (Bruton et al., 2005)  
 
7.5.1 Normative Forces 
    Regarding the MENA region in general and Egypt in particular, the normative 
pillar would be expected to be similar to the Asian market. The influence of the US 
would be present due to US trained VC practitioners and LPs who would have already 
invested in VC funds in the US. Moreover, many of the VCs in the region and Egypt 
tends to resort to larger technology funds as a trade sale exit strategy and therefore 
they „mimic‟ their investment behaviour and follow the norms of the industry. The 
Silicon Valley model remains the magnet were VCs and entrepreneurs aspire.  
     The VC industry in Egypt would be considered un-institutionalised. It is a new 
concept with few players in the whole region as well as Egypt and had only recently 
started to emerge and become of significance. On the other hand, the PE industry 
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would be relatively institutionalised. There are established PE associations in the 
region as well as an Egyptian Private Equity Association (EPEA) formed in 2010.  
Egypt has a handful of key PE players in the region and was the main recipient of all 
PE activities in MENA region till the January revolution. In contrary, VC in Egypt 
has no association, although EPEA partly covers VC activities, a designated VC 
association was found to be an important missing component to the VC industry 
(Seoudi, 2012). Policy makers indicated that supporting industries such as business 
and legal consultants and accounting firms are well represented and proficient in 
Egypt; however, lack of skilled VC fund managers and absence of an association for 
VCs in Egypt is a considerable obstacle.  
 
7.5.2 Cognitive Forces 
     From a cognitive/cultural perspective, although the status of entrepreneurs was 
found high in Egypt (Hattab, 2008), the legitimacy of entrepreneurship and 
„uncertainty avoidance‟ (see discussion Section 6.7.2.1) would arguably act as a 
burden towards a vibrant VC industry in Egypt. Regarding acceptance of failure, it is 
suggested that offence in collectivist societies leads to shame and loss of face 
(Hofstede, 2001). This factor was found to be significant in VC industry reports on 
the MENA region: “One of the prevailing cultural and legal problems with setting up 
a start-up business in the region is the non-acceptance of failure. While many cultures 
embrace failure as an invaluable learning experience, the Middle East is less 
comfortable with the topic. The fear of embarrassment, shame, loss of face, and 
potentially imprisonment discourages much young potential from becoming 
entrepreneurs. The cultural ramification of failure could be substantial to the 
individual and his or her family. The region‟s legal systems are also not build to deal 
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with bankruptcy and liquidations, and company founders could be subject to major 
legal litigation if their companies are not able to pay their dues in troubled times” 
(Boigner: MEPEA, 2013: p.4). It also shows that the regulatory system is reinforcing 
the negative implications of failure.  
          The current political instability is once more negatively affecting the 
entrepreneurial activities in Egypt; right after the revolution the „spirited‟, „hopeful‟ 
environment‟ was in favour of entrepreneurial growth (El Dahshan, 2014).  According 
to Hattab: “Egyptians, immediately after the 2011 revolution, displayed striking 
interest in starting their own companies and breaking from traditional mould.” (El 
Dahshan, 2014). Regarding innovative opportunities and idea generation, Egypt 
witnessed a big leap in entrepreneurial activities since then. Moreover, new relatively 
cheaper technologies such as, social networks, smart phones and mobile applications 
appeared to be alternative, affordable yet innovative opportunities to entrepreneurs. 
As earlier discussed in the previous chapter (section 6.7.2.5), „technology enabled‟ 
ventures are attempting to substitute the lack of breakthrough innovative technologies 
which needs high R&D and large investments with a simpler model to create value 
and differentiation.  
    Heavy reliance on informal social networks would be stronger than the US, Europe, 
and possibly Asia. The dynamics of networks on entrepreneurial finance was 
elaborated in the previous chapter six (section 6.7.1.5). Furthermore, cultural 
acceptance discussed in the previous chapter for equity financing and primarily VC 
model was partly explained by cooperative nature of the society in the form of 
informal networks (section 6.7.1.5) and Islamic influence (section 6.7.3.2). This 
cultural dimension might be considered the strongest pillar in favour of growth of a 
PE/VC industry and especially start-up, early stage VC. Such social and cultural 
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factors that are specific to Egypt as part of the MENA region should be well taken 
into account as a contributor to the distinctive normative and cultural influences on 
the VC industry in Egypt. Accordingly, further discussion on the specific influence of 
Islam on venture capital emerged to be fundamental for this research. Section (7.7) 
investigated further explanations on the topic of Islamic influence on VC industry in 
Egypt. 
    Li and Zahra (2012) suggest that the more developed a nation‟s formal institutions 
the more likely to reduce transaction problems and encourage VC funding. They 
further suggests that formal and informal institutions, specifically cultural institutional 
forces, are intertwined and therefore even similar formal institutions in different 
nations may result in a different development of its VC industry. According to Valdez 
and Richardson (2013), normative cognitive power was found more descriptive on 
macro-level entrepreneurship than the regulatory and legislative power. Thus it is 
suggested that understanding the normative and cultural determinants are eminent in 
addressing macro-level entrepreneurship in general and VC in particular.  
 
7.5.3 Regulatory Forces 
    From a regulatory perspective, the MENA including Egypt would be poorly 
developed, low shareholder protection, low enforcement of law, and low financial 
markets development. Egypt might be an exception for it has a well-developed 
financial market „infrastructure‟ that has the potential of further enhancement. The 
regulatory framework is neither in favour of PE firms nor VCs, however, till present 
both activities although mostly unregulated by the government they are tolerated to a 
great extent. It is partly because of the accommodating complex legal set-ups of those 
firms and due to their recognizable benefit to the Egyptian economy.  
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     The urgency of improving and developing a favourable regulatory framework was 
a consensus among all interviewees and industry reports on Egypt and the region. It 
could indeed be the major hurdle for creating a healthy and significant VC industry. 
The political and economic instability is highly affecting the prioritisation of this 
aspect to the Egyptian government. Kept in mind, the regulatory pillar might be the 
gate for foreign and regional VCs to explore the entrepreneurial activities and 
increasing opportunities that are taking place among the Egyptian youth.  
 
“Currently the number one challenge is the weak macro-economic performance 
affected by the political instability, then lack of regulation mechanism by the 
government… not only a law, but the implementation as well…there is no preferential 
tax treatment for VC companies in Egypt, requirements set by EFSA, including the 
minimum fund size, and investment portfolio shares, are stringent...” (Policy Maker). 
 
    The findings are in line with the work of Armour and Cumming (2006); suggesting 
that regulatory framework might be as important as depth of capital markets. 
Moreover, the cumbersome bankruptcy laws in Egypt may stand as a major hurdle for 
the development of a VC industry (section 6.7.3.2 for discussions on bankruptcy). 
Armour and Cumming (2006) highlighted the importance of the regulatory framework 
to support VC industries; bankruptcy laws were found a primary determinant in such 
regulations. Under the current regulatory framework in Egypt, it is very unlikely the 
VC industry can flourish and have a significant role to the economy. The capital gain 
tax would be would be a major hurdle towards a favourable VC regulatory frame 
work. According to Gompers et al. (1998), reduction of capital gain tax can encourage 
supply to VC funds. In Egypt capital gain taxes were considered high by industry 
210 
 
professionals (20%) and there were no preferential rates for VC activities. Thus it 
would be considered as another regulatory hurdle. 
       Similar findings were further recognized in studying developing and emerging 
countries‟ PE and VC industries. In Latin America, namely Argentina, Pereiro (2001) 
examined entrepreneurial finance and VC in Argentina to find that the average 
investment size per start-up is larger than in the US and that the business law is still 
problematic. However, he argued that the government played a significant role in the 
awareness of the VC industry among entrepreneurs. Another example of Latin 
America is the industry of Brazil. It has been analysed in a comparative study by 
Mariz and Savola (2005) on PE and VC industries in Brazil compared to the US 
figured that enhancing corporate governance, improving shareholders‟ minority rights 
and encouraging pension funds‟ investments have all facilitated the growth of the PE 
industry, however, unfavourable tax systems, high nominal and real interest rates are 
the major threats to the industry‟s development. In addition, the industry lacks seed 
capital and illiquid capital markets which are considered as major obstacles. Other 
researchers have examined the VC industry in transitional economies such as the 
work by Klonowski (2005) examining the evolution of the VC industry in Poland and 
its distinct stages and features. In addition, Karsai, Wright, Dudzinski and Morovic 
(1998) on VC industry in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia compared to that of the UK 
noted that the legal systems in different countries affect the VC firms and that specific 
legislations impedes the development of VC firms in the three Central and East 
European (CEE) countries. Also there is the work by Chu and Hisrich (2001) on the 
important role by the government promoting VC in Hong Kong as a promising Asian 
technology hub. It is apparent that developing economies share many problems 
regarding business environments and its effect on the development of a VC/PE 
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industry. However it remains that the severity and priority of such problems and its 
roots stem from different causalities from one region to another and from one country 
to another.  
   Table (7.2) summarises the institutional forces; normative, cognitive and regulatory 
pillars highlighting both the conducive and obstructive factors. 
 
Table (7.2): Institutional Forces Affecting VC Industry in Egypt 
 
 
Normative forces 
Cultural-
Cognitive Forces 
Regulatory 
Forces 
O
b
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
F
a
ct
o
rs
 
1- Lack of a VC 
association. 
1- Low levels of 
innovation. 
 
 
1-Unsupportive 
bankruptcy laws 
toward 
entrepreneurship. 
2- Lack of VC industry 
specialists.  
. 
2- Lack of sufficient 
education. 
2- No capital gain 
preference. 
 
3- No incentives or 
reward for risk 
investors.  
4- Insufficient R&D 
support.  
C
o
n
d
u
ci
v
e 
F
o
rc
es
 1- Positive perception 
towards entrepreneurship. 
1- Islamic finance 
influence supporting risk 
taking and equity 
financial tools. 
 
1- Efforts on 
restructuring and 
development of the 
financial sector. 
2- Viability of informal 
networks compensating 
lack of formal. 
 
2- Charitable practices 
induced by Islamic and 
cultural behaviour. 
2- Relative depth of 
capital markets.. 
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7.6 Venture Capital and Shari’a Compliance 
     The impact of Islam as an institution throughout the economic history of the 
MENA region is well established and has a significant influence on shaping its 
economy (Kuran, 2004).The Islamic finance industry holds over 1.3 Trillion USD of 
assets (Mughal: Zawya, 2013). There are approximately 1 billion Muslims around the 
world, yet Islamic finance is concentrated around the GCC in MENA, Malaysia and 
Indonesia in South East Asia (SEA), and the United Kingdom (UK) in Europe (Farid, 
2012). The UK has created access for Islamic finance to enter Europe through its 
British banks and joint ventures in the Arab world (Wilson, 2007). In the world, there 
are currently over 2000 Islamic financial institutions with activities ranging from 
Islamic banking, Islamic insurance (Takaful), Islamic funds, mudarbah, Islamic bonds 
(sukuk), and Islamic micro-finance (Mughal: Zawya, 2013). Islamic Funds grew to 58 
billion USD in 2010 with a 7.6% growth with sukuk reaching 50 billion USD in 
issuance; Total Islamic funds is in excess of 500 billion USD with an annual growth 
of 10-15%, the GCC liquid wealth with Shari‟a sensitive investors will add 70 billion 
USD by 2013 (Nazim, 2011). The size of Islamic banking in Egypt had grown by 6% 
from 2012 to 2013; it reached a volume of 114 billion by the end of 2013 representing 
7% of the total banking sector in Egypt (Egyptian Islamic Finance Association: El-
Ahram, 2014). 
    Literature has evolved around the topic of Islamic venture capital. Choudhuri 
(2001) had examined the Islamic venture capital instruments of mudarbah and 
musharkah. Choudhuri defined mudarbah as a profit sharing agreement between 
suppliers of capital and labour, management, or expertise while musharkah as equity 
participation where all are suppliers of capital in a joint venture. The main difference 
between musharkah and mudarbah is that in musharkah partners contribute with both 
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capital and effort and they both shore profits and losses, while in mudarbah, one of 
the partners contribute with capital while the other with effort and only the capital 
partner loses his money with no financial losses on the effort partner (Farid, 2012).  
    The concept of Equity financing is not an Islamic concept, however it is Shari‟a 
compliant (Wilson, 2007) and therefore permissible according to the Quran and 
Hadiths (Prophet‟s wordings and guidance) that forbids debt with interest or usury 
“Riba”. Debt interest is unwanted and unethical according to Islam, however, 
mudarbah and musharkah (M&M) agreements are supposed to hold instead. Investors 
in VC funds and the fund management firm resemble here the mudarbah in the sense 
that investors are the silent owners of the capital and fund managers are the workers. 
On another level, the relation between the VC fund and the portfolio companies 
resembles the musharkah concept as both the VC fund and the entrepreneur are 
partners in the new venture. The two concepts combined legitimise the VC industry as 
being Shari‟a compliant and thus favours its success over debt financing from an 
Islamic perspective as the dominant religion in the MENA region. 
     According to Hassan, Mikail, and Arifin (2011), the application of venture capital 
is neglected in the Muslim world while steadily developing in Western communities. 
They added that Islamic banks are also turning a „blind eye‟ to venture capital despite 
the essence of profit and loss sharing. Since 2003, PE firms in the MENA region had 
developed Shari‟a compliant funds to capitalise on the demand of such Islamic 
financial products (Wilson, 2007). Until the 1990s there were only Islamic banking, 
project finance and Islamic asset management; by 2005 more Islamic products were 
introduced such as Islamic leasing (Ijarah), Islamic bonds (sukuk), and later in 2010 
liquidity management products were introduced (Farid, 2012). It was estimated that 
Shari‟a compliant PE would‟ve reached 41 billion USD in the GCC by 2011, 
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however VC would still be much smaller and relatively unattractive. In respect to 
micro-finance, 800 million USD were dedicated to microfinance serving 1.3 million 
beneficiaries as of July 2013 (Mughal: Zawya, 2013). The development of SMEs can 
be an opportunity for developing Shari‟a compliant VC and PE funds (Farid, 2012). 
Regarding Shari‟a law and PE/VC activities, it is mostly based on a classic 
musharkah model which is a classic partnership agreement. The investors partner with 
the fund managers and they both partner in the investee firms. Other sub-models were 
diminishing musharkah (partnership) and temporary musharkah (partnership). Those 
two models mostly serve as a special purpose vehicle (SPV) for exiting scenarios in 
the case of diminishing partnership and a short term financing tool in the temporary 
partnership mostly to supply working capital.  
      The fitness of diminishing partnership as an exit alternative for VCs in Egypt has 
been indicated by industry professionals.  
 
“A diminishing partnership could be the best model in the absence of exit markets… it 
is applicable to Egypt however whether applied or not we need to know that… I'd 
expect this could be the best model… I've heard of it like a year and a half ago… so 
we can't judge if it happened or not…” (Industry Professional). 
 
    The „Musharakah-Mutanakisa‟ or Diminishing Partnership (DP), as the name 
indicates, is based on „Musharkah‟ partnership where one or more partners buys the 
shares of other partners and thus leading to full ownership in an interest-free 
transaction, hence Shari‟a compliant. DP was argued to be successfully applied in 
housing finance instead of mortgage for Islamic communities; the model is based on 
the highly successful Islamic Cooperative Housing Corporation introduced in 
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Toronto, Canada, established in 1981 for the Muslim community (Ramyah and Abdul 
Razak, 2008).  
     Musharkah is solely based on sharing profits and losses; it can take place in the 
form of management and/or ownership; capital could be in the form of liquid assets, 
commodities, or land (Farid, 2012). The notion of limited liability is also recognised in 
the Shari‟a as the business is separated from the individual and losses do not transfer 
to the personal belonging of the business partners (Farid, 2012). 
      Besides an interest free financing, other criteria has to be met by PE/VC funds to 
be Shari‟a compliant. Such funds should not participate or invest in projects that 
manufacture non-halal products such as pork products or alcoholic beverages, 
conventional insurance, entertainment activities that are non-Shari‟a compliant, 
manufacture or sale of tobacco, share trading in non-Shari‟a compliant securities, 
hotels and resorts, gambling or gaming, any other activity that a Shari‟a adviser finds 
non-permissible (Wouters, 2008). Other requirements concerning financial ratios are 
as follows: total debt (divided by 12 months average market capitalisation), total 
interest-bearing securities and cash (divided by 12 month average market 
capitalisation), and account receivables (account receivables divided by total assets) 
should all be less or equal to 33% otherwise it will not be Shari‟a compliant 
(Wouters, 2008). Preferred shares convertible preferred shares, and redeemable 
preference shares, which are essential in many VC covenants, were Shari‟a 
compliant. It was indicated that non-cumulative preference shares are a form of 
tanazul (surrendering the rights) to a share of profit based on partnership. Leveraged 
buyouts (LBO) when used through Islamic bonds (Sukuk) are also Shari‟a permissible 
(Farid, 2012). Regarding partnership and contract, as all religions Islam stressed on 
the values of business ethics, sources of Shari‟a emphasised on respecting contracts, 
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trustworthiness, and fighting fraud (Rizk, 2008). “On the Day of Judgement, the 
honest Muslim merchant will stand side by side with the martyrs” (Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH)). In another Hadith, Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) has said that 
Allah (SWT) proclaims: “I am one third partner of a two man partnership until one 
of the acts dishonestly to his partner, and in such event, I then leave them”.  
      The model of the venture capital industry is not only Shari‟a compliant but also 
reflects the essence of Islamic finance. Within a few Shari‟a parameters the VC 
industry is entitled to receive funding from Shari‟a compliant funds and can benefit 
from the immense growth of capital dedicated to Islamic finance. Moreover, the 
charitable nature of Islam can also help in the financial gap for MSMEs in the MENA 
region. It was found in this research that the GCC are more influenced by Islamic 
finance and give it more attention than other MENA countries. In Egypt, 
entrepreneurs were found to be more cautious and aware on the Shari‟a compliance of 
VC than PE/VC fund managers. Industry professionals such as financial consultants 
and investment bankers also recognised Shari‟a compliance as an important factor 
than VC/PE directors. It was found to be more of an individual preference rather than 
a societal norm.  
 
According to PE/VC director: 
“We can make a leveraged acquisition which is not Shari‟a compliant… I dealt with 
funds and companies that use their own sharia compliance… I noticed that they only 
change the term and the structure was almost the same with very minor changes in 
the contracts and agreements… others they really apply Shari‟a by the book... 
murabha and musharka....”. 
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     VCs and PEs were highly pragmatic; they were found likely to manage Islamic 
funds as any other commercial funds. However, as HNWI from GCC are the major 
component of LPs, those who are Shari‟a cautious might impose some pressures to 
comply with Shari‟a laws.  
 
“It would sure be a plus for a large number of people if you do have a sharia 
compliant product… sure… In our company we won't mind leverage... I can go for 
it… but if my partner refused we won't do it… personally I do invest in hotels which 
serves alcohol and even have a gambling hall, so I don't have a restriction here… our 
retail fund prohibited from investing in F&B that serves alcohol… so it depends on 
the fund because we had two Saudi groups, not all Saudis do, of a majority strictly 
requesting not to get involved with alcohol..” (PE/VC Director). 
 
    Another VC/PE director argued that it is more of a marketing tool to some of the 
funds that are Shari‟a compliant. He added that other than that it has no real impact 
regarding preference for both the investors and the investee companies. He continued 
to argue that it might even has some negative limitations for investee companies to 
borrow from Islamic banks which are most of the times more complicated and more 
expensive. It was noticeable that preference for Islamic tools differed according to the 
personal ideologies and beliefs, which was found to vary across the society. The most 
common answer was VC being Shari‟a compliant would sure add value and will be 
well received by many entrepreneurs. An industry processional indicated: 
 
“I think yes sure… the Islamic part is of an impact, until now in Egypt we tend to do 
the things as God indicates”. 
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     Moreover another industry professional argued that he didn‟t think people in Egypt 
are very much aware of the Shari‟a compliance issues; however it sure would add a 
lot of value if it is well positioned within the framework of the business. The 
preference of equity financing over debt financing for some entrepreneurs might be 
against conventional wisdom. Pecking order of financing indicates that the cheapest 
source of financing is through debt and therefore it should be the first choice for 
entrepreneurs. It could be argued that cultural values and personal beliefs might act 
against the best financial rewarding method. Behavioural finance could be a plausible 
discipline for further understanding of this matter.  
 
7.7 VC Policy Recommendations for Venture Capital in Egypt 
 
 
    There had been efforts by the Egyptian government to promote awareness to 
enhance the VC industry, yet still hadn‟t pay off (OECD, 2010b).  Several initiatives 
were apparent starting from 2004. A report on the application of VC within SME 
sector was published in 2004 (MoF, 2004). Furthermore, a study on simplifying the 
laws and regulations governing SMEs establishment activities, growth, export, and 
dissolving was published in September 2005 (MoF, 2005).  Roundtables between the 
ministry of Finance and international development agencies took place in 2006; they 
were followed by several workshops, seminars and events on the same topic. Among 
the recommendations of this work were to improve the legal and regulatory 
environment, in addition to, provide better training and improve the quality of human 
capital in the industry. Other recommendations included nurturing a VC association; 
ensure a communication channel among VC/PE firms and between them and 
entrepreneurs, recommend potential changes in tax laws as an incentive for R&D and 
investment, consider SME incubators, set numeric goals for the coming five years 
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regarding investment deals number of companies funded and finally work with Cairo 
and Alexandria Stock Exchange (CASE) to pilot list in the new secondary market. Yet 
little is known on what had been implemented due to the closure of the SME unit of 
the MoF in 2010 and the political and economic challenges following the January 
2011 uprisings. However, through interviews with policy makers it was clear that 
there was no follow-up on VC industry enhancement due to the pace of change among 
governments and ministers, and over and above that, the priority of more challenging 
and urgent matters affecting the economy, such as riots and demonstrations as well as 
the increasing budget deficit and escalating internal and external debt among other 
challenges.   
     International development agencies conducted research reports seeing the 
opportunities of a VC industry in the MENA region including Egypt. OECD (2006) 
report on risk capital in MENA region suggested recommendations for the industry‟s 
growth; they are as follows: encourage VC investments in family owned enterprises 
(FOE). Facilitate listing overseas, encourage corporate and individual investors to 
substitute institutional investors through tax or other incentives Encourage business 
incubators to foster innovation. Create technology clusters through universities and 
enterprises. Improve regulatory environments through taxation policies, intellectual 
property and commercial legislation improvement. Encourage foreign VC firms by 
improving FDI environment. And finally, close the financial gap in the different 
stages of ventures.The report concluded that although risk capital in the region is 
highly important to innovative industries; nevertheless it can also play a significant 
role in the financing of enterprises in traditional sectors. 
      Building on previous reports, academic literature, and primary data gathered in 
this research. The following policy recommendations are suggested to enhance the 
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VC industry in Egypt. In addition, it should be well noted that the urgency of 
developing a VC industry in Egypt could yield a short term benefit on decreasing 
unemployment and promote innovation needed for HGEs and their long-term benefit 
on economic growth. 
 
1- Enhance entrepreneurial activities and idea generation among the society through 
government supported national competitions while promoting risk appetite among 
entrepreneurs. Awareness of VC investment and other financial tools should be taken 
into consideration. Furthermore, including women entrepreneurs could help decrease 
the apparent gender gap in Egypt. Highly rewarding entrepreneurs and media 
championing of successful models are much needed for the success of this model. 
Presently, this role is handled by NGOs and business associations with limited 
resources and reach-ability. Thus a national program is much needed for larger 
exposure and impact.   
 
2- Differentiating between HGEs and other entrepreneurial ventures should be well 
identified and addressed. According to an industry professional:  
“The development of the [VC] sector should coincide with the overall objective of the 
country... which is not clear due to the circumstances... So, first there has to be a 
consensus around what direction or priority the government needs to adopt... is it 
growth... is it employment... is it poverty reduction? or is it a blend of all. Whatever 
the vision, the VC will only flourish if it is attached to a clear overall objective... that 
is adopted in the true sense of directing resources to achieve it, and not just a 
statement...”. 
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   HGEs should be well supported as a primary target for VC investments. Realizing 
investment opportunities yielding high returns in different sectors and not necessarily 
IT sector should be well addressed in policy making and resources allocation.   
 
3- To stimulate supply of VC funds, the Egyptian Government should allow pension 
funds to invest in VC activities. Furthermore, create incentives for banks to invest in 
VC funds. On the individuals‟ level, incentives for angel activities and HNWIs 
investing in VC funds to reward risk taking in the form of tax cuts should be applied. 
A regulatory adjustment to differentiate between professional investors to be able to 
supply VC funds is highly needed to relax the prohibition on receiving funds from the 
public.   
 
4- To enhance the capital markets, Egyptian Government should facilitate access to 
NILEX listing. This could be achieved by applying relaxed and favorable conditions 
for SME listing. Further programs to share the cost of listing could support in 
increasing the numbers of SME listing. A secondary market would highly support the 
enhancement of a VC industry.   
 
5- Among the major impediments found was the business environment caused by the 
unfavorable regulatory framework. GoE has to improve the legal environment by 
higher law enforcement, capital gain incentives, minority shares rights, IP rights, 
favorable bankruptcy laws, and tackling corruption. Furthermore, separately 
accommodate VC activities in a new law targeting favorable capital gain tax and 
lenient fundraising activities. Introduce a crowdfunding law to support the 
entrepreneurial funding gap and create an integrated eco-system. 
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6- Give political support and VC awareness by promoting a fund of funds for VC 
investments. This fund will act as a „certification‟ and will provide „legitimacy‟ for 
the VC industry by the government. Successful models of Israeli „Yozma‟ fund 
targeting foreign VC firms and „New Zealand Seed Investment Fund‟ encouraging 
locally based early-stage funds could act as guidelines for successful government 
initiatives enhancing VC industries (Lerner, 2009).     
 
7- Create technology based clusters and capitalize on technology enabled new 
ventures; through possibly an entrepreneurship city with favorable taxes in certain 
areas. Another initiative should include a national business incubators/accelerators 
program focusing on „value chain‟ and other indigenous industry-specific incubators. 
Furthermore, support the private accelerators through tax incentives and a favorable 
legal framework. According to Lerner (2009), there could be more innovation when 
there is more venture capital, not because the venture capital caused the innovation, 
but rather because venture capitalists reacted to a technological shock that was sure to 
lead to more innovation (p.61). Thus creating a technology base could indeed attract 
VC investors whether locally or internationally.  
 
8- Regarding training of VC industry professional, Egyptian Government should 
introduce training programs for VC specialists and certification via EFSA. It should 
support building a VC association to spread favorable norms and ethics among the 
industry. It would also create awareness and assist in the supply of VC professionals. 
 
9- Education was found to be a major hurdle towards entrepreneurship, 
entrepreneurial finance, and VC industry. To Enhance R&D in universities there 
should be an improvement in the research environment. An adequate rewarding 
system should be introduced, and create integration among R&D fund and research 
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centers in universities. Furthermore the education system should introduce 
entrepreneurship education syllabus from early stage and among non-business 
schools, especially science majors.  
 
10- Accommodate and „factor in‟ cultural dimension such as Shari‟a compliance and 
cooperative nature. The conducive normative and cultural factors of the Egyptian 
society should be taken into consideration in all policy recommendations. Moreover, 
building on the growing Islamic finance industry might be of support in the promotion 
of the fund of funds as well as encouraging individual investors to supply funding to 
the industry. The cooperative nature would also support stimulating fundraising if 
managed to increase the risk appetite by further regulatory incentives.     
 
   In general, governments should play a catalytic role to create a jump start and not by 
direct intervention. Boosting demand through entrepreneurship and increasing supply 
by funding and certification eventually creates a „Virtuous Cycle‟ (Lerner, 2009). 
Thus, policy recommendations should integrate three components of entrepreneurial 
finance (financial vehicles, supporting innovative education, in a hospitable legal 
environment) and their institutional complementarities to enhance the PE/VC market 
and support its role in the development of the region‟s economy (Eid, 2006). 
      It was further observed from most of the interviews including financiers, industry 
professional and policy makers that there was an awareness of the need for an 
integrated entrepreneurial ecosystem. Furthermore, there was a need for government 
support to create a healthy environment to foster both entrepreneurship and 
innovation. The most important aspect was to develop an integrated clear programme 
with clearly defined objectives. This programme should include entrepreneurship 
education, stir innovation, create incentives and improve the regulatory barriers, and 
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create a funding programme in the form of a fund of funds to support entrepreneurial 
financiers. There was a consensus that the current government support was 
insufficient on both the financial and non-financial aspects. According to a board 
director of a major business association: 
“The role of the government should be bigger... they have made some initiatives to 
support SMEs... they try to create incentives for banks to finance SMEs but banks 
were reluctant to finance start-ups...” 
   A VC/PE director commented on the non-financial government support and 
indicated that the most problematic part is lack of consistent regulations and strategic 
vision. The majority of industry professionals expressed the need for a single 
governmental body to support and syndicate the current initiative on SMEs and 
entrepreneurship and to create and implement a single strategic vision representing 
the government side. “Egypt is going to have to develop its small and medium-sized 
economies. It needs to become a formal, organized and highly professional chunk of 
the economic pyramid.” (Founder of Cairo Angels: Solovieva, 2012). 
 
   For further illustration on the entrepreneurship ecosystem in the MENA region, 
figure (7.3) shows the development of the different stakeholders affecting the 
ecosystem (Sayed, 2013).  
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Figure (7.3): The Entrepreneurship Ecosystem in the MENA Region 
 
                Source: Sayed (2013): Booz & Company 
 
   There are currently five institutions with considerable roles and responsibilities in 
SMEs and entrepreneurship eco-system in Egypt; SFD, Ministry of Investment, 
Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Higher 
Education and research. However, there is no single body or committee dedicated to 
coordinate all the policy initiatives taking place (OECD, 2010a). “Ambiguities in the 
delegation of responsibility and task assignment pose a risk of policy gaps, overlaps, 
and the duplication of policy measures” (OECD, 2010a).  
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7.8 Accommodating Cultural Difference 
     There was the problem of „importing‟ foreign models regarding entrepreneurship 
and entrepreneurial finance.  An industry professional argued:  
“I believe we should make use of such norms and experiences, learn a lot out it, 
however put it somewhere in the back of his head and then never think of it again; we 
should think with a pure Egyptian mentality! A pure Egyptian mentality! A unique 
setup... totally think as an Egyptian who knows the Egyptian market and how to deal 
with it...”. 
     There was a unique VC firm through the course of this research. This investment 
company had roots since the 1960s in partnering with entrepreneurs and providing 
them with essential capital and technical and managerial assistance. They have 17 
projects under management worth approximately a capital of 100 million Egyptian 
pounds. It is a family run business with 16 employees including family members. 
They have already exited from 6 of their investments, three of which were 
successfully sold to bigger firms and three were a management-buy-in to eliminate 
losses. Until recently exit have not been their primal objective to realise profit, 
however from their previous experiences this has been the major source of their 
capital gain. Those indigenous models should be encouraged, especially that they 
don‟t just target IT investments and argues that traditional industries yields 20-30% 
annually.  
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     An industry professional argued:  
“Here the model needs to change we can't just copy the western model... the western 
model have strong institutions... a strong stock market, banks, and VCs evolving over 
years.. Their culture is different you can drop out education start a venture and be the 
most successful... they rely on consumption and debt... surplus is limited... in our case 
culture is different... we have to put something aside... and you'd be clever to use it... 
buying gold coins or any gold... when you get more you'd by an apartment for the 
kids… we follow wealth accumulation... when a good opportunity arises they're in...”. 
    It was suggested that a government fund of funds that would yield higher averages 
than the banks would be highly appealing to the masses. Accounting for Shari‟a 
compliance would be a supporting factor for both the individuals and Islamic funds. 
Building on the charitable and cooperative nature of the society, highlighting the 
employment effect and economic impact of this fund could be of support. 
Nevertheless, the previous policy recommendation and accommodating the cultural 
distinctiveness of Egypt would support entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial finance, and 
creates opportunities for a vivid VC industry. 
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7.9 Conclusion 
    There VC industry is growing worldwide (Bruton et al., 2005; Wright et al., 2005), 
and the shape of this growth varies across countries (Ooghe et al., 1991; Bruton et al., 
2005). There is a growing interest in VC activities as an economic growth engine in 
the MENA region (Eid, 2006; OECD, 2006). Indeed, the PE/VC industry has been 
growing at a high pace during the past decade in the MENA region (Morales et al., 
2011), and an observable tendency towards early stage VC activities are taking place 
(MEPEA, 2013). Egypt has always been a significant player in the regional PE/VC 
markets; however, the economic and political challenges are affecting the growth of 
the industry. There was found several challenges and opportunities on both the VC-
industry level and firm-level that are shaping its current development. Similar to the 
previous findings on entrepreneurial finance in general, the regulatory framework 
would be considered the major hurdle toward a VC industry. In addition, the 
normative and cognitive dimensions could be guided by further regulatory 
adjustments. However, an overall positive outlook on the normative and cognitive 
level was expected to support the growth of a VC industry. The policy 
recommendations discussed in this chapter are aspired to assist in the growth of the 
VC industry accommodating the cultural and normative dimension of the Egyptian 
society to „factor in‟ such determinants in the light of the current institutional 
determinants.   
“It is definitely evident that Egypt has all the prerequisites to un-leash a huge 
potential with its rich pool of ideas driven by a smart and educated population, 
natural and industrial resources, diversified economy, hundreds of thousands of 
SMEs… All it takes is a collective, focused effort with smart objectives and a 
reforming of mind-sets and regulations…” (PE/VC director). 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
 
8.1 Aims and Key findings 
    The primary purpose of this thesis was to generate a thorough understanding of the 
extant entrepreneurial finance in Egypt. The research explores the major impediments 
and enabling factors shaping its current status. Moreover, it answers why Egypt has 
not been able to develop a venture capital industry as would be expected in 
comparison to the MENA region and other developing countries. In achieving the 
aims of this research, this study had three main objectives.  
     The first objective was to explain the current status of entrepreneurial finance in 
Egypt by mapping the financial alternatives and the institutional determinants shaping 
it. The first research objective was fulfilled through exploring the domain of 
entrepreneurial finance. From previous findings and discussion in this thesis, it was 
apparent that there are many concerns regarding banks‟ support to SMEs in Egypt. 
Moreover, banks were found to be risk averse towards SME banking, albeit the 
regulatory changes by the CBE amendments and the formation of credit guarantees 
and credit rating. On the demand side, SME firms‟ imbedded difficulties in the form 
of scale, lack of collaterals and opacity were among the hurdles to match banking 
requirements. In addition, fear of legal consequences, negative social image, and 
religious preferences were among the reasons why entrepreneurs might be 
apprehensive towards banking finance. The leasing industry was found a significant 
and growing tool and was positively perceived by industry professionals and 
entrepreneurs alike. Shari‟a compliance was among the positive factors towards 
leasing, however, the high involvement of the banking sector in the industry was 
found negative due to the perceived inflexibility in banking selection criteria.  
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    Bootstrapping in the form of personal loans and credit cards was found to be a 
common practice among entrepreneurs in Egypt. Deferred cheques were also common 
in delaying payments and gaining credit from suppliers which was argued by industry 
professional that the extent and significance of deferred cheques in Egypt might be a 
distinctive feature of the Egyptian market.  
    Among a few governmental initiatives, the SFD and Bedaya fund were found to be 
of potential significance. However, the SFD was mostly involved with micro 
enterprises and was criticised for red tapes, low level of technical support, inclined 
towards micro loans, and once more high bank involvement. The SFD was 
strategically getting involved with equity finance while developing its human 
resources. On the equity side, Bedaya fund and the NILEX were found to be in an 
early stage with little impact on the entrepreneurial finance arena in Egypt yet with a 
positive outlook if properly utilised. 
     The informal financing and love money were found reasonably substantial in 
Egypt. In respect of „love money‟ there was a „taken for granted‟ attitude for financial 
family support that would extend beyond direct family members, signalling a 
cooperative behaviour among the society members. Other signs of society cooperation 
were evident, such as the rotational saving and lending „Gami‟a‟ model. It was a well-
established household activity that was applied mostly among small businesses 
signalling another cooperative approach based on trust and close social networks. 
Among other forms of informal financing was partnership as a source of finance and 
not for any other value adding activity.  
    Crowdfunding was also present in Egypt reflecting a globalisation effect and high 
pace of knowledge transfer. In addition, the business angel concept was also found, 
yet different from the habitual model. However, a group of angels recently formed a 
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consortium of angels that was found similar to the western model found in Europe and 
Anglo-Saxon economies.  
    Although HGEs are the most significant to a country‟s economic development and 
the highest contributor to job creation; sufficient funding among other factors is vital 
for their growth (OECD, 2013). However, it remains that potential high growth 
enterprises in Egypt are facing many challenges over and above the challenges facing 
start-ups and entrepreneurial ventures in general. Undoubtedly, insufficient funding is 
among those major challenges.  
 
According to an entrepreneur:  
 
“We [Egypt] might have plenty of courageous entrepreneurs but less educated 
capable entrepreneurs that can really build a company... but those who can scale and 
impact the economy and create jobs, we do have a problem in this category...”. 
 
    Furthermore, the first research question on the main institutional determinants 
shaping entrepreneurial finance in Egypt was answered through identifying the major 
hurdles impeding, and conducive factors supporting, the development of 
entrepreneurial finance in Egypt. 
    Among the obstructive determinants were Poor level of Education, training, and 
entrepreneurship education. The importance of entrepreneurship education is clearly 
evident (Kirby, 2004) and it was considered by most interviewees to be a major 
obstacle towards entrepreneurship in general and subsequently entrepreneurial 
finance. Lack of professional associations and westernised influence was also found 
to be another obstructive determinant. Westernisation was taking place among the 
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whole society (Amin, 2000) and it was no surprise to affect the entrepreneurial 
finance domain causing difficulties to accommodate cultural differences. 
Furthermore, it was found that there was an abundant family owned enterprises which 
lead to lack of corporate governance. This was perceived as a major obstacle by 
financiers to fund potential ventures. Among the cultural barriers, there was a weak 
legitimacy towards entrepreneurship career which also hindered entrepreneurial 
activities. In addition, low level of innovation was clearly evident. According to 
Xavier et al. (2013), R&D and innovation are vital for entrepreneurship and economic 
growth. From a regulatory perspective, the business environment in Egypt was 
unfavourable and cumbersome with weak rule of law, similar to the findings of 
McMullen et al. (2008) and Li and Zahra (2012) as hindering aspect towards 
entrepreneurship. Moreover, an unsupportive bankruptcy law was another clear hurdle 
towards entrepreneurship in Egypt. The role of bankruptcy on entrepreneurial activity 
is evident in the work of Armour and Cummings (2006). Moreover, there were no 
laws governing entrepreneurial finance (VC, crowdfunding, Angel investment), nor 
were there any privileges or tax exemptions for their funding. Another regulatory 
obstructive factor was the inefficient intellectual property rights laws and protection.             
         On the other hand there were conducive factors that supported the development 
of entrepreneurial finance in Egypt. There was a positive perception towards 
entrepreneurship and the society valued a successful entrepreneur. Another conducive 
factor was the viability of informal networks compensating lack of formal ones, 
similar to the findings of (Peng and Zhou, 2005); nevertheless heavy reliance might 
inhibit business transactions (Peng, 2003). In addition, there was a notable presence of 
indigenous developmental organisations supporting the domain of entrepreneurship 
and entrepreneurial finance. Furthermore, the Islamic finance influence supporting 
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risk taking and equity financial tools was found an influential factor supporting equity 
financial vehicles funding entrepreneurial ventures. Another Islamic and cultural 
conducive aspect was found to be the charitable practices induced by Islamic and 
cultural behaviour within the Egyptian society. Among the cognitive conducive forces 
was the bottom-up problem solving behaviour supported by the findings of Schroeder 
(2013). This behaviour supported the presence of many indigenous feasible ideas that 
were capable of solving deeply rooted problems among the society. From a regulatory 
perspective, there were clear efforts on restructuring and development of the financial 
sector by the Government of Egypt, and observable attempts on creating a favourable 
ICT infrastructure. 
     Regarding the second objective of the research, it was to understand the 
development of the venture capital industry, through the surrounding institutional 
factors affecting its growth. The second objective was fulfilled through exploring 
prospects of development of a venture capital industry in Egypt. Using an institutional 
theory lens, factors supporting the VC industry were similar to the factors affecting 
entrepreneurial finance in general earlier explored such as the positive perception of 
entrepreneurship, informal networks substituting the formal, Islamic Shari‟a 
compliance, and cooperative and charitable nature of the society. However some 
specific factors were found conducive to the development of a VC industry, such as 
relative development of financial sector and relative depth of capital markets, which 
was found in line with the findings of Jeng and Wells (2000) to be more supportive to 
PE activities than early stage VC. However, they remain an important pillar for the 
development of VC industries worldwide.  
     Regarding inhibiting factors towards a VC industry in Egypt, was lack of a VC 
association and a clear shortage of VC industry specialists. Other general aspects 
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affecting entrepreneurial finance in general as well as a VC industry was lack of 
innovation and insufficient education. The regulatory dimension was found to be 
particularly inhibiting the development of a vivid VC industry in Egypt. The 
cumbersome bankruptcy laws and no capital gain preference, supported by the 
findings of Gompers et al. (1998) are crucial determinants for success of VC 
industries worldwide. Over and above, there were no incentives or rewards for risk 
investors and insufficient R&D support. Lack of such policies and governmental 
initiatives are once more a clear hurdle for countries considering developing a VC 
industry. Similar to the previous findings on entrepreneurial finance in general, the 
regulatory framework was considered the major hurdle toward a VC industry. In 
addition, the normative and cognitive dimensions could be guided by further 
regulatory adjustments. However, an overall positive outlook on the normative and 
cognitive level was expected to support the growth of a VC industry.  
     The third objective was to develop policy recommendations for an Egyptian 
venture capital model that would better fit the case of Egypt in the light of the current 
institutional forces. According to Lerner (2009), several efforts took place around the 
world unsuccessfully trying to imitate the US Silicon Valley model. It is vital to 
understand the unique circumstances and requirements of each nation to promote 
entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial finance. However, it remains a strong case to 
confirm to global standards to be able to attract international entrepreneurs and VC 
investors (Lerner, 2009). This research objective, for the case of Egypt, was fulfilled 
through ten policy recommendations elaborated in section (7.7), in summary, 1- 
Enhance entrepreneurial activities and idea generation. 2- Differentiating between 
HGEs and other entrepreneurial ventures should be well identified and addressed. 3- 
Stimulate supply of VC funds. 4- To enhance the capital markets. 5- Improve the 
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regulatory framework. 6- Give political support and VC awareness by promoting a 
fund of funds for VC investments. 7- Create technology based clusters and capitalize 
on technology enabled new ventures. 8- Introduce training programs for VC 
specialists and certification via EFSA and support building a VC association. 9- 
Enhance R&D in universities and introduce entrepreneurship education syllabus from 
early stage education. 10- Accommodate and „factor in‟ cultural dimension such as 
Shari‟a compliance and cooperative nature. It should be well noted that implementing 
such recommendations is a long process. Moreover, all these recommendations are 
intertwined and interdependent. According to Scott (2002), the regulatory 
determinants are the easiest to change and most observed. Thus such 
recommendations should commence with regulatory changes on the short run and 
then further objectives, whether educational, training, or cultural should be 
incentivized and eventually assessed on the medium term. The whole set of 
recommendations is an ongoing, long process and a direction for enhancing 
entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial finance.  
   Thereby, the three objectives of the research are fulfilled in the finding and 
discussion of this research. The following section summarises the discussion of these 
findings and objectives. 
    It is worth mentioning that during the recent socio-political changes that have taken 
and are taking place in Egypt and some governmental efforts over the preceding 
decade, many changes have taken place in the domain of entrepreneurial finance. The 
more dramatic changes that occurred post the 25
th
 of January revolution enhanced 
such changes, entrepreneurial finance and entrepreneurship in general experienced 
unprecedented attention. After researching the available financial tools and supporting 
activities, it was found that many interested organisations, associations, and 
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individuals have shown a high level of interest in entrepreneurship domain. During 
the years of the course of this research between 2008 and 2013, it was clear that the 
post revolution period was the most dynamic and showed a significant momentum 
towards entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial finance. The period post-revolution 
witnessed the creation of several business incubators/accelerators, electronic 
platforms, media materials, crowdfunding, organised business angels‟ efforts, and 
dedicated VC firms. Moreover, developmental SME financing companies as well as 
SMEs specific leasing companies were established. All of which have the potential to 
help in the development of a thriving entrepreneurial eco-system.  
     However, there was a setback in the demand side, not that there is insufficient 
demand, but that there is a mismatch of demand and supply in regard to 
entrepreneurial finance. Lack of innovativeness and the relatively small number of 
high growth enterprises is inhibiting the flow of venture capital that might exist in 
regional and international markets. The opportunity of utilising Islamic tools 
alongside the appetite for risk and entrepreneurship tendencies exists, yet to find good 
opportunities was the real challenge. Nevertheless, with new technologies and the 
current momentum in Egypt and the whole region there is a potential for the current 
environment to improve. 
    A major challenge was to attract investments towards the venture capital industry 
and enhance the supply of capital to high growth enterprises. Building on success 
stories and creating industry champions would be of support and would increase the 
appetite of investors in venture capital. On the policy level, there is a pressing and 
urgent need to have a synchronised programme to capture and arrange all the 
programmes, initiatives, and efforts exerted on entrepreneurship in Egypt. Such 
programme should include an entrepreneurial finance and VC initiative in the form of 
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a fund of funds to work simultaneously on the supply and demand side of venture 
capital. At the moment, many developmental agencies are aware of the opportunity 
and necessity of a venture capital industry in Egypt, however, the industry will not 
grow without the involvement of institutional investors, HNWIs, family offices, 
international and regional VC firms. One of the main impediments is regulatory 
issues; there is an urgent need to facilitate laws and regulations to start-ups, ease of 
taxations, labour laws, social insurance, and other cumbersome licences and 
permissions. Over and above a full revision of bankruptcy laws and their legal 
consequences is paramount to decrease the fear of failure towards entrepreneurship. 
The financial regulations need to be altered to accommodate a favourable venture 
capital fund setup and fund management companies with a specific notice to capital 
gain taxes and other protections needed by VCs to operate such as minority shares 
rights.  
    There is a shortage of innovative start-ups in the region, however, high innovation 
is not a prerequisite for start-ups, technology enabled ventures have proven to solve 
indigenous chronic problems in Egypt and were successful on financial returns. Thus 
remains, an Islamic VC fund with a charitable drive might help to close the gap of 
entrepreneurial finance in Egypt and other MENA countries. It can be a start for a VC 
localised model in the region and a start for an aspired integration between the 
resource rich countries and resource scarce yet with an educated growing population. 
Nevertheless, a sustainable and profitable model should be the primary objective of 
the suggested funds and the social impact should be a supporting feature. 
    Finally, the distinctive Islamic component of the region and Egypt can surely play a 
significant role in promoting a VC industry. The fact that venture capital naturally 
complies with the Shari‟a law; in addition to the charitable dimension along the 
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interest free notion can be decisive aspects in the establishment of the industry. 
Building on the magnitude of capital dedicated to Islamic financial tools and directing 
it towards a VC industry might also have a social impact on the region‟s societies, and 
thus could be considered within the scope of social responsibilities of Islamic funds. 
Such Islamic funds are capable of helping the staggering number of unemployed 
youth in the region and will have an economic value and feasible financial returns. 
  
8.2 Further Implications for Theory and Practice 
    The theoretical implications of this research directly contribute to the work on 
institutional theory and its usage. It adds to the literature utilising the theory in 
industry analysis in emerging economies and especially entrepreneurship and the VC 
industry. In addition, it enhances the literature of entrepreneurial finance and 
entrepreneurship in general. On the practitioners‟ level, it seeks to assist investment 
decisions of entrepreneurial financiers and entrepreneurs operating in Egypt, whether 
local, regional, or international. Through identifying the major sources for 
entrepreneurial finance as well as the cultural and normative determinants in Egypt, it 
is believed that it supports decision making for market entrants regarding 
entrepreneurial financiers. Moreover, it recommends policy changes to improve the 
current entrepreneurial finance environment and enhance the emergence of the VC 
industry and consequently promote entrepreneurship and innovation in Egypt. 
    Using institutional theory as the lens for analysis was found highly beneficial in 
assessing the effect of the institutional forces on the development of the VC industry 
and on the investment decisions of the present venture capitalists in Egypt. Further 
theoretical utilisation was found to be resource dependency theory in the case of 
investment companies competing for resources (Funds). To be able to survive through 
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management fees and capital gains, they tended to be more generalist and 
„opportunistic‟, hence follow the appetite of investors more than their own strategy or 
focus. Investment companies were fragile and dependant on the HNWIs behaviour 
and preference, where VCs found difficulties in acquiring such resources. The 
findings of the research would agree with the suggestions of Wright et al. (2005b) on 
using institutional perspectives along with the resource based view for a better 
understanding of the behaviour of VCs across countries.  
    Furthermore regarding theoretical implications, was the preference of equity 
financing over debt financing for some entrepreneurs. This appears to contradict 
conventional financial wisdom and Pecking order of financing. A pecking order 
indicates that the cheapest source of financing is through debt and therefore it should 
be the first choice for entrepreneurs. In the findings of this research, a sound 
preposition would argue that cultural values and personal beliefs might act against the 
best financial rewarding method. Hence, behavioural finance could be a plausible 
discipline for further understanding of this matter. 
 
8.3 Contribution of the Research  
    Although there is a growing literature on entrepreneurial finance and the worldwide 
VC expansion and VC behaviour in emerging economies, it is apparent that many 
regions in the world are still under researched. There is 'virtually' no research on VC in 
Africa, Latin America and Oceania (Bruton, Fried and Manigart, 2005). Also, there is 
sparse academic literature on the MENA region concerning entrepreneurial finance or 
venture capital. Hence, there is a gap in academic literature for the concerns of 
entrepreneurial finance and VC/PE industry in the MENA region in general and 
entrepreneurial finance and the VC industry in Egypt in particular. As little is known 
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on entrepreneurial finance in the Africa and the MENA region, this research 
contributes to knowledge of entrepreneurial finance and venture capital in those 
regions through the case of Egypt. This study generated an understanding of the 
current situation of the VC industry and its environment in Egypt, as an integral part of 
the MENA region. The thesis examined its growth while relating to the literature on 
developed VC markets. Moreover, it explains the growth pattern of the industry; what 
is inhibiting the industry‟s development and what can be done to enhance its growth 
pace. The grounded theory approach in data gathering, through combining the primary 
data via interviews and participant observations with the secondary data, is believed to 
have created both the depth in knowledge concerning entrepreneurial finance and the 
VC industry and the breadth needed to comprehend the whole topic. The researcher 
being „grounded‟ to the data through observations and interviews with entrepreneurs 
and entrepreneurial financiers initiated a bottom up approach. This approach enabled 
in depth understanding of the why questions behind the observations. Combining the 
primary data and secondary data enabled triangulation of the findings for further 
validation. Moreover, triangulation among the multiple informants of the data gave 
further validation.  
    In addition, this thesis partly captured the Egyptian entrepreneurial environment 
during and after the January 25
th
 revolution in 2011 where the socio-economic and 
political environment in Egypt was heavily influential. This thesis might well be 
amongst the early academic researches undertaken in Egypt as well as the Arab 
MENA region focusing on early stage entrepreneurial finance and venture capital. 
Moreover, the thesis utilises secondary data through GEM reports and the recently 
formed PE and VC regional associations which was of valuable addition to this 
research. Those reports were not available to prior studies on the region, hence giving 
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helpful insights on entrepreneurship and VC industry in Egypt and the MENA region. 
Although the data was not gathered for scientific research, they still remained of value 
for facts and figures and for validating the findings. 
 
8.4 Research Limitations 
    Limitations of the study were in the nature of the VC industry in Egypt as well as 
most developing countries. The data opacity, newness of the industry, and the small 
sample of the population restricted the data gathering away from running rigorous 
statistical analysis to assess the development, performance, and behaviour of the VC 
industry in Egypt. Another limitation would be the case specific nature of this study, 
although the MENA region has lots of common characteristics; however, 
heterogeneity amid some of the countries was quite obvious. Consequently, the results 
from this study can neither be generalised on countries of the MENA region nor any 
other developing country. In addition, the timeframe of this study is another limitation 
for the ongoing and dynamic process of change in the industry, as well as the slow 
nature of institutional changes that were captured over the time of the research. Over 
and above, this research was made partly before the January uprising in 2011 and 
partly after that until the end of 2013. The political and socioeconomic nature of this 
period is to a great extent unique, consequently the volatility of the Egyptian situation 
was far beyond capturing completely. Therefore, some of the results of this study 
reflect the outcome of the data that are collected in these specific years and thus once 
more cannot be generalised for the country or the region at all times. This study is 
intended to serve as a guideline for entrepreneurial finance and VC in Egypt, as part of 
the MENA region and as a developing country, to identify the strength and 
weaknesses affecting its growth and set the course for its development. Thus this 
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research should remain „generalisable‟ within the scope of time and place of the study 
and not beyond it. Therefore, the limitations earlier discussed do not affect its core 
objectives and the research should remain of value to both theory and practice.  
 
8.5 Direction for Future Research 
    During the course of this study, several topics were covered regarding 
entrepreneurial finance. More depth on some of these topics is suggested to be 
beneficial for future research. The apparent gender gap towards entrepreneurship in 
the MENA region and specifically in Egypt needs further understanding from a 
cultural perspective. There has been the work by Hattab (2012) on the gender gap, 
however further research is believed to be needed for more understanding. The topic 
on the informal angle financing although needs a more in-depth study. The amount of 
„love money‟ would be a good start for exploring this domain.  The topic of business 
angels was covered on in the GEM report (Hattab, 2008), yet remains an under 
researched area on entrepreneurial finance in Egypt. The profile and motivation of 
business angels are among the topics that need such clarification, especially in the 
light of no tax incentives rewarding such behaviour. Regarding SME finance and 
capital structure preferences, study of a larger sample of SMEs for further 
understanding of their preferences and the reasons for such preferences. The impact of 
Islamic finance influence on external finance choices of entrepreneurs could be 
another study for future research. Regarding the VC industry, a future longitudinal 
empirical analysis on the effect of the regulatory framework such as corruption and 
tax policies on entrepreneurial activities and VC industry in Egypt could be of benefit 
to assess the development, if any, on promoting a VC industry in Egypt. 
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        This research took place during highly turbulent time in the history of Egypt. 
However it turned to be highly interesting to the researcher to be able to capture such 
unique circumstances. Although the turmoil might have caused several challenges, yet 
the highly dynamic environment enriched the findings of this thesis. If the researcher 
was to take this work again, it could have been beneficial to focus more on the 
demand side of capital (entrepreneurs). The cultural aspect was of specific interest to 
this research, which was found apparent and reflective in entrepreneurs rather than 
financiers, policy makers, and industry professionals. Furthermore, the sample of 
entrepreneurs was illimitable and more accessible contrary to entrepreneurial 
financiers and policy makers. In addition, a mixed method of quantitative and 
qualitative could have supported some of the findings, specifically the preference of 
capital structure and the effect of Shari‟a on entrepreneurs‟ choice of sources of 
funding. A larger sample with gathered via questionnaires could have supported such 
findings. However, the value of a qualitative approach remained to be paramount and 
indispensable to this research and possibly for further research covering cultural and 
cognitive aspects in regards of entrepreneurship in general and entrepreneurial finance 
research in specific. 
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Appendix A 
Interviews’ Questions: Venture Capital in Egypt 
 
Market Level: 
1. How would you define the nature of your business? i.e. Private Equity or Venture 
Capital. 
2. From your point of view, what are the major differences and similarities between the 
two?  
3. What is the current position of the VC industry “in its broader definition” in Egypt? 
4. What is the impact of the industry on the Egyptian economy? 
5.  How do you perceive its development compared to MENA region and other 
developed markets? 
6. If any, what are the current factors affecting its growth? How would you rate them? 
7. If any, what are the major challenges facing the industry? How would you rate such 
challenges? 
8. What would you suggest to improve the VC environment? 
9. In particular to early stage investments, how do you describe the current market 
position? 
10. What are the obstacles facing early stage investment? How can they be approached? 
Firm Level: 
1. What is the current strategy of your firm? (regarding stage, size, and sector of 
investment) 
2. What is the rationale behind your strategy? 
3. Why or why not do you consider early stage investments? 
4. How do you assess the inflow of capital? What are the major sources of funding? 
5. What is the relationship between the fund investors and your firm? (compensation 
and restrictions) 
6. How do you assess the pipeline of new ventures? Do you find this problematic? 
7. What are the main sources of new ventures? 
8. What are the main screening methods? 
9. What are the main valuation methods? 
10. Do you consider syndication with other firms? Why? 
11. What is the level of involvement with investee companies? (hands-on/off, time 
allocated, and geographical closeness) 
12. What are your main value-adding activities?  How would you rate them? 
13. What are the main covenant issues? ( staged financing, preferred/convertible shares, 
anti-dilution, majority position, board seats, rights to sell) 
14. What is your main exit strategy? What are the problems that you face in exit? 
15. What policies would you suggest will improve your company‟s performance? 
16. What are the regulatory concepts that you find most problematic? 
17. What is the impact of Shari‟a on the whole cycle of investment? 
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Policy Level: 
1. Where does the VC industry fit in the business development agenda of the 
government of Egypt? 
2. What are the major impediments that are hindering the industry? 
3. What are the current changes that will enhance its development? 
4. What are the current regulations to set up a VC fund and firm management? How 
adequate are they in the light of international standards?  
5. Regarding taxation policies, is there any change in the current policies that will 
impact the industry? (especially capital gain tax and early stage ventures‟ 
exemptions)  
6. What are the current initiatives to promote the industry? 
7. What are the actions taken in the process of commercial law enforcement and 
intellectual property rights? 
8. What are the current initiatives to promote entrepreneurship in general? 
Entrepreneurs: 
1. Are you familiar with the concepts of venture capital? 
2. Do you consider it as an option for your growth strategy? Why and why not? 
3. What can be changed to make you consider VC funding? 
4. What other sources of funding would you prefer? 
5. Does the fact that it is Shari‟a compliant affect your decision? 
VC backed Entrepreneurs: 
1. How did you know of your current VC investor? 
2. How did the investment process take place? 
3. What are the major challenges that faced you? And how did you resolve 
disagreement issues with the VC firm? 
4. What is your level of decision making? 
5. To what extent is the control of the VC firm exercised? How comfortable are you 
with it? 
6. Overall do you find it a feasible experience? 
7. If you had that chance to do it again will you still choose VCs as your partners? Do 
you consider repeating the same experience with a new venture? 
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Appendix B 
Transcriptions Sample 
 
Part of Interview VC/PE (2): 
 
 I prefer the SMEs definition used by the Nilex, it is the most convenient. There are actually 
many criteria for such a definition and I personally see it as a waste of time. Some suggest it is 
according to no. of employees which is actually ridiculous. Some company have a team of 
seven and they manage billions of assets such as PE firms. Also the turnover is not sufficient 
as some companies have a paid in capital of 5 million and a turnover of 100, 200 or even 300 
million with a very slim margin of 2 or 3%. I am convinced that the paid in capital is the most 
relevant. It is not really a condition for us to have a certain size to work with, it is more of a 
mix of paid in capital and turnover so our limit will be a max of paid in capital 100 million 
and a turnover of 300 to 400 million which makes it a medium size and not a large company 
regardless of the profitability. 
 
 The way I‟m seeing things are different if we focus after the January revolution, the past three 
years, or the past five years. PEs in Egypt are, from my point of view, dead. Or we can say 
stuck, the multiples were high prior to the revolution and the transactions were valued on such 
high multiples. It was more like the real estate market, no one wants to realise the real value 
and the buyers don‟t want to realise any losses. This caused stagnation in the market and thus 
there was almost no transactions taking place during the last three years. Especially after the 
financial crisis as one used to hear about 1 or 2 transactions by max. I see the opportunity in 
both PEs and VCs catering SMEs, yet there should be a certain formula to be developed for 
catering such business which is different than the one for midcaps, it has to be adjusted to be a 
win-win and becomes profitable to the investor. I have a certain belief that the SMEs and not 
micro can be a source of huge money, as it is much easier to help and help to grow the 
entrepreneurs and family businesses.  
 
 Value can be created by adjusting organisational charts and applying corporate governance, 
proper financial restructuring and proper management. However applying corporate 
governance itself will be of great value, yet one of the main challenges you‟ll find is that 
entrepreneurs and business owners usually handles the financial and sales activities 
themselves. Therefore applying corporate governance in itself in SMEs can be found 
problematic.  This hinders the growth although the great potential and its need to grow. The 
age bracket of such entrepreneurs is between 30 till 45 where he struggles to grow using 
consultants and seeks all support. 
 
 External factors that do not support the SMEs environment are regulations, taxations, and 
surprisingly the understanding of the different bodies that are claiming they are supporting 
SMEs do not understand SMEs. I personally believe there should stem from a single body or 
an authority. 
 
 The financing tools are the main issue; the banks for instance still don‟t want to finance SMEs 
as it really should. Usually the effort needed for financing SMEs are larger than the efforts for 
large companies, they need supervision, and thorough support. I see that leasing companies 
are handling SMEs in a much better way, and they have gone a long and successful way 
compared to banks and PEs. The PEs are actually tragic in regards to SMEs, they are all white 
collars and they don‟t want to really understand the needs of entrepreneurs, it‟s not private 
equity! It‟s more of a business development issue. One needs to be a hunter, the investor 
should be capable of that, and one can‟t perceive this as portfolio management. There is a 
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distinction between PE, VC and business angels, yet angel investors could usually play the 
role of VCs therefore there should be separate funds for both of them.  
 
 There are norms for such industries. Such norms can be applicable in Europe and the states, 
maybe the Eastern European experience could be of some relevance to us, maybe the Gulf 
region as well. I believe we should make use of such norms and experiences, learn a lot out it, 
however put it somewhere in the back of his head and then never think of it again; we should 
think with a pure Egyptian mentality! A pure Egyptian mentality! A unique setup, totally think 
as an Egyptian who knows the Egyptian market and how to deal with it.  
 
 There are many criteria from a VC perspective, first is the industry and here we have many 
common factors with the international perspective to different industries and their profit 
margins. Second is the regulatory system, it is a very serious issue and here you need to think 
with a local‟s mentality. The whole covenants issues here in Egypt are inapplicable; usually 
you need to manoeuvre by creating an SPV that is governed by a more efficient regulatory 
system. Third is the taxation systems, you also need to create novel solutions to overcome 
capital gain taxes issues. Such issues can be overcome by an Egyptian tax expert. Someone 
with an Egyptian exposure that knows his way around and not a person from the international 
companies. Here as well the localisation of such knowledge is highly important.  
 
 
Part of interview VC/PE (4): 
 
 
 The world structure of LP/GP is not in the egyptian law.. And this is why we resort to 
offshore, we establish the GP offshore however we can establish the fund in Egypt and this 
what we did.. we do this in the form of regular stock joint companies.. for instance we made a 
retail fund, it was a company under law 159 specially that in retail we need import permits and 
thus it had to be an egyptian owned company.. and according to the law it's permitted that I 
invest in other companies that work in the same field.. So mostly we addapt to the requiremets 
of the fund we work with.. 
 
 We are longterm investors, in general, our exit ranged from 7 to 12 years, sometimes earlier 
but in capital we are in the housing company for the fourth year now.. and we're not planning 
to exit now.. we still see we can develop.. we have a different approach than many pe in the 
region.. we get really involved and very close to the management of the company.. yes we 
would consider ourselves  hands-on.. our major investor is a businessman.. he's an ex 
industrialist, he's not a banker you know what I mean.. He's one of the Shareholders long time 
ago and has different investmenst.. His family have diversified investments.. when they totally 
divested.. he created the private equity firm.. they sold stakes gradually till he totally divested 
a year ago.. and he focused on the pe business.. totally devoted.. by his nature he's hands-on 
and operational.. he understands operations.. we prefer to have a role.. there must be a value 
add I offer, it's not only money.. I have to bring something to the table.. 
 
 I do it and I'm not a saint.. I focus on exit.. specially smes they are used on a certain pace.. It 
takes me time.. I have to start with this so he gets used to it.. so when I exit the company 
would be well structured have a system.. even if it's publicly listed it would be ready.. Deal 
sourcing is done throughh many ways.. one is through referals with current investment banks 
and boutiques.. we have some sort of agreement with some of them.. with the midcap funds 
because they're all istitutions they asked to make a contract with one or two.. one was a bank 
who is also a share holder and the other is an investment botique who is also an adviser of the 
fund.. they both get us referals.. we also go and screen ourselves and approach by ourself.. 
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depending on the criteria of the fund.. we have someone who is dedicated for this job.. yet we 
all do that.. me as a partner as well as the other partner 3/4 of our time we do business 
development.. between business development and monitoring our investment.. investment 
directors are responsible for 2 or 3 investments maximum.. he follows up with the 
managament he governs.. he can also be a board member.. we choose who are capable of 
being board members who are not we try to develop him to be a board member at one point in 
time.. we can't be board members in all.. we (partners) can be board members, they 
(investment directors) can be board members, sometime it's both depending on the board 
representation.. Trust is the base, it's the most importanat thing we do..  
 
 We were burnt at some times.. we made it a point that this is a partnership.. I know we're there 
for sometime and we'll exit.. but at the end it is a partnership.. if there is no chemistry forget 
it.. even if it will profit me 200 million pounds! we entered in an investment lately and we 
didn't complete 4 months.. very soon there was foul play and problems.. and we took it to a 
legal dispute.. it was solved by metigation and settlement.. but why did it happen, it was a 
misjudgement.. we couldn't cooperate with this partner.. it came against our expectations.. we 
really take good care that the management or partner there is chemistry and understanding we 
take sometimes a long time to know him  and letting him know us.. how we deal with things 
how we think all this is very important.. from our experiences the most important factor that 
makes an investment successful is the partner, it's not the performance or the market.. if you 
get a long with your partner and we understood eachother well and we started to respond well 
it goes well.. we have problems, ups and downs.. you can do all agreements in the contract 
and still you can go bust.. with other partners you can ignore all this and it flies.. It can apply 
on our investors too but it is not a personal thing it's more of comfort.. there is something 
called an investment club.. I have a group of investors that I always deal with and those are 
what investments rotate around.. The biggest source of investors are from high net worth 
individuals it's like a 60 to 70% of HNWI to a 30to 40% institutional investors..  
 
 I know this might be specific to the region.. it is because you don't have a strong institutional 
investor.. banks are there but they don't enter.. In the region only Egypt would have a proper 
pension fund and they are not entitled to invest in such vehicles.. The GCC have soveriegn 
funds and they would invest with us.. yet their participation is not really high.. uptill now we 
don't have any.. we do on the level of investment banking, brokerage and funds.... we have 
nothing to do with that.. we are totally seperated, only joined by the name.. they only own 2 or 
3 %.. we have many HNWI in the GCC, plenty.. Saudis, Emaratis, Kuwaitis, Qataris, and 
Egypt.. but HNWI in Egypt are not many.. or those who would invest.. they are many in 
general as a number but they invest in their own businesses.. They would mostly do something 
themselves with their own minset.. they won't give their money to someone else to invest to 
play it with his mindset… 
 
